AhlulBayt News Agency (ABNA): Eli Bodeh, a professor of Islamic and Middle Eastern studies at Hebrew universities, in an article on Channel 12 of the Zionist regime, examining published reports about warnings from the UAE and Egypt to Netanyahu, claimed that the Zionist regime's Prime Minister made a miscalculation in assessing the Hamas threat.
According to him, Netanyahu, relying on assessments about Hamas's military weakness, tense talks with Sinwar, and the impact of economic incentives, did not take the possibility of a military operation seriously.
Eli Bodeh, a professor of Islamic and Middle Eastern studies at Hebrew University and a board member of the "Metafim" Institute and the Regional Security Coalition, in an article referring to the disclosure of Mohammed bin Zayed's warning to Benjamin Netanyahu about the possibility of an operation by Yahya Sinwar, considered the UAE Foreign Ministry's statement about the existence of direct communication channels with the Zionist regime as indirect confirmation of the report's accuracy.
He believes Abu Dhabi's diplomatic language was crafted to confirm the existence of communication with Tel Aviv while reducing its political costs in the Arab and Palestinian world.
Bodeh, referring to the UAE's track record of reacting to information leaks from Netanyahu's office, argued that if such a warning had not been raised at all, Abu Dhabi could have explicitly denied it.
He went on to claim that Netanyahu's disregard for the possible UAE warning, and perhaps a similar Egyptian warning, stemmed from a kind of arrogance and miscalculation, according to which Hamas's military capability was underestimated, the talks between Sinwar and Zionist regime officials were misinterpreted, and it was assumed that economic concessions and relations with Qatar would prevent the execution of a large-scale military operation.
This Zionist professor then compared the warnings before October 7 with the warning of King Hussein, the then-King of Jordan, before the October 1973 war.
According to him, King Hussein, on September 25, 1973, after a secret meeting with Golda Meir, the then-Prime Minister of the Zionist regime, had warned about the readiness of the Egyptian and Syrian armies and the growing frustration of these countries' leaders with the political deadlock.
Bodeh believes the similarity between these two incidents shows that the Zionist regime has once again been at risk of ignoring warning signs.
He, however, assessed the current conditions as more dangerous in some respects, saying that in 1973, Golda Meir shared the information received with army and Mossad commanders, and responsibility for the assessment error was divided among several institutions; but regarding Mohammed bin Zayed's warning, it is claimed that Netanyahu was personally informed and did not share it with the heads of security agencies.
Of course, Eli Bodeh added that according to reports published in Haaretz, the Zionist regime's security agencies had received a similar warning about two weeks earlier and had discussed it in a meeting attended by Netanyahu; therefore, warning information existed at various levels but was once again not correctly interpreted.
Bodeh concluded by emphasizing that with the passage of time, more information about the events leading up to October 7 will be revealed, and the case of this event cannot yet be considered closed.
He considered the only way to provide a complete, documented, and reliable picture of the decisions and assessments before this operation to be the formation of an official investigation committee, an issue that remains one of the main axes of political and security disputes within the Zionist regime regarding responsibility for the October 7 intelligence and security failure.
**************
End/ 345E
