AhlulBayt News Agency (ABNA): After a quarter-century, September 11 is no longer merely a reminder of an attack that claimed nearly 3,000 lives. It has become a historical turning point and a dividing line between the America before and after that day. What collapsed that day was not only the towers of the World Trade Center in New York, but according to American media accounts, the myth of an invulnerable America also fell with them.
While New York revisits that painful memory, another legacy of that day continues to assert itself: prolonged wars, the expansion of security tools, the erosion of trust in institutions, and the growth of a discourse that at many points placed Muslims at the center of suspicion, to the extent that the American website The Intercept stated that Muslims have become the perennial victims of American politicians.
It is true that the attack ended on the morning of September 11, 2001, but its political and social consequences never ended. After 25 years, the story of Muslim Americans stands as one of the clearest examples of the gap between the initial shock of that day and the outcomes that emerged in the years that followed.
Between a wound that has yet to heal, wars that lasted for years, and trust that eroded in institutions, the story of September 11 after 25 years is less about the event itself and more about what America did to itself and the world after that day.
A Deep Wound
Peggy Noonan, in an article in the Wall Street Journal revisiting that day, speaks of humanity before politics. She recalls that New York as a city lost its sense of security and compares the impact of September 11 to a dark ring in the trunk of a tree—a ring that remains no matter how much time passes.
She remembers hospitals where paramedics waited for wounded who never arrived, because many of the victims were not merely injured but had disappeared under explosions and masses of dust. She also recalls the scene of train passengers in New York staring at the point where the towers once stood, then all sighing deeply, and a burly man suddenly bursting into tears.
This memory goes a long way in explaining why America's reaction was so intense. Fear was not a fleeting emotion, but quickly became a political force that redefined the concept of security and the definition of the enemy.
Noonan explains that this deep-rooted fear and the horror that gripped the hearts of Americans provided fertile ground for catastrophic decisions—decisions that were supposed to change the face of the world.
From Fear to War
From New York to Washington, the picture broadens in Gerard Baker's analysis in The Times of London. He recalls that September 11 occurred when the United States was at the height of its global dominance, but the shock of the attacks led America into a series of choices that undermined some of the very power it sought to defend.
This pervasive sense of insecurity drove decision-makers in Washington to hasty actions. According to Baker, instead of showing the steely resilience it had promised, America entered fruitless wars, the most significant of which were the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
America's response began with the war in Afghanistan and the pursuit of al-Qaeda, and at that time Washington enjoyed broad international support. But the war later extended to Iraq, even though the invasion of that country was not an inevitable consequence of the September 11 attacks. Baker believes the shock of September 11 provided the political space that made the war possible. Then years of conflict, human casualties, enormous financial costs, the Abu Ghraib scandal, and the controversy over weapons of mass destruction led to the weakening of America's image and a decline in citizens' trust in their government.
Here, The Times analysis intersects with what The Intercept raises. When trust erodes, society becomes more willing to seek an enemy to explain its fear and anxiety. And Muslims, at many stages, were among the groups that paid the price for this shift.
Muslim; A Security Issue
Rosina Ali, in her article on The Intercept, brings the discussion inside American society, where the impact of September 11 was no longer limited to war, but extended to what fear left behind in American society and politics.
According to her, Islamophobia was no longer merely a direct reaction to the attacks, but over time became part of American politics, intensifying during election seasons. Thus, Muslim citizens who had no connection to terrorism sometimes found themselves in a position where they had to prove their innocence and loyalty.
According to the author, American Muslims remember September 11 from a dual position. On one hand, they were American citizens who lost friends, relatives, and fellow citizens in the attacks, and they condemned the terrorism committed in the name of their religion. But on the other hand, some of them faced collective suspicion after the attacks that had no connection to individual responsibility.
This contradiction is worth pondering. An American Muslim was sometimes forced to prove their loyalty to the country they belonged to, simply because the perpetrators of the attacks attributed their actions to Islam.
The Intercept speaks of cases where Muslims and Arab Americans were placed under surveillance and prosecution, as well as laws used in the name of counterterrorism that raised concerns about the expansion of their scope.
Here, the legacy of September 11 goes beyond Islamophobia itself. Because tools created to combat terrorism, if the definition of the enemy expands, can become tools for prosecuting other groups as well.
The Simultaneous Erosion of Security and Trust
But Baker goes even further. From his perspective, the issue is not limited to wars or security policies, but reaches the heart of American political life.
The mistakes associated with the Iraq war, the exaggeration of some threats, and the loss of credibility of institutions reinforced the public sentiment that the government, the media, and the political elite of America were no longer trustworthy. From this environment emerged a polarization that later transformed American politics.
From this perspective, Muslims are part of a broader story in America. Islamophobia is not merely the issue of a religious minority, but an example of how fear operates in a democratic system. First, exceptions are applied against a group identified as a threat, and then the language and logic of exception gain the capacity to expand.
However, the author himself warns that not all of America's crises should be reduced to September 11. The history of the United States before these attacks was also full of crises, wars, and social divisions, and the country's economic, technological, and military power has not disappeared.
Thus, in this analysis, September 11 was not an inevitable fate that led America toward decline, but rather the starting point of a series of decisions that could have been different.
A quarter-century has passed, enough to reveal a point that was not so clear on the morning of the attacks. Combating terrorism is measured not only by a government's ability to pursue armed individuals, but also by its ability to uphold the values and freedoms of its citizens while doing so.
For Muslims, the question of whether the consequences of September 11 ended with the major wars, or whether part of it was transferred from the battlefields to the ballot boxes, political discourse, and laws, holds particular importance and urgency.
After 25 years, New York still carries its heavy memory, as Peggy Noonan described in the Wall Street Journal, and America still bears the marks of the decisions it made under the pressure of fear. Amid memory, war, and politics, American Muslims have often paid a double price. They were citizens of a country that was a victim of terrorism and at the same time faced suspicion they played no role in creating.
In fact, the question is no longer how America remembers those who died that day, but rather how it will also remember what it did to itself and its society after that day. If memory, as Noonan says, is like an indelible ring in the trunk of a tree, the best thing one can do with that memory is not to let it lead to the creation of new injustice.
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