31 October 2026 - 21:36
Iran's influence network in Africa; from economic diplomacy to religious and security ties

In a report, Al Jazeera wrote that Iran, to expand its influence in Africa, has not relied solely on religious ties and ideological slogans but has employed a set of economic, developmental, diplomatic, and security tools.

AhlulBayt News Agency (ABNA): When the martyred Ayatollah Sayed Ebrahim Raisi, the late president of the Islamic Republic of Iran, stood alongside his Kenyan counterpart William Ruto in the city of Nairobi, the capital of Kenya, on July 12, 2023, Ruto described Tehran as an important strategic partner and expressed hope that the two countries' trade balance would improve with increased exports of Kenyan tea, meat, and agricultural products to the Iranian market. He also expressed a desire for Kenya to benefit from Iran's experiences and support in the health and blue economy sectors, especially fisheries.

According to a report by Al Jazeera network, Kenya was the first stop of the martyred Raisi's African trip, a trip that also included Uganda and Zimbabwe. After returning to Tehran, the martyred Raisi spoke about the results of this trip in terms that were distant from the discourse of his African hosts, as he placed the expansion of Iran's strategic depth at the top of the trip's goals.

While Nairobi presented this trip from the perspective of expected economic interests, Tehran presented it to its domestic audience as the natural extension of the message of the Islamic Revolution. The martyred Raisi said that Iran has established good relations with many countries of the world, especially African countries. Because the nations of this continent have seen faith, anti-colonial spirit, and courage in the people and the Islamic Revolution of Iran.

Thus, Africa in the discourse of the Islamic Republic of Iran appeared not as an emerging market or a trade partner, but as a political and ideological space in which concepts such as the oppressed and resistance against Western domination can have wide reflection.

Between text and action

Behind the gap between the tea discourse that Kenya raised and the strategic depth discourse that the Islamic Republic of Iran emphasized lie two principles of Iran's constitution that shape the country's foreign policy.

The constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran does not view international relations solely based on interests but divides the world morally and politically into two categories: arrogant forces and oppressed nations. Article 152 emphasizes the rejection of submission to hegemonic powers, and Article 154 emphasizes the Islamic Republic of Iran's support for the struggle of the oppressed to achieve their rights.

However, this same article also sets a clear limitation, which is complete refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of other countries. This means that the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran simultaneously speaks of supporting oppressed nations and movements and recognizes the commitment to respect the sovereignty of countries.

Therefore, this law does not provide an unlimited license for exporting the revolution and theoretically places this goal within the framework of declared legal and political restrictions.

However, this balance, when crossing from text to the realm of action, leaves a wide space for interpretation. Here the question arises as to what counts as support for the oppressed, what the precise definition of these groups is, and where this support ends and interference begins.

In practice, the answer to these questions has not always been constant and has not remained separate from the national security calculations of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The path of Iran's foreign policy shows a continuous overlap between the revolutionary heritage on the one hand and the necessities of the system's survival, deterrence against rivals, protection of allies, and expansion of Tehran's scope of maneuver on the other. Meanwhile, the security institutions of the Islamic Republic of Iran, especially the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, have had an important influence in determining how these general principles are turned into concrete policies.

This issue is evident in regional arenas such as Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen. Where Tehran has not set aside its doctrinal language to explain its presence, but this presence in reality is linked to practical calculations related to security, preserving allies, and lines of influence.

Hence, field realities have created a kind of interpretive flexibility in the implementation of the two constitutional principles. A flexibility that is closer to pragmatism than to literal and rigid adherence.

This flexibility becomes more evident when examining Iran's relations with African countries. Because these countries are environments different from the traditional arenas of Iran's presence in the Middle East.

Tehran has not always used a single tool. Because direct promotion of the revolutionary model or establishing relations based on ideological proximity has not been the key to opening all doors of the African continent. Therefore, Iran has taken a set of tools. From revolutionary discourse, political solidarity, and doctrinal commonalities to economic cooperation, agricultural and developmental projects, and even security and military relations when possible.

Eric Lob, an American researcher, has monitored part of this process in examining Iran's policies in Africa. He notes that Tehran has found agricultural and rural development projects in several African countries to be a more effective solution for creating influence. Because developmental tools have shown a greater ability to serve Iran's strategic interests compared to direct revolutionary discourse.

"Jihad of Construction"; an arm compatible with the environment and interests

This pragmatic dimension is evident in the experience of the Jihad of Construction. An organization established a few months after the victory of the Islamic Revolution of Iran with the aim of developing Iran's rural areas.

This institution became a ministry in 1983 in the middle of the imposed war and took on a logistical and prominent role during this war. Its activities also expanded to Africa from the mid-1980s and, by using agricultural development projects, health services, and vocational training, created political and commercial channels and presented Iran as a helping country.

According to Eric Lob, this organization did not use a single tool in all arenas. Its activity in Africa was more technical and developmental in nature. An approach that provided the possibility of access to Sunni or non-Muslim communities without provoking the sensitivity of local governments.

In contrast, the branch of the Jihad of Construction affiliated with Lebanon's Hezbollah had a more overtly religious nature and combined health centers with the construction of mosques, Husseiniyas, and religious schools. This difference shows Tehran's ability to adapt its tools to the characteristics of the local environment.

Moreover, these projects were not gratuitous aid but brought specific benefits for Iran.

In 2017, the Ministry of Agricultural Jihad — the new name of the Jihad of Construction after its merger into the Ministry of Agriculture in 2001 — was able to allocate about 6,000 hectares of land in Ghana for Iran's agricultural projects. This action was carried out within the framework of the extraterritorial agricultural policy. A policy through which Iran sought to compensate for its water and land shortages and produce agricultural products for the domestic market or export.

In return, Tehran proposed projects to transfer water to the city of Accra, the capital of Ghana, build a cement factory, and establish a tractor production line.

Thus, Ghana gained infrastructure and industrial capacity, and Iran gained land, agricultural products, investment and export opportunities, and alongside them, credibility in the field of diplomatic influence. This process is consistent with Eric Lob's analysis of these activities as a tool serving Iran's interests rather than merely a commercial or solidarity-seeking activity.

In Tanzania, cooperation focused on the fisheries sector. Based on a memorandum of understanding signed in July 2018, Iranian fishing vessels were allowed to operate in Tanzanian waters. In return, Iran exported its boats, equipment, and technologies and provided experience and technical training to this country.

Thus, Tanzania gained tools for developing the fisheries sector, and Iran gained access to new marine resources and a market for its equipment and technical services.

In Senegal as well, Iranian institutions held workshops for teaching electrical wiring and plumbing in areas facing significant urban expansion. Since these trainings were designed based on Iranian methods and technical standards, trainees become familiar with the technologies and equipment that Iranian companies use. This issue can give these companies an advantage in the future competition for implementing electricity, water, and infrastructure projects.

Africa in the Shah's regime's calculations

These examples show that in the current conditions, economic interests are Tehran's gateway to Africa, and political presence or influence is considered an additional achievement.

Here one of the fundamental differences between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Shah's regime becomes evident.

According to Fred Halliday, a professor of international relations, countries that are born out of revolutions do not suffice merely with changing their internal conditions but often have a project or vision whose influence they want to extend beyond their borders.

From this perspective, the Islamic Republic of Iran considered its foreign policy a tool for transferring the ideas of the revolution and at the same time creating influence. While the Shah's regime's policies stemmed solely from state security calculations and the balance of power during the Cold War.

For this reason, Geoffrey Leverett, a researcher, describes the Shah's regime's policy as defensive. A policy whose goal was to protect Iran and its position in the existing regional order and contain its rivals, not to rebuild this order based on a new ideological project similar to what was pursued in Iran after the Islamic Revolution.

In that period, Gamal Abdel Nasser was the Shah's regime's most important rival. Because this regime considered Arab nationalism and Gamal Abdel Nasser's regional alliances a threat to Iran's position.

Therefore, the Shah's regime entered a network of balance of power with Ethiopia, Turkey, and the Zionist regime. A network known in Zionist literature as the peripheral strategy.

After the wave of Nasserism subsided, concern about the expansion of Soviet influence took first place in the Shah's regime's calculations. The Horn of Africa, given its command over vital maritime passages, became a front line in the Shah's regime's conception of Iran's security. Especially since the Shah's regime was seeking new oil buyers and securing its export routes.

Accordingly, the Shah's regime considered the Indian Ocean the strategic extension of the Persian Gulf and believed that the protection of Iran's oil trade begins from the Bab al-Mandab Strait and continues to the Cape of Good Hope route.

At the same time, the Shah's regime sought to secure uranium resources needed for its nascent nuclear program and to gain the votes of the growing bloc of African countries in the United Nations.

The leap in oil revenues provided the Shah's regime with tools commensurate with this ambition. After the oil price increase in 1973, the Shah's regime's oil revenues were converted into low-interest loans, aid, and development projects in countries such as Sudan and Senegal.

Robert Steele, a historian and author of the book "Pahlavi Iran's Relations with Africa," notes that oil diplomacy led to the rapid expansion of Iran's relations with African countries.

Tehran had political relations with only five African countries in 1969, but this number exceeded 30 countries by the mid-1970s as a result of aid and the expansion of economic exchanges.

In the southern part of the African continent as well, Iran became the most important energy supply artery for the apartheid regime of South Africa. So that by 1978, more than 90 percent of South Africa's crude oil imports were supplied from Iran.

According to Steele, one of the factors bringing the two sides closer was the increased importance of the Cape of Good Hope route after the closure of the Suez Canal following the June 1967 war. An event that turned this maritime route into a vital passage for Iran's oil exports.

In addition, the Shah's regime realized that there was an intelligence agreement between the apartheid regime of South Africa and the United States of America, according to which South Africa was obliged to photograph passing ships around the Cape and send copies of the images to Washington.

The Shah's regime also requested to receive this same information. Asadollah Alam, the minister of the Shah's regime's court, wrote in his memoirs that Iran benefited greatly from the images and data that South Africa provided about Soviet ships heading to Iraq. This information allowed the Shah's regime's intelligence apparatus to monitor the type of military equipment sent from Moscow to Baghdad.

Limitations of oil diplomacy

However, oil diplomacy was a double-edged sword. This policy created a widespread presence of purchase for the Shah's regime but could not create lasting influence.

From late 1974, the decline in oil demand and the fall in the Shah's regime's revenues limited this regime's ability to fulfill promises related to loans and credit. According to Geoffrey Leverett, the Shah's regime in these conditions became a hesitant helper.

Shirin Hunter, a professor of international affairs, also believes that the Shah's regime's aid failed to create lasting dependence. Because the lifespan of this aid was about five years before the victory of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, and there were also wealthy regional rivals offering similar proposals.

The weakness of the Shah's regime's diplomatic infrastructure also exacerbated this problem. In a report presented to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1974, Robert de Souza, the French ambassador in Tehran, described the closeness of Iran and Africa as superficial and vague.

Steele believes that the Shah's regime's Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not have diplomats who had both language skills, familiarity with African issues, and readiness to relocate to this continent, a continent that was not considered a desirable destination for the Shah's regime's diplomats.

Moreover, the Shah's regime's cooperation with the apartheid regime of South Africa placed Iran in conflict with the principles of the Organization of African Unity and with governments that derived their legitimacy from the struggle against colonialism and white domination.

The dependence of this presence on personal relations with specific rulers, without creating institutional foundations to guarantee its continuity after these leaders stepped aside, increased the vulnerability of the Shah's regime's influence.

The fall of Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974 was the most prominent example of this situation. With his fall, one of the pillars of the Shah's regime's influence in Ethiopia collapsed, and this regime was forced to readjust its alliances in the Horn of Africa.

However, these limitations could not eliminate all the commercial ties created during the era of oil diplomacy.

South Africa remained Iran's largest trading partner in sub-Saharan Africa before and after the Islamic Revolution, and after the fall of the apartheid regime in South Africa in 1994, its share increased.

Eric Lob and Hakan Yilmazkuday, in a quantitative study published in 2025 on trade between Iran and sub-Saharan African countries between 1962 and 2021, found that countries that had relations with Tehran during the Shah's era remained the most important partners of Iran in the post-Islamic Revolution era.

South Africa maintained its first place, and Kenya remained in second place. Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Madagascar also remained among Iran's main trading partners.

After the victory of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, only a small number of countries, such as Sudan and Senegal, were added to this collection. Although these relations were mainly based on economic goals, the case of Sudan went beyond this pattern and from the beginning was accompanied by political and security closeness that gave it a different nature.

The Horn of Africa; connection and rupture

The closeness of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Khartoum began after the June 1989 coup. A coup that, with the support of the National Islamic Front led by Hassan al-Turabi, brought Omar al-Bashir to power.

Some leaders of Sudan's Islamist movement considered the Islamic Revolution of Iran a model of an Islamic movement that had been able to come to power. In return, Tehran also found in Sudan's new system a partner that shared with it in international isolation and anti-Western discourse.

On this basis, political and security cooperation was formed, which was strengthened by Khartoum's need for financing and weapons.

However, Al-Wathiq Kameer, a Sudanese academic researcher, warns against reducing this relationship to Sudan's acceptance of the Iranian model. According to him, Tehran's intellectual and religious influence on Sudanese society remained limited even at the peak of the two countries' official alliance.

The path of relations between the two countries shows the weakness of the doctrinal foundation of this closeness. Khartoum closed Iran's cultural centers in September 2014 and in March 2015 joined the Saudi-led coalition in the war in Yemen against Yemen's armed forces. Then, in January 2016, in solidarity with Riyadh after the attack on the Saudi embassy in Tehran, it completely cut its relations with Iran.

Diplomatic and military communications between the two countries were resumed only following the pressures caused by the Sudan war that began in April 2023. The two countries announced the restoration of relations in October of the same year.

According to a report by Reuters in April 2024, military need was the most important factor in the return of relations. This news agency, citing tracking data collected by a researcher at the Dutch organization PAX, reported six flights of an Iranian cargo plane to the port of Sudan between December 2023 and January 2024.

Also, a "Mohajer-6" drone was seen in a satellite image of the "Wadi Saydna" base in northern Khartoum.

Reuters, citing Iranian, regional, and diplomatic sources, reported that the Sudanese army had received Iranian drones and that these drones played a role in halting the advance of the Rapid Support Forces and recapturing areas around the capital of Sudan. However, Khartoum denied receiving any weapons from Iran.

According to an investigation conducted by the independent investigative journalism organization Bellingcat in 2021, this same drone model had also been observed at the "Semera" airport in Ethiopia during the "Tigray" war. Reports were also published about the use of drones in Ethiopia that matched the "Mohajer-6" model, although no official contract for their delivery was announced.

Thus, drones became one of the tools that allow Tehran to enter African arenas that need rapid and low-cost military support.

In Sudan, relations between the two countries went beyond the scope of drone diplomacy. The two countries exchanged ambassadors in July 2024 and, alongside that, opened official channels for economic, financial, and reconstruction cooperation.

A few months before that, in March 2024, the Wall Street Journal, citing Ahmed Hassan Mohamed, the intelligence adviser to Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the head of Sudan's Sovereignty Council, reported that Khartoum had rejected Iran's request to establish a permanent naval base in the Red Sea in exchange for receiving a helicopter carrier. However, both governments denied this account.

Regardless of the accuracy of this account, the matter falls within the framework of a broader history of Tehran's efforts to find a foothold in the ports of the Horn of Africa.

In Eritrea, from the late first decade of the twenty-first century, reports were published about Iran's presence in the port of Assab, but Asmara denied hosting Iranian bases or forces.

Djibouti and Somalia also cut their relations with Tehran in 2016. Djibouti resumed diplomatic relations in September 2023, but this action did not lead to an overt Iranian military presence in the country. Somalia has also not announced a similar path since the closure of Iran's representation and the severing of relations.

These periods of connection and rupture from Sudan and Eritrea to Somalia and Djibouti reveal the fragility of the foundations of Iran's influence in Africa. Tehran's relations with the countries of the Horn of Africa and its surrounding areas have always been subject to rapid change and even collapse in the face of serious political tests.

This issue was also clearly seen in Sudan. A country that called Iran's attacks on the Arab states of the Persian Gulf a clear aggression and warned armed groups fighting alongside the Sudanese army to refrain from declaring support for Tehran.

Senegal; the bond of Shiism with Sufi traditions

Iran-Senegal relations have also experienced a pattern of rupture and resumption of relations since the 1980s.

Dakar closed Iran's embassy in 1984 after accusing Tehran of spreading religious propaganda and financing local media and associations.

The presence of the late Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the then president of the Islamic Republic of Iran, at the Organization of the Islamic Conference summit in Dakar in December 1991 was one of the first signs of improving relations. Relations between the two countries were resumed in the 1990s based on economic cooperation.

The closeness of Tehran and Dakar reached its peak in the first decade of the twenty-first century. In that period, Senegal became Iran's gateway to enter West Africa. While Tehran proposed the implementation of an oil refinery project and the establishment of a Samand car assembly plant, and Dakar also supported Iran's right to have nuclear technology.

But this path changed after the seizure of 13 Iranian weapons containers in Nigeria in 2010 and Tehran being accused of arming the separatist "Casamance" rebels in southern Senegal.

Senegal cut its relations with Iran in February 2011, and these relations were resumed in February 2013. Subsequently, the two countries' relations were consolidated at a calmer level based on economic cooperation and vocational training.

Mara Leichtman, an American professor of anthropology and Islamic studies, notes that Senegal's bond with Iran was not formed on the basis of a new political coalition but intersected with a Shia sphere within Senegal that existed before the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

She traces the roots of this sphere to the migration of Lebanese to West Africa from the 1880s. When a number of migrants settled in the city of Dakar and worked as intermediaries in the peanut trade during the colonial era.

However, Shiism found institutional presence only with the arrival of the Lebanese cleric Sheikh Abdul Mun'im al-Zein in Senegal in 1969, after his studies at the Najaf seminary. He established the Lebanese Islamic Institute in Senegal in 1978.

According to a press report in Senegal in 2003 that Leichtman cites but did not verify the accuracy of its figures, Sheikh Abdul Mun'im al-Zein established five mosques and about 130 religious schools outside Dakar, entrusting their management to Senegalese whom he had personally trained.

This means that Tehran entered an existing religious and social structure and did not create it from scratch.

Despite the exceptional position of Sufi orders in Senegal, Leichtman believes that Sufism was not an obstacle to the spread of Shiism. On the contrary, Sufism, due to certain commonalities such as extensive attention to the AhlulBayt (a.s.), supplication to the righteous, and pilgrimage to tombs, provided a bridge for the spread of Shiism.

Therefore, some of those who converted to Shiism presented this change not as a break from Sufism or acceptance of an imported religion but as a kind of return to the origin or completion of rooted spiritual traditions. They cited narrations that link the arrival of Islam in West Africa to Fatimid or Idrisid influences.

However, according to Leichtman's conclusion, this change did not stem solely from spiritual familiarity and closeness. Some Senegalese intellectuals considered Shiism a textual and intellectual alternative to the prevailing Sufi model.

These individuals criticized the follower's obedience to the personal authority of the guide and believed that Shia authority, jurisprudential ijtihad, and reference to religious texts provide a more suitable framework for answering their theological and philosophical questions.

Hence, for some of them, Shiism was linked to the search for organized religious knowledge and not merely a change of religious affiliation.

This transformation did not necessarily mean a complete exit from the Sufi order. Leichtman has identified hybrid religious identities that encompassed both spheres.

Some leaders remained active in prominent Sufi orders and at the same time acted as representatives of Shia authorities in Iran or Iraq.

This duality allowed Shiites to maintain their family, social, and spiritual ties while accepting Shia authority with varying degrees of commitment. Thus, an individual could remain part of the Sufi world without setting aside their new affiliation.

Adapting rituals to the local environment also helped consolidate this overlap. Senegalese Shiites redefined their occasions in formats familiar to the local community and, instead of certain mourning practices, replaced them with intellectual gatherings, religious hymns, and communal meal offerings. Ceremonies that resembled Sufi occasion celebrations.

Thus, Shiism in Senegal did not form in opposition to Sufism but grew within its context.

However, the existence of local roots for Shiism does not mean that Iran was outside the process of the spread of this religion among Senegalese.

The Islamic Revolution of Iran gave new momentum to this current, both through presenting a political and religious model that, according to Leichtman, inspired some Shiites, and through establishing educational and propagation institutions linked to Tehran.

One of the most prominent of these institutions is the "Hawza of the Messenger of God (p.b.u.h)" near the University of Dakar, whose goal was to teach Shia beliefs to a generation of Senegalese youth by clerics who had studied in Iran or Lebanon.

Iran's educational and cultural institutions also provided a channel for training Senegalese students and clerics and bringing them into transnational Shia networks.

Nevertheless, there are no definitive statistics on the number of Shiites in Senegal, and estimates differ greatly. A study conducted by the international institute "Mazdehr" in 2021, cited by the US State Department's 2023 religious freedom report, estimates the number of Shiites in Senegal at about one million people, equivalent to nearly 6 percent of the country's population. While other estimates provide much lower figures.

On the other hand, Tehran has not been the only guiding actor in this sphere. Therefore, Senegalese Shiism cannot be considered a direct extension of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Many followers of Sheikh Abdul Mun'im al-Zein have followed the authority of Grand Ayatollah Sayed Ali Sistani in Najaf Ashraf. An authority that grants the jurist religious and jurisprudential authority and a role in some public affairs but does not accept the model of direct guardianship of the jurist similar to Iran.

Also, many Senegalese Shiites have maintained their bond with Sufi orders and local rituals. As a result, Senegalese Shiism is the product of interaction between Iran's overt influence, other Shia authorities, and the local religious environment. An environment that has redefined this religion according to its own specific conditions.

Nigeria; the dominance of the velayat-e faqih model

Nigeria offers a different example in which the revolutionary intellectual line prevails.

Compared to Shiism in Senegal, which has a smaller scope, this religion has expanded more in Nigeria and has turned this country into the home of the largest organized gathering of Shiites in West Africa. Although estimates of their number vary greatly.

The International Crisis Group estimates the proportion of Shiites at between 2 and 3 percent of Nigeria's population, that is, about four million people. Other sources put their number at about three million, while the Pew Center's statistics are much lower.

Shiism found its way into Nigeria through Sheikh Ibrahim Zakzaky. He began his activity as a member of the Muslim Students Association at Ahmadu Bello University in the city of Zaria and was influenced by the ideas of Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb. Zakzaky believed in the superiority of Islam over capitalism and socialism.

After traveling to Iran in 1980 as part of a student delegation, he was influenced by the symbolism and discourse of Imam Khomeini (r.a.). He then introduced the model of the Islamic Revolution of Iran at universities in northern Nigeria and gradually, from the late 1980s to the early 1990s, turned toward Shiism and transformed his student activity into the Islamic Movement in Nigeria.

This movement rejected the legitimacy of the secular system and called for the establishment of an alternative Islamic system. At the same time, it avoided limiting its identity to Shiism. An approach that allowed it to attract Sunni Muslims dissatisfied with the Nigerian government and the country's religious elites.

This movement gradually created an institutional and parallel network that encompassed most of Nigeria's states. This network included schools, health centers, a newspaper, a radio in the Hausa language, and media platforms, and alongside them, a structure for protecting the ceremonies and gatherings of the Islamic Movement in Nigeria was active.

However, the expansion of this network led to bloody conflict with the Nigerian government.

In December 2015, the Nigerian army accused the movement's followers of attempting to assassinate Tukur Buratai, the chief of staff of the Nigerian army, and then launched a military operation for three days that led to the martyrdom of more than 300 people.

Human Rights Watch, in a report, described this attack by the Nigerian army as completely unjustifiable.

Zakzaky and his wife were arrested and remained in detention for about five and a half years. Finally, on July 28, 2021, the Supreme Court of Kaduna State in Nigeria acquitted them after accepting the defense and arguing that the prosecution had not provided sufficient evidence to continue the trial.

The Nigerian government also classified this movement as a terrorist organization in 2019, after bloody protests in the city of Abuja in which demonstrators demanded the release of Sheikh Zakzaky.

It is noteworthy that, according to Robert Steele, the tension between Tehran and Abuja began before the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Iran's relations with the Shah's regime with the apartheid regime of South Africa were a subject of criticism by Nigeria. But the Islamic Revolution of Iran shifted the source of this tension from protest against the Shah's regime's foreign relations to Nigeria's internal developments. With the expansion of the Islamic Revolution of Iran's influence among local groups in Nigeria, the activities of the country's Shiites became a contentious issue between the two governments.

Nevertheless, this tension did not stop the official relations of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Nigerian government.

In December 2025, the Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs welcomed Gholamreza Mahdavi Raja, the new ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran. He described Nigeria as a gateway to West Africa.

The two sides' negotiations focused on trade, investment, energy, and multilateral cooperation, and their official statement made no mention of the issue of Nigeria's Shiites or Sheikh Zakzaky's case.

This issue shows that doctrinal export, even in its more confrontational forms such as the Nigerian example, is not an automatic extension of a unified Iranian policy but part of a network of institutions with different tasks and interests.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs manages official relations, state companies seek markets, development institutions help create bridges and prepare the ground for interaction by offering projects and services, cultural institutions and universities spread religious education, and the institutions of the Revolutionary Guard and the Quds Force also operate in weapons and security areas.

These paths do not necessarily operate in every country or under a single operational command, but the combination of official channels with less overt networks gives Tehran more flexibility. Especially in circumstances where it faces the pressure of sanctions.

Today, this flexibility is under pressures that Tehran had not experienced before.

According to an analysis published by the Al Jazeera Studies Center in June 2026, Iran's ability to operate on the African continent has decreased after the Ramadan war. The financing of some of Iran's educational and cultural institutions, including Al-Mustafa International University, has stopped, and this issue has weakened Shia networks in Nigeria.

Also, Iran's proposal to supply drones and air defense systems to Niger in exchange for receiving uranium has faced problems.

From this perspective, Iran's presence in Africa can be considered a network of regional nodes with different functions.

In West Africa, where Tehran encountered existing religious spheres in countries such as Senegal and Nigeria before the Islamic Revolution of Iran, universities, seminaries, and social networks found a more prominent role compared to economic presence.

In the Horn of Africa, where security and shipping calculations intersect, ports, drones, and intelligence coordination were prioritized. Without a similar religious institutional presence being formed alongside them.

In the southern part of the African continent as well, commercial interests from the Shah's regime era to today remain the main driver. Although Iranian ships participated in joint naval exercises with China and Russia near the coast of South Africa in January 2026, an action that drew US criticism of Pretoria.

What links these different arenas together is Tehran's ability to separate its tools and recombine them according to the characteristics of each region.

**************
End/ 345E

Tags