AhlulBayt News Agency (ABNA): A study prepared by researcher "Shadi Ibrahim" and published by the Al Jazeera Center for Studies indicates that Azerbaijan has become a strategic partner for the Zionist regime on Iran's northern borders. A relationship that has gone beyond diplomatic and commercial cooperation and has turned into a military, intelligence, and economic partnership. This relationship has been formed on the basis of a quid pro quo equation: Baku supplies a significant portion of the Zionist regime's oil needs, and Tel Aviv, in return, provides it with advanced military weapons and technologies.
According to this researcher, the Azerbaijan equation is based on the simultaneous use of two capacities: Turkey as a political supporter and regional bridge, and the Zionist regime as a supplier of advanced technology and security capabilities.
This study cites the statements of "Hikmat Hajiyev," the assistant to the President of Azerbaijan for foreign affairs, who said that both Turkey and the Zionist regime trust us.
Baku has also used this position to play a diplomatic role between Ankara and Tel Aviv, including participation in the process of re-normalizing relations between Turkey and the Zionist regime in 2022.
Azerbaijan has also hosted rounds of technical talks to prevent clashes between Turkish and Zionist regime military activities in Syria.
This study believes that Baku's ability to engage with parties that have different interests in other files gives this country a wide room for maneuver and strengthens the independence of its foreign policy decision-making.
Russia's Retreat and the Expansion of the Zionist Regime's Room for Maneuver
This study considers Russia a traditional security actor in the South Caucasus region. A position that stems from the legacy of the Soviet Union and Moscow's historical relations with Armenia.
Russia, despite its security ties with Armenia, has also maintained its pragmatic relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey so that its interests in the region's transport and energy routes are not harmed.
In previous periods, the Zionist regime was careful to keep its cooperation with Baku within a range that would not provoke Moscow, because Russia's and the Zionist regime's relations in Syria and the arms market were intertwined.
But Russia's war in Ukraine caused Moscow to become preoccupied and reduce its presence in the South Caucasus region. This situation allowed the Zionist regime to expand its security and economic cooperation with Azerbaijan without facing severe Russian reactions.
This study also refers to the decline of Iran's influence after Baku's victories in the Karabakh region, a development that strengthened Turkey's position in the region.
As a result, Azerbaijan is placed in a regional environment that gives it more opportunities to diversify its partnerships and take advantage of the competition of great and regional powers over influence in the South Caucasus.
The researcher believes that one of the common goals of Baku, Ankara, and Tel Aviv is to contain Iran's influence and rearrange energy and transport routes in Eurasia away from routes under Russian influence.
Iran and Azerbaijan; Security Competition Alongside Deep Social Ties
Despite the continuous tensions between Tehran and Baku, this study emphasizes that the relations between the two countries are more complex than a confrontation between a country allied with the Zionist regime and a country opposed to it.
The two countries share a common border and enjoy religious, cultural, and social ties. Also, the majority of the population of both countries are Muslim and Shiite.
This study refers to the existence of a large Azeri population in Iran, who mainly live in the northwestern regions of the country.
Based on estimates that this study quotes from the research of "Rasmus Christian Elling," the Azeri population of Iran is between 12 and 18 million people, a figure equivalent to about 16 to 24 percent of the country's population.
This study emphasizes that the mentioned figures are estimates, because Iran does not publish official population statistics based on ethnicity.
It also raises broader estimates. Among them are the statements of "Ali Akbar Salehi," the former foreign minister of Iran, in 2012 that about 40 percent of Iranians speak Turkish. Of course, this ratio also includes other groups of Turkic speakers in addition to Azeris.
According to this study, such demographic ties make relations with Azerbaijan not just a foreign policy file for Iran, but also take on domestic dimensions.
For this reason, Tehran tries to prevent Azerbaijan from becoming a base for the hostile activities of the Zionist regime against it. But at the same time, it knows that direct confrontation with Baku can affect Iran's internal balances and regional relations.
Intelligence Accusations and the Dispute Over the Zangezur Corridor
This study describes the security relations between Iran and Azerbaijan as based on mutual mistrust.
Tehran accuses Baku of allowing the intelligence activities of the Zionist regime near Iran's borders. In contrast, Azerbaijan accuses Iran of military support for Armenia and the use of religious and media networks to influence Azerbaijani society.
The dispute over the Zangezur Corridor has also added to these tensions. Baku considers this project a strategic plan that provides the possibility of connecting the main territory of Azerbaijan to the Nakhchivan region and Turkey.
In contrast, Iran considers this project a threat to its regional influence and its geographical position on the border with Armenia.
According to this study, the relations between the two countries have also reached dangerous levels of tension in previous periods, including the attack on the Azerbaijani embassy in Tehran in early 2023.
However, despite these crises, the two sides have tried to keep their communication channels and economic cooperation open.
This study describes the nature of the relations between the two countries as a cold peace. A situation in which inevitable cooperation flows alongside security and political competition.
Azerbaijan does not want to lose its interests with Iran, but it is not willing to overlook its partnership with the Zionist regime either. In contrast, Tehran tries to limit the Zionist regime's activity on its borders without being drawn into an open confrontation with Baku.
Why Azerbaijan Does Not Want War with Iran
This study concludes that the very geographical position that gives Azerbaijan importance in the Zionist regime's strategy also creates limitations for how this country interacts with Iran.
Sharing a border with Iran provides opportunities for security and intelligence cooperation with the Zionist regime, but at the same time places Azerbaijan directly exposed to the consequences of any military confrontation.
Economic relations and demographic and cultural ties between the two countries also increase the costs of escalating tensions.
According to this study, Baku tries to get the maximum benefit from its partnership with the Zionist regime, without entering the level of a direct military alliance against Iran.
This country, in advancing such an approach, benefits from its close relations with Turkey, the continuation of communication channels with Russia, and the ability to manage differences with Tehran.
Therefore, Azerbaijan's policy is not based on fully joining a single regional axis, but relies on distributing relations and interests with the aim of strengthening the independence of political decision-making.
However, the study warns that the expansion of the war against Iran makes maintaining this balance more difficult, especially with the increase in Tehran's sensitivity to the presence of the Zionist regime near its northern borders.
The Future of the Alliance; Deeper Partnership and a More Fragile Balance
Shadi Ibrahim in this study predicts the continuation and expansion of relations between Azerbaijan and the Zionist regime in the fields of energy, military technology, and security and intelligence cooperation.
The Zionist regime needs Azerbaijan's oil and benefits from Baku's strategic position. In contrast, Azerbaijan needs the Zionist regime's advanced weapons to develop its military capability and maintain its regional superiority.
This study says that the relations between Baku and Tel Aviv are formed on the basis of structural interests that are difficult to separate from the strategic calculations of the parties. Especially after the role that the Zionist regime's military cooperation with the Republic of Azerbaijan played in the Karabakh war, and Baku's oil exports to Tel Aviv continued during the Gaza war.
However, this closeness does not eliminate the limitations arising from geography and regional politics.
Turkey will remain Baku's closest ally, and Russia, despite the reduction of its influence, will remain one of the influential actors in the calculations of the South Caucasus. Meanwhile, Iran will continue to exert pressure to prevent Azerbaijan's borders from becoming a source of direct threat to its security.
This study considers the Nakhchivan crisis a sign of the fragility of this balance. A crisis during which the Zionist regime's war against Iran came close to spreading to a country that tries to benefit from its relations with the first party without entering into war with the second party.
Ultimately, this study concludes that Azerbaijan has been able to turn its geographical position, military needs, and oil resources into components for increasing power in regional relations, but at the same time, it has itself become part of the equation of conflict between the Zionist regime and Iran.
The Zionist regime has found in Azerbaijan both a relative replacement for Iran of the Shah's era, a main source for energy supply, and a security partner on Iran's borders. In contrast, Azerbaijan has obtained technology and military superiority from the Zionist regime, without abandoning its close alliance with Turkey or its efforts to manage relations with Tehran.
According to the conclusion of this study, Baku's biggest challenge is no longer the development of its partnership with the Zionist regime, but preserving this partnership without Azerbaijan itself becoming a new front in the war between Tehran and Tel Aviv.
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