AhlulBayt News Agency (ABNA): Zabihullah Mujahid, the Taliban spokesperson, in a recent interview with the "RT India" network, announced that the group is not willing to change its domestic policies in exchange for recognition by the international community.
In response to a question about the restrictions imposed on women and girls, Mujahid said that Afghanistan has its own "beliefs, religion, internal interests, and laws," and other countries must respect them.
He effectively rejected the conditioning regarding the Taliban's domestic policies and said that the group's government believes it has the normal conditions of a state and should not face additional conditions for official recognition.
These remarks clarify the Taliban's position on one of the most fundamental disputes of the past five years: the Taliban wants the world to change its policy toward Kabul, but is not willing to accept changing its domestic policies as a condition for normalizing relations.
What Does the Taliban Want from America?
Mujahid, while rejecting requests to reform domestic policies, has called for normalizing relations with the United States.
He said that the Taliban wants the reopening of the US embassy in Kabul, the resumption of Afghanistan's representation in Washington, the lifting of sanctions, and the return of Afghanistan's frozen assets.
According to the spokesperson, policies related to the war era must be set aside, and relations between Kabul and Washington should be based on normal diplomatic interaction.
Mujahid also claimed that Afghanistan is undoubtedly in a better condition after the withdrawal of American forces and has regained its independence; although he acknowledged that economic problems and other challenges continue.
These remarks highlight a political contradiction: the Taliban expects the United States and Western countries to lift sanctions, reopen their embassies, release assets, and change their view of the Taliban; but in return, they consider requests to change policies that have caused a large part of this government's international isolation as interference in internal affairs.
Closer Ties with Russia
In another part of the interview, Mujahid introduced Russia as Afghanistan's important partner in the region and said that the Taliban wants investment by Russian companies and the expansion of cooperation with Moscow in trade, reconstruction, fuel, and energy.
In July 2025, Russia became the first and so far only country to officially recognize the Taliban government. Beijing, Tehran, and many other regional capitals have extensive political and economic relations with the Taliban but have not yet announced official recognition of the group's government.
What Does This Position Mean for Afghanistan's Shia?
When the Taliban spokesperson says in general terms that his government will not change its domestic policies to meet the demands of the international community, this position also gains significance for other disputed areas, including the religious rights of Shia.
Especially since, to this day, there is no clear sign of reform in several important Taliban policies that the Shia community has protested against; rather, some reports from 2026 indicate the continuation or even expansion of restrictions.
Removal of Ja'fari Jurisprudence from the Official Structure
One of the most fundamental issues is the position of Ja'fari jurisprudence.
The European Union Agency for Asylum, in its 2026 report on Afghanistan, wrote that Ja'fari jurisprudence has been excluded from the Taliban's judicial system, and Hanafi jurisprudence has replaced it in schools and universities.
The report also states that educational centers have been required to remove books and resources deemed incompatible with Hanafi jurisprudence, and this process has specifically included works related to the Shia sect.
This issue for Afghanistan's Shia community is not merely an educational dispute. In the previous republican system, Ja'fari jurisprudence had a specific legal status in the constitution and the Shia Personal Status Law; but in the current Taliban structure, this official status has been removed, and the judicial system is run based on the Taliban's Hanafi interpretation.
Interference in Shia Religious Rituals
The UNAMA human rights report on the first quarter of 2026 also documented specific examples of Taliban interference in Shia rituals.
According to this report, in at least eight provinces, Shia communities were ordered to celebrate Eid al-Fitr not based on their own religious calendar and determination, but on the date set by Taliban officials.
UNAMA also reported that in one province, a number of Shia clerics who refused to accept this order were arrested. In Herat, vice and virtue officers ordered a Shia mosque to prevent women from attending nightly prayers.
Reports from past years have also indicated restrictions on some Muharram ceremonies, flags, and Shia religious symbols in parts of Afghanistan.
Dismissal of Shia Professors at Bamyan University
The latest example relates to Bamyan University.
Local sources reported in August 2026 that Ibrahim Zaki and Khalil Kohi, two Shia professors at the Faculty of Sharia at Bamyan University, were dismissed and replaced by graduates of religious schools approved by the Taliban.
According to these reports, with the dismissal of these two individuals, no Shia professors remain in the Faculty of Sharia at Bamyan University. In the official Taliban document, the reason for the dismissal was stated as "creating opportunities for youth," and the Taliban has not officially accepted the accusation of religious exclusion of professors.
Nevertheless, the removal of the last Shia professors from the Faculty of Sharia at a university located in one of the most important Shia-populated areas of Afghanistan has raised concerns about the limitation of the presence of Shia jurisprudence and thought in higher education.
Closure of Tamaddon and Khatam al-Nabiyin
In June 2026, the Taliban also halted the activities of "Tamaddon" television, one of Afghanistan's most important Shia media outlets. The Committee to Protect Journalists described this action as part of the intensification of pressure on Afghan media, particularly a Shia outlet.
Simultaneously, the Khatam al-Nabiyin religious and educational complex in Kabul was also closed.
The Taliban has said that these measures were not religious in nature and were related to the alleged affiliation of these complexes with the Islamic Movement Party and legal issues concerning land. The officials of these complexes have rejected these accusations. Therefore, definitively attributing their closure solely to the Shia sect requires caution; but the practical result has been the cessation of activities of two important media and religious institutions of the Shia community.
The Taliban Invites the World to Change, Not Itself
Mujahid's recent remarks are significant from this perspective: after five years, the issue is no longer merely a temporary policy or a promise of reform in the future.
The Taliban spokesperson now openly says that his government is not willing to change its domestic policies to gain international recognition.
This message regarding women is completely explicit: the Taliban considers the restrictions that the world wants lifted as part of its religious and internal system.
The existing record and the absence of any sign of retreat on issues such as the position of Ja'fari jurisprudence, religious education, the presence of Shia professors, and the freedom of certain religious institutions provide serious reason to doubt the existence of a will for reform.
In other words, if Mujahid's new position is the basis of the Taliban's overall policy, its message for the Shia community is not very promising either: the Taliban currently sees reforming domestic policies not as a commitment to citizens, but as a foreign demand it does not feel obligated to accept.
This is while the issue of the rights of Afghanistan's Shia is not a "foreign condition"; Shia are citizens of this same country, and demands such as the right to practice Ja'fari jurisprudence, education in their own jurisprudence, the preservation of religious centers, participation in the political structure, and immunity for religious rituals are, before being an issue for the international community, a matter of domestic rights for millions of Afghan citizens.
Consequently, the main question for the Taliban is not why it does not yield to "foreign pressure"; rather, it is whether it is willing to listen to the voice of a part of its own people in Afghanistan and reform policies that have restricted their religious, educational, and social rights.
As long as no practical answer to this question is seen, Mujahid's recent statements are more a sign of the Taliban's insistence on the same pattern that over the past five years has been protested by a significant portion of women, Shia, and other groups in Afghan society, than a sign of the Taliban's readiness to emerge from isolation.
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