AhlulBayt News Agency (ABNA): The Taliban’s re-established rule in Afghanistan has entered its fifth year. In 2022, following the collapse of the republic and the withdrawal of foreign forces, the Taliban seized full control and declared the establishment of the Islamic Emirate
Prior to the Taliban’s return to power, under the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, issues of religious majority and minority were not prominently contested, as individuals from diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds held positions in government. During the 18-month Doha negotiations between senior Taliban figures and the United States, the inclusion of religious minorities was discussed, with no formal opposition from the Taliban.
Among the minority groups, Twelver Shia Islam, practiced by approximately 10 million people in Afghanistan, received particular attention. In the early months of the Taliban’s governance, the Shia Ulema Council formally submitted a comprehensive set of demands to Taliban authorities, including official recognition of Ja'fari jurisprudence, the legal status of Shia personal status laws, the teaching of Shia beliefs in universities and schools, and meaningful representation of Shia elites within the government structure.
The pursuit of these demands remained active and visible through media appearances, public interviews, and gatherings until 2024. However, despite these efforts, no concrete progress was made. To date, the Taliban have neither issued a positive nor a negative response to the Shia community’s demands.
While no formal rejection has been made, the practical outcome has been negative: under the previous republic, Shia legal rights and religious education were protected. The Taliban government, however, not only revoked the official status of Shia personal law but also removed the teaching of Shia doctrines from schools and universities in predominantly Shia provinces such as Bamyan and Daykundi.
Despite this lack of recognition and systemic marginalization, the Shia community has maintained a constructive and comprehensive engagement with the Afghan government over the past four years. Several Shia institutions have held large-scale conferences across provinces, including Balkh, Bamyan, Daykundi, and Ghazni, without making any demands, publicly affirming their support for the current administration.
This sustained cooperation has led to a significant decline in the visibility and intensity of Shia demands by 2025. The Shia Ulema Council has drastically reduced its advocacy, and other key Shia bodies—such as the High Shia Commission, which operates with the support of the current Kabul government—have also become less active.
It now appears that individuals and groups within the Afghan Shia community, particularly the Shia Ulema Council, have grown disillusioned with repeatedly raising their demands. In recent months, no formal meetings have taken place between council members and Taliban officials.
Currently, there is a clear lack of trust between the Shia Ulema Council and the Taliban leadership. The council, which operates independently, is neither officially recognized nor formally challenged by the current Kabul authorities. This contrasts with past actions by the Taliban, who previously dissolved several independent institutions not aligned with their ideology.
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