AhlulBayt News Agency (ABNA): In this critical juncture when the global order is changing and new powers are emerging to position themselves in the new order, we are witnessing the emergence of a different Iran from the recent wars, especially the Ramadan War.
The way Iran managed the war, despite extensive enemy attacks and the assassination of senior officials, has compelled international analysts to closely examine the political, intellectual, and religious system of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and has become a hot topic in political circles.
In this regard, Foreign Affairs, as a specialized journal in political science and international relations considered by many to be among the most reputable publications on U.S. foreign policy and relations, has addressed the question, "Why did the Islamic Republic of Iran not collapse despite severe attacks?"
Iran Is Not Iraq 2003!
This article believes that the United States and its allies initiated the war with the mistaken assumption that they could operate in Iran using the same successful patterns used in the fall of Saddam's regime or even Maduro's fall in Venezuela, and expected Iran to surrender with quick strikes, the assassination of senior government officials, and the bombing of oil resources. But this method did not work.
The key point in this article is Iran's learning from the weaknesses of countries such as Iraq under Saddam; just as the Iraq war caused structural changes in Iran, the current war conditions have also increased Iran's tactical experience and the reconstruction of its defense systems.
By designing a multi-layered and decentralized defense system, Iran neutralized the impact of attacks and, by dividing areas into several operational points and establishing independent command in each area, prevented the collapse of the decision-making chain.
The Failure of the "Decapitation" Strategy
In the second part, the article addresses the generational differences in Iran's governance structure and the mistake of the Trump team in dealing with these changes.
The article claims that contrary to U.S. expectations, terrorist operations to eliminate top leaders (decapitation) did not lead to Iran's surrender. American officials like Rubio were mistaken in their warmongering analysis, and the Trump team, due to a lack of precise understanding of the new structure, did not correctly perceive the reality.
The article claims that the first generation of revolutionary leaders, such as Imam Khomeini (r.a.) and Martyr Beheshti, who experienced the monarchical era in their youth, focused their attention on managing domestic issues such as improving health, literacy, and addressing the structural problems of post-revolution society; because they faced a society that was very vulnerable in terms of literacy and health and had to rebuild the country based on domestic needs.
However, the new generation of current commanders and managers, which includes new IRGC commanders, security apparatuses, and even layers of governance, have a kind of extroversion in political, security, foreign, and geopolitical discussions, and act more actively and globally.
Preventing the Link Between Religion and Nationalism in Iran
The third part of the article addresses the point of "linking religion and nationalism" as one of the most sensitive and strategic concepts in Western analyses of Iran.
The article refers to a quote from Brzezinski, Carter's National Security Advisor, who stated that one of America's greatest strategic errors in dealing with Iran would be creating conditions for linking "Shiite religion with Iranian nationalism."
The article analyzes that according to Brzezinski's warning, if religion as a tool for transnational unity is combined with a national identity rooted in Iran's history and soil, we will witness the formation of a highly mobilizing and powerful force that operates far beyond a simple religious movement.
The article concludes by warning that from now on, the situation will become much more dangerous for the United States; because the link between religion and nationalism has created a new defensive and offensive layer for the power of the Islamic Republic of Iran that is difficult for the West to analyze.
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