AhlulBayt News Agency (ABNA): The extensive media hype that has accompanied the dispatch of Arab and non-Arab forces to Yemen—including forces with a historical and symbolic standing, such as Egyptian forces—does not, in reality, bring about much change. It does not appear that any of the countries that have dispatched forces, at least officially and on a large scale, have any willingness to fight inside Yemen in order to change the existing equation in this country.
According to a report by the Lebanese newspaper Al-Akhbar, in contrast, Yemen also does not intend to target Saudi Arabia except within the framework of responding to the bombing and blockade of the areas under its control by Saudi Arabia, and with the aim of pressuring Riyadh to simultaneously stop the war and the blockade and leave the Yemenis to their own devices.
In such circumstances, ending the war against Yemen depends on Saudi Arabia's ability to bear the pressures and exit the deadlock in which America has placed it within the framework of the broader war against Iran. Because this battle, overall, is taking place between two major coalitions, and Saudi Arabia is inevitably required to play its part in it.
Saudi Arabia has so far not been able to force the countries that have allied with it—whether through formal coalitions such as the Mecca Coalition, which also includes Turkey and Pakistan, or outside such coalitions such as Egypt—to form a real coalition. A coalition that would enter the war inside Yemen with masses of its military forces and transform the field equation that is clearly changing in favor of Yemen's armed forces.
The reality is that Saudi Arabia cannot buy, with money, anything more than a symbolic and largely ineffective participation. Deploying the armies of other countries requires massive resources that Riyadh may not have the ability to provide. In addition, the allied countries themselves cannot justify extensive military participation unless they achieve gains proportionate to the scale of this participation and the consequences arising from it.
Even Saudi Arabia itself has not dispatched its own army to fight inside Yemeni territory. Although this issue can fundamentally be attributed to the Saudi army's inability to fight. An issue that is well known to be related to the structure of the Saudi state—and other Arab countries of the Persian Gulf littoral. These states were fundamentally formed on the basis of a permanent need for a force to defend themselves and, in return, benefit from their facilities and capacities, especially in the field of oil.
Even if we assume that the countries participating in the war set aside all their internal considerations and restrictions and enter Yemen with masses of their military forces to fight Yemen's armed forces, they will still not necessarily succeed in changing the equation.
For example, Turkey cannot do in Yemeni territory what it does in Syria and Iraq; where it has dispatched its army to confront the Kurdish insurgency that threatens the Turkish state itself.
Pakistan also cannot fight in Yemen in the same way it fights at its borders with India in the Kashmir region. A region that has witnessed a border dispute for decades, and this dispute affects Pakistan's own territorial integrity.
Despite this, Saudi Arabia continues to try to drag these countries into war. Riyadh's effort to open a border front with Yemen's armed forces—specifically in the provinces of Sa'dah, Hajjah, and Al-Jawf—also pursues this same objective. Drawing Yemen's armed forces into direct conflict with allied forces stationed in the Jizan and Najran areas along Saudi Arabia's border with Yemen.
Given these realities, the war appears to continue with its current course. A course that allows Yemen's armed forces to continue their advance in the areas of former northern Yemen without serious obstacles.
In this framework lies the battle of the city of Taiz, which Yemen's armed forces are currently advancing, and this battle appears to soon reach a conclusion, whether through war or without it. This assessment is raised given the siege of the city of Taiz by these forces and their entry into some of its inner neighborhoods.
This same situation has forced the Brotherhood-affiliated "Islah" party to request Oman's mediation to reach an agreement on how to administer the city of Taiz. This party has also sent a delegation to meet with the Yemeni government's negotiating delegation in Muscat.
In contrast, Yemen's armed forces need Saudi Arabia's acceptance of defeat in order to end the war. These forces can neither definitively settle the battle militarily against Saudi Arabia nor is it possible that they would be able to enter the southern and eastern provinces controlled by Riyadh.
These provinces host separatist forces seeking the independence of southern Yemen. In the current circumstances, opening the file of these forces, whether militarily or politically, does not appear appropriate. In addition, the issue of the south may fundamentally not be resolvable except within the framework of a comprehensive resolution of the Yemen crisis, a process that also requires Saudi Arabia's participation.
The Yemeni government understands this reality well. For this reason, it has limited its demands to the minimum possible, namely stopping the war and lifting the blockade. Measures that can also make the path smoother for Riyadh, because the demanded concessions are not very extensive and are fundamentally rights that belong to the Yemeni people.
However, the Yemeni government cannot retreat from what it considers its only option for achieving the aforementioned goal, namely applying military and economic pressure inside Saudi Arabia, in the Strait of Bab al-Mandab, and in the Yemeni provinces controlled by Saudi Arabia.
On the other side, Saudi Arabia has trapped itself in a corner from which exit is difficult. Unless it once again experiences what, from its perspective, will be a humiliating defeat in Yemen. This situation has become more difficult especially after Riyadh has sought help from numerous coalitions and forces to achieve objectives whose attainment appears impossible.
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