AhlulBayt News Agency (ABNA): The Zionist regime has well understood that the path of agreement and compromise between the United States and Iran is almost the only remaining option before it, and the era of decisive military options has, at least in practice, come to an end—even if this has not yet been officially announced.
According to a report by the Lebanese newspaper Al-Akhbar, this very reality has caused Tel Aviv to face growing concern, especially as the ongoing process between Washington and Tehran resembles more of an open-ended negotiation process that could lead to gradual agreements and exchanges of limited concessions on negotiable issues. In contrast, fundamental and strategic issues, particularly the nuclear file, have been deferred to an uncertain future open to various scenarios—a future with no clear timeline nor definitive strategic guarantees.
Thus, after years of political and security coordination with the United States and participation in joint wars and confrontations against Iran, the Zionist regime now finds itself facing a temporary agreement that has become Washington's direct objective. Tel Aviv is forced to come to terms with this reality, even though it is fully aware of its costs and strategic risks. From the Zionist regime's perspective, these risks include providing Iran with the opportunity, financial resources, and legitimacy to rebuild its capabilities and those of its allies in the region.
But the Zionist regime's problem is not limited to the agreement itself; it extends to the gap between the assessment of the threat and the ability to act. Voices have risen within the occupied territories warning that any agreement with the current form and content will serve Iran's interests at the expense of the Zionist regime's national security. These currents call for rejecting U.S. demands or even undertaking independent military action against Iran.
The Zionist Regime and the Crisis of Dependency
Although these assessments are understandable from a Zionist perspective, the call to defy Washington or launch a unilateral war against Iran is in practice nothing more than a theoretical option that cannot withstand existing realities. The structural and comprehensive dependency of the Zionist regime on the United States is such that any confrontation with Washington could turn into strategic suicide, as without American military, security, intelligence, political, and economic support, Israel will be unable to face the challenges ahead. Moreover, such an act could have immediate and catastrophic consequences, including international isolation, military attrition, and logistical collapse.
This situation has become even more complex during Donald Trump's presidency. Trump's pragmatic approach has meant that foreign relations are measured more than anything by economic, trade, and even personal interests. Within such a framework, any disobedience by the Zionist regime to Washington's demands could be perceived as a direct challenge, leading to severe punitive reactions—reactions that would affect not only political decision-makers but the entire structure of the Zionist regime. Hence, the call for independent confrontation with America reflects more the regime's desire to regain its lost position than a practical and realistic plan.
Consequently, neither complete submission nor absolute opposition—both costly options—constitute suitable solutions for the Zionist regime. This situation stems not merely from the nature of the potential U.S.-Iran agreement, but from the Zionist regime's lack of strategic independence—an issue that has transformed the regime from an influential actor in shaping regional security into a passive party awaiting the results of negotiations taking place outside its will and sphere of influence.
Is There an Option Beyond Washington's Will?
Nevertheless, while unwilling acceptance of the agreement appears to be the Zionist regime's most likely reaction, Tel Aviv still retains a limited space for tactical maneuvers, observable in several axes:
First: The Zionist regime is not a direct party to any potential U.S.-Iran agreement. Therefore, it can declare that it does not consider itself bound by the outcomes and provisions of such an agreement and will theoretically retain all its options, including the military option, regardless of how capable it is of implementing these options in practice.
Second: Zionist decision-makers, on the eve of elections and amid increasing domestic pressure over the war's failures, can focus on what they call the achievements of the war against Iran. Although this war did not achieve its declared objectives, from Tel Aviv's perspective, it yielded some tactical gains that Benjamin Netanyahu and his allies can exaggerate and present to the public as strategic successes.
Third: The Zionist regime may attempt to compensate for its failure on the Iran file through the Lebanese front. Tel Aviv is currently seeking, with American support, to gain greater freedom of action in this arena. Simultaneously, the Zionist regime is trying, by gradually seizing more areas of Lebanese territory, to strengthen its position in negotiations with the Lebanese government and turn these areas into levers of pressure and bargaining. The aim of this strategy is to impose an equation whereby land is traded for the disarmament of Hezbollah.
However, the success of this approach depends on the outcome of the Zionist regime's field efforts and the time constraints it faces—an issue that still shrouds the future of this strategy in ambiguity.
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