AhlulBayt News Agency (ABNA): Mar'at al-Bahrain, in an analysis titled "Appointments in Bahrain; An Unprecedented Phenomenon Worthy of Reflection," examined the growing trend of appointments in the country and wrote: "The issue requires an in-depth study of the motives of the ruler, Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa, in establishing principles and rules that have no parallel in any other country in the world."
Initially, this did not exceed the natural limits of power authority: ministers were appointed, deputies and directors of ministries were appointed, and members of the Shura Council were appointed. But it seems the "appointment syndrome" was not confined to the official state institution. Over time, this pattern evolved to the point where even elected members of parliament have effectively become a kind of "appointed," albeit this time through careful electoral manipulations, laws and regulations, and the management of the electoral process in a way that the outcome often resembles "engineering the political scene" more than the free choice of voters.
Today, the innovation of "mukhtars" has emerged in Bahrain, and the return to the era of mukhtars by direct royal decree has raised many questions. While the mukhtar was originally considered one of the closest forms of local representation to the people and their communities, the entry of this space into the circle of appointment or administrative control means that power does not want even the smallest details of community life to remain outside its sphere of influence.
The Threat to Control Husseiniyas and Mourning Councils
More concerning is that this issue is not limited to mukhtars. The recent decision of the Minister of Justice, who explicitly spoke of beginning "the development and integration of practices of trusteeship over husseiniyas and endowments to strengthen governance and transparency," has raised concerns that the logic of appointment and official management may be extended to one of the institutions closest to the people and their religious and social heritage, namely the heads of husseiniyas and mourning councils.
The intention or approach of the government has also extended to charitable societies, which for years have suffered from a real crisis in electing their boards of directors. The increasing practices of the Ministry of Justice and the disqualification of many candidates have made elections in a number of these societies a difficult and complex process, to the point that a legitimate question arises: are we still facing real elections, or a process in which the voter only has the right to choose from a pre-approved list by the authorities?
From Mosque Imams to Complete Control of Society
This trend is inseparable from previous efforts to appoint mosque imams through the "Imams and Muezzins Cadre" law. Although these efforts failed in many aspects, the proposal itself reveals an important point: the gaze of power is not limited to ministries, parliaments, or state institutions, but extends to the religious space as well.
If we put this entire scene together, the following picture emerges: the minister by appointment, the Shura Council member by appointment, the state official by appointment, then efforts to manage parliamentary elections, the return to the mukhtar position, prior to that the bottleneck on civil society elections, then the regulation of husseiniyas and mourning councils, and efforts to control the appointment of imams and muezzins. What remains then? What free space is left for the people to choose their representatives?
The author concludes, "The problem is not the person who is appointed or rejected; rather, what lies behind this matter is that society cannot choose, and the people always need a guardian to determine who is worthy of representing them and who is not, who can run and who must remain outside the scene. This is a mindset that does not trust society. Any space in which the people choose for themselves is a space that needs supervision, regulation, and control, to the point that society is transformed from an acting selector and manager of its own institutions into a passive recipient of an election designed for it elsewhere."
The question raised here is not only political, but almost a question about the psychological state of appointment that power has reached: "What does a person do when they are unable to see any institution, society, board, or social space without their own fingerprint?"
Perhaps it is time to expand the royal agenda:
Appointing ministers: Done.
Appointing the council: Done.
Controlling elections: Done.
Controlling societies: Underway.
Mukhtars: On the way.
Husseiniyas and mourning councils: Under review.
And the question remains: "What psychological state has the king reached that he even thinks of stifling voluntary work and civil activities, after having completed his domination over the political arena? Is his obsession that he might wake up in the morning and find no official in Bahrain, no society, no mourning council, or even no neighborhood whose appointment has not passed through the gates of power? This is a power that fears even the people's choice of one another."
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