AhlulBayt News Agency (ABNA): The capable, committed, and courageous forces of the 63rd Brigade of Iraq's Popular Mobilization Forces, in their latest operation, foiled an attack by elements of the terrorist group ISIS on a military position in the east of Salah al-Din province and forced the attackers to retreat. This comes as the full-fledged fight of Iraq's popular mobilization against Takfiri terrorists, who are sporadically present in various parts of the country, continues.
Precisely in such circumstances, some members of the Iraqi government and parliament are busy laying the groundwork for disarming the Popular Mobilization Forces and dissolving it by the end of September, which is the same deadline set by Trump and other White House officials. Here, a question comes to mind that cannot be easily ignored: beyond the insistence of some senior Iraqi officials on dissolving the Popular Mobilization Forces, what calculative, field, strategic, and operational logic governs this?
Escalating Risks
At present, the security risks facing Iraq have not only not been resolved, but we are witnessing a diversification in their depth and scope: the sporadic movements of ISIS in parts of Salah al-Din province and other areas of the country continue. We are also witnessing the reorganization of the remnants of the dissolved Baath Party, led by the military wing of this terrorist party, in parts of Iraq. Beyond that, the emergence of the Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham government in Damascus should logically compel the Iraqi government and parliament to preserve the structure and security-military framework of the Popular Mobilization Forces. Therefore, one cannot, under the pretext of the official but unrealistic withdrawal of American occupying forces from Iraq, claim an end to the crises engineered by Washington and the Zionist regime in this country. In every society, there come times when the country faces a serious threat; a threat that may be in the form of external aggression, terrorism, a security crisis, infrastructural collapse, or even widespread social upheaval.
In such circumstances, the logic of governing the country is no longer the ordinary, day-to-day logic. What might, in times of stability, be considered merely a local organization, a volunteer force, or a popular network, can, in times of crisis, become a symbol and indicator of the pillars of national resilience. In such a situation, weakening the capability and questioning the existence of the Popular Mobilization Forces, especially at a time of defending Iraq's national entity, is not merely a political error but a fatal strategic mistake. Dissolving or even weakening Iraq's popular mobilization is synonymous with disarming the country against the hybrid war and the future sinister plans of Washington and Tel Aviv.
If some Iraqi politicians think that removing the Popular Mobilization Forces from their country's security equations will lead to an end to the conspiracies of the American-Zionist terrorism support network in this country, they are gravely mistaken. America's macro-approach toward Baghdad has been shaped on the basis of dividing Iraq along ethnic and sectarian lines. This approach has become a major operational formula in the field of American foreign policy, and both Democratic and Republican administrations frame their tactics and behaviors regarding the developments in this important country in the West Asia region around it. In fact, one of the absolute points of commonality between America's two traditional parties is their effort to partition Iraq. In this equation, the Popular Mobilization Forces play the role of a significant obstacle for Baghdad's enemies.
The main issue is that Iraq's popular defensive and supportive capacity must not be weakened. In the current era, as we witness the escalation of regional crises deliberately engineered by the United States and the Zionist regime occupying Jerusalem, Iraq needs participation, trust, solidarity, and public readiness more than ever.
If a valuable asset named the Popular Mobilization Forces is worn down through destructive rhetoric, blanket accusations, media delegitimization, or political rivalries, the cost will not be borne by just one institution or one group; rather, the entire Iraqi society will pay the price. The strategic logic of this matter is very clear: in times of threat, a country's defensive and supportive capacity must be preserved, organized, and reformed, not dismantled. With its deep capability and capacity, the Popular Mobilization Forces can play a role in many arenas: from relief work and protecting various parts of Iraq, to assisting public order, providing logistical support, transmitting field intelligence, creating security assurance in public opinion, and strengthening social morale. These are not tasks that the government or official forces can handle alone.
In major crises, official capacities usually face limitations in resources, time, and scope of coverage. Meanwhile, organized popular networks act as auxiliary arms and reduce the gap between need and official capacity. Have the opponents of Iraq's resistance still not grasped this clear and evident logic? If the Popular Mobilization Forces had not responsibly shielded the country against the savage terrorist pawns of America (ISIS) between 2015 and 2018, would we today be witnessing relative calm in this country?
From a realistic perspective, the more complex the crisis, the greater the need for "synergy between official and popular forces." The army, popular forces, police, relief agencies, urban management, the health sector, the media, and public participation all together form a defensive and resilient system. If one of these components is unfairly weakened, the overall security chain is damaged. In times of war or national defense, "reaction time" is critical. If distrust is created between the official and popular layers, operational coordination decreases, decision-making slows down, and human and economic costs rise.
Another important reason for avoiding the weakening of the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq is the preservation of social capital. Social capital is that invisible yet decisive force that drives people toward cooperation, mutual trust, and participation in hardships. In normal circumstances, this capital may be less visible, but in a crisis, its true value becomes apparent. A society in which people feel that their efforts are overlooked or that any voluntary action is easily undermined will gradually become demotivated and passive. In contrast, a society that recognizes popular mobilization participation will have greater capacity to overcome crises.
Another point is that in conditions of national defense, abandoning the field to baseless narratives and a psychologically destructive atmosphere is itself a form of security damage. In a crisis, the battle of narratives is as important as the physical battlefield. Every humiliating message, every misplaced label, and every sharp polarization against the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq undermines public morale.
While the external enemy is often seeking to break the collective will, any internal weakening of effective institutions, whether intentional or unintentional, contributes to that same goal. Therefore, from a strategic perspective, preserving the dignity and function of popular forces is part of the country's psychological and social defense.
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