AhlulBayt News Agency (ABNA): With Egypt's decision to provide military support to Saudi Arabia in its war against Yemen's armed forces, attention has once again been drawn to Egypt's experience of military intervention in Yemen during 1962 to 1967. An experience about which historical interpretations remain different and even contradictory.
According to a report by the Lebanese newspaper Al-Akhbar, for example, "Jesse Ferris," a researcher, in his book titled "Nasser's Gamble," published in 2013 by Oxford University Press, presents an important hypothesis that is also reflected in the book's subtitle, and that hypothesis is how Egypt's intervention in Yemen led to the Six-Day War and the decline of Egypt's power.
To prove this hypothesis—some aspects of which cannot be considered incorrect—Ferris has gathered an extensive collection of documents and analyses. However, this research is not free from a clear bias against the motives of Egypt's action. He examines Cairo's intervention within the framework of this country's effort to maneuver between the Soviet Union and the United States from the early 1960s and, further on, considers it part of what he calls the Arab Cold War between Egypt and Saudi Arabia. A competition that began in October 1962 and continued until the withdrawal of Egyptian forces from Yemen in December 1967.
The number of Egyptian forces stationed in Yemen at the peak of their presence in 1965 reached about 70,000 people.
Egypt in Yemen; Exporting Revolution or a Battle in an Imperialist War?
On September 26, 1962, a group of Yemeni army officers led by Colonel "Abdullah al-Sallal" overthrew "Imam Muhammad al-Badr bin Ahmad." Al-Badr was from the "Hamid al-Din" family that ruled the "Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen." This coup occurred about a week after he assumed power following the death of his father, "Imam Ahmad bin Yahya."
Only two days after the coup, Egypt recognized al-Sallal's government. A government that at that time controlled only the Yemeni capital and a number of surrounding areas. Cairo also dispatched its forces to Yemen within a month to support the new government.
Following these developments, Cairo-Riyadh relations quickly deteriorated and led to the severing of relations between the two countries in November of the same year. According to "Anthony Nutting" in his book about "Gamal Abdel Nasser," published in 1972, Egypt and Saudi Arabia practically entered a situation resembling a real war. While both countries had allies and aligned forces inside Yemen.
The speed of Egypt's reaction raises at least two interpretations that do not necessarily negate each other. First, that Cairo was aware of al-Sallal's coup plan in advance. Second, that Egypt saw the coup as an opportunity to establish strategic influence in the southern Red Sea and along Saudi Arabia's borders and also to limit Riyadh's influence.
A point that Nutting emphasizes reinforces the first interpretation. He, who was closely familiar with Egypt's foreign policy and the management of Egypt-Britain negotiations before 1954, notes that Abdel Nasser in the mid-1950s did not show much personal interest in Yemen and had repeatedly refused to travel to this country.
Al-Sallal's coup thus provided an opportunity to completely change the nature of governance in Yemen. A change that Egypt's revolutionary leadership had sought since the mid-1950s but had not met with a positive response from Imam Ahmad's government.
In 1956, after Imam Ahmad rejected the invitation to travel to Cairo, Egypt sent "Anwar Sadat," then a member of the Revolutionary Command Council, to Taiz to persuade the aged ruler of Yemen to carry out some political reforms or delegate part of his powers to his son and crown prince. The crown prince had been present in Cairo before Sadat's trip, but Imam Ahmad categorically rejected all these proposals.
Abdel Nasser in March 1958 succeeded in officially annexing Yemen to the United Arab Republic—the integrationist union of Egypt and Syria. However, this structure known as the United Arab States practically remained on paper, and Nasser ended it in late 1961.
In the same period, Yemen moved closer to the Arab Federal Union. A union that Jordan and Iraq had formed to counter the spread of communism in the region and was also known as the Hashemite Union.
However, Fawaz Gerges in his book about the great powers and the Middle East, published in 1994 by Oxford University Press, assesses the main goal of this union as balancing against Abdel Nasser's regional influence and preserving the system of Arab states.
Sadat; The Main Architect of Egypt's Post-Coup Approach
After al-Sallal's coup, Anwar Sadat appears to have been the main architect of Egypt's approach toward Yemen. He is introduced as the first Egyptian official to receive news of the coup. Then "Abdul Rahman al-Baydani," the then Deputy Prime Minister of Yemen, called him and requested the dispatch of a fighter aircraft to demonstrate Egypt's support for the coup in Yemen.
With the increase in Saudi Arabia's support for the deposed Imam, the supporters of the new republican system in Yemen increased their demands on Sadat and asked Egypt to dispatch infantry and tanks to Yemen and provide them with air cover.
Gamal Abdel Nasser delayed for a few days to make the final decision, but his concern about the failure of the Arab revolution model—alongside other details that Nutting has included and whose accuracy or inaccuracy the available Egyptian documents do not definitively confirm—ultimately determined the decision in favor of intervention.
He believed that the rapid dispatch of Egyptian military advisers to support al-Sallal could, before Saudi Arabia and Britain had the opportunity to react, break the power of the supporters of the royal system and opponents of the coup in Yemen.
The Soviet Union was also not far from these developments. Moscow in October 1962 was the first non-Arab capital to recognize the new Yemeni republic. After this action, Soviet-Egyptian understandings expanded and even reached Soviet military support for Egyptian forces stationed in Yemen.
These understandings were formed in circumstances where Cairo in the same year had accepted the National Charter. The Kremlin considered this charter a progressive document and an example of the tendency of member countries of the Non-Aligned Movement toward progress and closeness to communism.
Fawaz Gerges considers this Soviet approach a pragmatic policy in which geopolitical interests took priority over ideology. In contrast, Abdel Nasser had also realized that to confront America's threats on the one hand and break Saudi Arabia's efforts to isolate Egypt in the Arab East on the other, he needed Soviet support. Saudi Arabia had enjoyed increasing American support since the presidency of "Dwight Eisenhower."
Egypt's Experience in Yemen; The Costs of Role-Playing and Its Consequences
Abdel Nasser's policies in Yemen remain the subject of intense debate and disagreement. Especially given the heavy cost of this intervention and the tangible achievements Egypt did not obtain from it.
It can be said that Egypt's involvement in Yemen exhausted this country in a long war. Entering the war was done with relatively quick and successive decisions, but exiting it without achieving a decisive victory became an emergency and painful option. A decision that was repeatedly postponed, and these very delays imposed more costs on Egypt.
From mid-October 1962, Egypt entered the Yemen crisis with full force. At that time, a delegation from the United Arab Republic was sent to Yemen to assess the situation, and afterward, "Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer" also traveled to this country.
A few days later, al-Sallal was introduced as President, Head of Government, and Commander of the Yemeni Army. On October 31, a temporary constitution was issued for a five-year period in Yemen. Then in February 1963, al-Sallal delegated his powers to a presidential council consisting of officers, tribal leaders, and economic experts.
Cairo also played a central role in Sana'a's economic agreement with the Soviet Union in December 1963. This agreement provided the ground for the entry of 400 Soviet engineers, technicians, and experts into Yemen to work in the agricultural and water sectors and to examine the possibility of developing industries, radio, and establishing banking centers.
A Project to Modernize Yemen or Expand Egypt's Influence?
Egypt's support also extended to various areas of Yemen's political and social life. A matter that indicated the existence of a kind of Egyptian modernization project in this country.
For example, Egypt's presence was able to contain the civil war in northern Yemen and help al-Sallal strengthen the nationalist approach against tribal tendencies. In contrast, opponents of Egypt's intervention believe that al-Sallal's government limited the scope of political participation of segments of Yemeni society.
Alongside these measures, Egypt's "Middle East" news agency opened a large office in Sana'a, the Yemeni capital, and "Voice of the Arabs" radio also broadcast its programs from there. Yemen's administrative apparatus gradually shrank and gave way to Egyptian advisers. Egyptian soldiers also formed the main part of al-Sallal's presidential guard.
However, the Egyptian army in northern Yemen faced a classic challenge. A challenge that usually traps any regular army in war with tribal groups lacking a cohesive military structure.
"David Witty" in his research titled "Egypt in North Yemen, 1962-1967," published in April 2001 in the Journal of Military History, notes that despite the presence of Egyptian military advisers in Yemen before al-Sallal's coup—and the knowledge that this presence was expected to have created about the conditions and internal differences of Yemen—the Egyptian army, as the crisis deepened, showed that it did not have sufficient readiness for an intervention of that scale, timing, and duration.
Major General "Salah al-Din al-Hadidi," one of the military commanders present in the war, also confirms this interpretation in his book titled "A Witness to the 1967 War," published in 1974. He compared Egypt's situation to someone who entered an exam without preparation and wrote with a sarcastic tone that Egyptian soldiers only knew about Yemen that this country is located in the neighborhood of Saudi Arabia.
Heavy Casualties and Failure to Achieve Military Objectives
The dimensions of Egypt's human and operational casualties from the start of "Operation 9000" in October and November 1962 until the final withdrawal of this country's forces from Yemen reveal the failure of the plan to dominate all of northern Yemen and control the shared borders with Saudi Arabia.
The goal of this plan was to prevent Saudi Arabia's aid and supplies from reaching the supporters of the former regime.
Egypt's airstrikes, especially in the Najran and Jizan areas and the British protectorate in Aden, also did not bring the expected results. This was while Egyptian forces made exhausting efforts and in 1962 and 1963 achieved important gains, especially on the eastern shores of the Red Sea.
Egypt and Yemen; A History Lesson for Today's Decision-Makers
Today, with the announcement of the readiness of "Abdel Fattah el-Sisi," the President of Egypt, on October 21 to support Saudi Arabia in its self-defense, the debate about Egypt's intervention in Yemen has once again been raised.
These remarks have raised understandable and legitimate concerns among part of Egyptian public opinion. In contrast, a wave of propaganda also justifies this action as a kind of solidarity with Egypt's largest Arab ally in recent decades.
However, one historical point draws the attention of observers. "Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer" used the Yemen war and Egypt's intervention in this country to consolidate his dominance over the armed forces. This happened in the same year that the National Charter laid the foundations of a modern state based on citizenship.
Amer used the war to expand the army's influence in Egyptian society and beyond its traditional sphere of national activity and may have sought to create a power base independent of Abdel Nasser himself. Nasser had entrusted responsibility for the Yemen political file to Sadat and its military and operational management to Amer.
Perhaps this very situation, alongside other internal and external factors, provided the ground for Egypt's defeat in the Six-Day War in June 1967. This is in circumstances where the national state project was halted for years on a costly and painful path, and the effects of this interruption are still visible in some areas in Egypt.
Regardless of the possible dimensions of Egypt's role in Yemen today, the possibility that this role remains limited to defensive support, as well as the ambiguity regarding Saudi Arabia's own position and the necessities of the current conditions that may exert pressure on decision-makers, this historical rereading still carries an important reminder. Unilateral and hasty decision-making can have painful consequences, consequences that last for decades and change the fate of societies and countries.
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