AhlulBayt News Agency (ABNA): The official definition of terrorism in Bahrain has distanced itself from its conventional meaning and has become a tool for suppressing political dissidents, activists, clerics, and even an entire sect (Shias).
Apart from the conventional international definition (a definition that arrogant powers typically use to impose domination over countries and nations), terrorism means the organized and unlawful use of violence or the threat of it to create terror and fear and to exert pressure on governments or societies to achieve political or religious objectives, with murder, bombing, destruction, targeting civilians, and threatening them being among the most obvious instances of terrorism.
But the concept of terrorism in the official discourse of the Al Khalifa regime has taken another path; a path in which the scope of the accusation has expanded and encompasses the political dissident, the political activist, the cleric, and any citizen who raises the voice of his protest or calls for reform. In this framework, terrorism is no longer necessarily related to the use of violence or bearing arms; rather, it has become a tool for criminalizing political and ideological positions, restricting freedoms, and prosecuting opponents.
Mar'at al-Bahrain, analyzing this concept in a piece, referred to the position of Ayatollah Sheikh Isa Qasim, one of the most prominent scholars of the region, and wrote, "He considers terrorism a dark and destructive path that is in conflict with religion and human values, from whatever origin and source it may be. This position of his has not been a passing speech but has been repeated and consolidated in his numerous positions."
He has emphasized that the demand for reform is possible only through peaceful means and has said, "There is no terrorism, and no option in demanding reform other than the peaceful method."
He has also emphasized, "Every oppressive terrorist act, and every aggression and playing with the sanctity of blood, honor, and property, from whatever source it may be, at the level of individuals, groups, parties, governments, and the entire world, is condemned."
How can a religious scholar who explicitly rejects terrorism and violence and calls for peacefulness be placed among terrorists or inciters to terrorism? How can demanding reform through peaceful means be considered a crime, while its proponent has declared an explicit rejection of violence and terrorism?
The position of Ayatollah Sheikh Isa Qasim was not alone; Sheikh Ali Salman, the Secretary-General of the Al-Wefaq Society, also took this same path and repeatedly rejected violence from any side. The statements of the Al-Wefaq Society, the largest political opposition society in Bahrain, have emphasized the peaceful movement as a strategic option for demanding political and legal reforms and have always rejected joining armed confrontation or destructive operations.
But the strange point is that Sheikh Ali Salman is still in Bahraini prisons and has been sentenced to life imprisonment on charges of spying for Qatar. While the restoration of diplomatic relations between Bahrain and Qatar raises questions about the continuation of citing this accusation; an accusation that has been described as "ridiculous."
Prominent Bahraini scholars and students of religious sciences have also, on various occasions, declared their opposition to violence and terrorist operations and emphasized peacefulness and the condemnation of targeting the innocent. These scholars also reject the use of counter-terrorism accusations as a political cover to harm religious identity, restrict freedoms, and prosecute clerics.
From the perspective of the Bahraini opposition, the main problem is no longer terrorism itself as a crime; rather, it is the expansion of its definition so that it becomes a general and vague title that can be used against anyone who disagrees with power. In this way, the word "terrorism" has transformed from describing a specific crime into a political and ever-ready accusation.
From the early 1990s until the years after the 2011 events, Bahraini authorities have repeatedly announced the discovery of terrorist networks and destructive plots. These announcements have always been accompanied by accusations against activists and political forces of links to foreign organizations or attempts to overthrow the regime.
In earlier stages, accusations were leveled against groups of activists regarding the formation of "Bahraini Hezbollah" and the "Bahraini Free Movement," and these groups were introduced as destructive networks. But these accusations were not always supported by evidence that would justify the volume and danger of the accusation.
With the February 2011 movement, Bahrain entered a new stage of using the discourse of terrorism and security. With the expansion of protests, security agencies announced the discovery of alleged networks and organizations, and officials presented their narrative of this movement as a security and organized plot. But the accusation did not stop at a particular political group or organization; rather, it gradually expanded. Part of the official discourse was directed toward the Shia community and its scholars, and claims were raised about networks linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Lebanon's Hezbollah.
Later, the term "Velayat-e Faqih networks" was also raised so that the accusation would be increasingly linked to religious and sectarian identity.
Every time Bahrain's opponents are accused of links to Iran, the same question returns: Does demanding political and social rights necessarily mean loyalty to another country? Can an entire Bahraini sect be reduced to a political or religious relationship with Iran? Does the mere religious affiliation of Bahrain's Shias mean that they want to turn Bahrain into a version of Iran?
Reducing the position of Bahrain's Shias to "loyalty to Iran" ignores a fundamental reality: Bahrain's Shias are citizens who live in their own country and belong to their land, history, and society. No one has the right to make their religious affiliation a sign of treason or conspiracy.
Bahrain's Shias have no plan to occupy the country and do not seek to turn it into an arena of regional conflict. Demanding rights does not mean treason, the desire for reform does not mean overthrowing the government, the desire for freedoms does not mean bearing arms, and protesting against the policies of power does not mean conspiring with foreign parties.
Turning every opponent into a terrorist, every cleric into a defendant, and every demand for rights into a foreign conspiracy is not fighting terrorism; it is the political use of the concept of terrorism. The final question is: If terrorism is the same as murder, bombing, destruction, and creating terror, where does the demand for peaceful reform fit into this definition? And if fighting terrorism is for the protection of society and the state, why has it become a tool for prosecuting opponents and religious scholars?
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