AhlulBayt News Agency (ABNA): As American media portray it, the war against Iran has now stalled in a gray zone that is neither all-out war nor lasting peace. Neither Washington nor Tehran is ready to make the concessions that would pave the way for a genuine agreement, yet neither is inclined to return to full-scale conflict. For this reason, the ceasefire has entered its second month—a ceasefire that appears simultaneously sustainable and fragile.
According to a report by Al Jazeera, the Wall Street Journal writes that in such an atmosphere, Donald Trump continues to insist on a narrative of complete victory, warning that the ceasefire is now on life support. He has also emphasized that he will not back down from pressuring Iran to abandon its nuclear program.
But Tehran has a different narrative. From Iran's perspective, the political system remains intact, the nuclear and missile programs have been preserved, and the Strait of Hormuz remains a pressure lever in the hands of the Islamic Republic.
A War That Turned into a Mutual Blockade
The Wall Street Journal writes that instead of directly returning to war, the two sides have relied on a kind of mutual blockade, from which a retreat would carry heavy political costs for both.
Within this framework, Washington has increased pressure on Iranian ports and vessels, while Tehran has maintained its control and influence over the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world's most vital energy arteries.
Allison Minor, a former U.S. official and researcher at the Atlantic Council, told the newspaper that the current situation is full of bad options, and if the Trump administration wants to end the war more quickly, it may be forced to back down from some of its core objectives.
Negotiation Without Concession
According to the Wall Street Journal, optimism about the negotiations had increased last week, with some officials close to the talks reporting that Tehran and Washington were nearing a framework for lasting peace.
But this optimism was quickly overshadowed by two fundamental disagreements concerning the future of the Strait of Hormuz and the extent of restrictions acceptable to Iran on its nuclear program.
According to the report, Iran's latest proposal, quickly rejected by Trump, reflects Tehran's growing confidence—confidence based on the perception that Washington's threats to escalate the conflict are not decisive, and that Iran can outlast the White House in a protracted confrontation.
The proposal showed little flexibility regarding the U.S. demand for a long-term halt to the nuclear program. In contrast, Tehran had called for postponing the nuclear file until after the war's end, early sanctions relief, and quicker U.S. action to lift the economic blockade. In exchange, a gradual reopening of the Strait of Hormuz was mentioned.
The Wall Street Journal also writes that Iran is trying, with the participation of regional actors, to define new rules for passage through the Strait of Hormuz—rules that may include fees or mechanisms that Tehran considers a form of war reparations.
Iran has also tried to link the end of the war to a lasting ceasefire in Lebanon and a reduction in tensions between Israel and Hezbollah—an issue opposed by Washington and Tel Aviv.
Raz Zimmt, director of the Iran program at Israel's Institute for National Security Studies, says Tehran's confidence in its ability to shape a peace agreement has increased following America's failure to reopen the Strait of Hormuz militarily and the Trump administration's emphasis on ending the war.
According to him, Iran no longer wants to return to pre-war conditions and is now seeking long-term economic and security guarantees and to profit economically from the new regional reality.
The Iranian Trap from John Bolton's Perspective
On the other side, John Bolton, Trump's former national security advisor, in an article in the Washington Post, presented a more radical view of the crisis.
Bolton believes that Trump has fallen into a self-made Iranian trap. On one hand, he is desperately seeking an agreement he can present as a victory, and on the other, he is terrified of an agreement similar to Barack Obama's JCPOA.
In Bolton's view, a large part of this crisis is the result of actions Trump did not take before the attacks. These include failing to explain the reasons for using military force to the American public, insufficient coordination with the U.S. Congress and NATO allies, and the Gulf countries, as well as lacking a clear plan for Iran's political future.
In Bolton's view, Trump's main problem was not starting the war, but not finishing it. He believes that the U.S. and Israeli attacks dealt significant blows to Iran, but the cessation of operations gave Tehran time to rebuild its military, nuclear, and regional structures.
Although this analysis is clearly in favor of escalating the conflict, it shows that there is a current in Washington that views any diplomatic agreement as a retreat and believes that leaving the Strait of Hormuz in Iran's hands will weaken America's deterrence.
Achievements Without a Final Outcome
The Wall Street Journal, citing American officials, writes that the Trump administration has managed to achieve some tactical gains, including weakening part of Iran's military and naval structure.
But these successes have not yet translated into strategic objectives, as Iran has neither abandoned its nuclear and missile programs nor stopped supporting its regional allied networks.
The White House believes that pressure on Iran's trade and ports has given Washington an important lever, and that Iran, under severe economic pressure, is seeking a way out.
Nevertheless, U.S. administration officials emphasize that the war against Iran should not be compared to the Iraq or Afghanistan experiences, and they still consider the war against Iran a short, effective operation that can force Iran to make concessions.
But here lies the core of the crisis: the war has been too short to be called a quagmire, yet it has become long and complex enough that a quick victory can no longer be spoken of.
The ceasefire has lasted almost longer than the war itself, but it has not brought peace. American pressure has been painful, but it has not forced Iran to surrender, and negotiations are trying to extract concessions that the war could not impose.
Suzanne Maloney, a researcher at the Brookings Institution, believes that the most likely scenario is the continuation of this attritional state, as both sides seek through negotiation to achieve what they failed to achieve on the battlefield.
Ultimately, what is today called the Iranian trap is less the result of Tehran's design than the outcome of a war that America began with ambitious goals, without a clear path to end it.
Now, every path before Trump—including an imperfect agreement that would accuse him of weakness, a renewed escalation that could turn the crisis into a prolonged conflict, or remaining in this gray zone where there is neither peace to declare nor victory to display nor a guarantee against the crisis's return—carries a heavy cost.
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