AhlulBayt News Agency (ABNA): In 1956, one of the most pivotal turning points in modern geopolitics occurred. On July 19, 1956, as the United States withdrew funding for the construction of the Aswan Dam in Egypt, the Suez Crisis began.
The crisis intensified on July 26, when Egyptian revolutionary leader Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal. Britain and France perceived this move as a direct threat to their interests. Indeed, the crisis placed the global economy at risk, as the Suez Canal was a vital artery for international trade.
Israel as the Initiator of the 1956 Suez Crisis
After Gamal Abdel Nasser assumed the presidency of Egypt in 1954, the British Royal Navy withdrew from Egypt, though Britain retained the right to reoccupy the area in times of crisis. Britain could not accept the complete loss of control. Thus, Nasser’s actions were viewed both as a strategic threat and a symbolic challenge.
Diplomatic efforts between August and October 1956 failed. On October 22–24, Britain, France, and Israel reached a secret agreement at Sèvres, near Paris, on a covert, green-tinged plan. Israel was not merely a supporting actor in this arrangement but the operational catalyst.
Since Britain and France lacked international legitimacy to launch a direct attack on Egypt, Israel initiated the war on October 29, 1956, by invading the Sinai Peninsula. Subsequently, Britain and France intervened under the pretext of separating the warring parties and securing the canal’s safety.
It should be noted that Israel became a de facto nuclear power around 1967, although it has never officially confirmed this status. The foundations of this capability were laid in the late 1950s, immediately following the 1956 Suez Crisis. This crisis established a strategic alignment between Israel and France. France, seeking to counter the influence of Gamal Abdel Nasser in Algeria, agreed to provide critical nuclear assistance to Israel, support that included the Dimona reactor and the technological infrastructure for plutonium production.
Studies indicate that Israel consciously assumed the role of the primary aggressor, making the military operation in 1956 possible. This was not an accidental three-way conflict but a coordinated intervention, with Israel at its core. Israel entered Sinai on October 29; Britain and France launched air attacks on October 31; and on November 5–6, ground forces landed in Port Said.
Hungary and the Soviet Union
At the same time, the anti-communist uprising in Hungary, which began on October 23, 1956, created a strategic opportunity for the Soviet Union. Prime Minister Imre Nagy introduced reforms, moved toward a multi-party system, and declared Hungary’s withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact.
On November 4, just before the British and French ground forces landed in Port Said, Soviet forces entered Budapest with overwhelming force and crushed the uprising. While the United Nations was preoccupied with the Suez Crisis, the Hungarian crisis was pushed to the margins. The Western powers, divided and indecisive, failed to deliver an effective response.
This simultaneity revealed a fundamental geopolitical truth: fractures in one arena create opportunities in another. President Eisenhower was particularly enraged by this outcome. Britain retained military capability but lacked financial capacity. On January 9, 1957, Anthony Eden resigned.
The Decline of Britain
Britain's decline was gradual. In the 19th century, the pound dominated global trade. By the early 20th century, the United States had surpassed Britain in industrial production. The two World Wars left London heavily indebted.
Although the Royal Navy remained powerful in 1945, it rapidly declined due to economic constraints and dependence on the United States. By 1956, Britain was no longer capable of independent action. Britain withdrew from the eastern Suez in 1971, relinquished its strategic military positions to the U.S. Navy, and effectively ended its era of global naval supremacy.
The Strait of Hormuz Crisis and Lessons from the Past
Seventy years later, a similar systemic rupture emerged in the crisis centered on the Strait of Hormuz in March 2026. As the Gulf War entered its fourth week, the Strait of Hormuz was effectively blockaded. The cost of this conflict has already exceeded $30 billion for the United States.
Typically, around 140 ships pass through this strait daily. Now, only a handful can navigate it. Approximately 20% of global oil trade flows through this chokepoint. The disruptions have triggered a physical supply crisis. Energy prices are rising sharply, impacting fertilizer, agriculture, industry, and semiconductor production. Food security risks are rapidly emerging.
On March 15, the United States released 172 million barrels from its Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), reducing reserves to approximately 243 million barrels. With a daily consumption of about 20 million barrels, this amount covers only roughly 12 days. In 2009, SPR levels stood at 727 million barrels.
Meanwhile, the United States faces mounting fiscal crises and an escalating national debt that has surpassed $40 trillion. Annual interest payments are approaching $1 trillion. The request for an additional $200 billion in defense funding underscores the fragility of this trajectory. The inability to pass domestic budgets, combined with the expansion of overseas military commitments, reveals a deep institutional imbalance.
At the same time, China and Gulf states are actively reducing their holdings of U.S. Treasury securities, evidence of the erosion of the dollar’s reserve currency status and a stark reminder of Britain’s earlier decline.
The Waning Power of the U.S. Navy / The High Risk of American Casualties in Ground Operations
The United States’ real power lies in its dollar and its navy. Yet today, both are weakening. Its land-based military capability is insufficient to reverse the situation in the Strait of Hormuz. Although two carrier strike groups have psychological deterrence value, they cannot exert tangible operational impact.
The USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group cannot approach the coast due to severe Iranian missile and drone threats. The situation with the USS Gerald R. Ford remains unresolved, as it is being held off the coast of Saudi Arabia due to the ongoing Houthi threat in the Red Sea. A fire aboard the Ford, which lasted 30 hours, was kept concealed by the public. The vessel is now returning to Kure Island for inspection and repairs.
In the Pacific Ocean, the USS Ronald Reagan is undergoing repairs, the USS Tripoli and its attached Marine Expeditionary Unit have departed the region, and at least four destroyers have been redeployed to other operational areas. As a result, the number of U.S. surface vessels continuously operating in the Pacific has fallen to critical levels.
These figures clearly demonstrate that, despite possessing 292 ships, 233 of which are combat-capable, the United States will have only 104 vessels (75 of them combat-ready) available for active combat operations by 2026, making it incapable of simultaneously sustaining military deployments across two fronts. The stationed Marine Corps force, comprising approximately 2,500 personnel, is vastly outnumbered and geographically distant from a country like Iran, with a population of nearly 85 million and vast territorial depth. Moreover, the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit, which departed San Diego on March 20, 2026, will not reach the Persian Gulf for at least three weeks. Even if both Marine units were to unite, their military impact would be negligible, while American casualties would likely exceed all projections.
Furthermore, the fact that NATO and Asian allies have failed to deliver a strong response to Washington’s call for “deploying ships to the Persian Gulf to reopen the Strait of Hormuz” underscores that this transformation has already begun. At this juncture, a fundamental truth of international relations is once again revealed: states have no permanent friends, only permanent interests.
All these developments confirm General Colin Powell’s warning about Iraq in 2002, “If you break something, you own it.” If you dismantle a system by force, you must also assume responsibility for the chaos that follows. The current crisis in the Strait of Hormuz demonstrates that this principle now operates on a global scale.
The Western Pacific and the Potential Crisis Over Taiwan
The current Hormuz crisis inflicts its greatest impact on the Indo-Pacific region. Energy importers such as Australia, Japan, and South Korea will suffer severe consequences, while exporters like Russia stand to benefit from higher prices. This crisis, combined with the lifting of Trump-era sanctions, generates a daily windfall of approximately $150 million for Russia. Meanwhile, countries whose energy security has been compromised will rapidly seek new alliances.
What further exacerbates this situation is unfolding on the Korean Peninsula. As the United States transfers Patriot and THAAD systems from South Korea to the Middle East, North Korea conducted new ballistic missile tests last week. Moreover, it is believed that the cruise missiles launched from newly commissioned destroyer platforms may possess the capability to carry nuclear warheads.
These developments indicate that the U.S. missile defense umbrella in the Pacific is weakening, and the regional deterrence architecture is becoming increasingly fragile. Reports published in The Financial Times on March 21, 2026, remind us that extensive use of Tomahawk cruise missiles and air defense interceptors (Patriot, SM-series) will be essential not only for defending Taiwan but also for launching strikes against Chinese forces at the outset of any conflict. The reports also warn that U.S. production capacity is limited, and replenishing munitions could take months or even years.
The conclusion is that China’s pressure on Taiwan is not solely determined by China’s own capabilities, but also by the declining attention and resources of the United States. The U.S. is simultaneously attempting to balance its commitments across multiple fronts. While the Trump administration seeks to achieve a symbolic success in Cuba, China continues to steadily escalate its military pressure around Taiwan.
In the second week of March 2026, over 40 combat aircraft and more than 10 naval assets conducted operations around Taiwan within a 24-hour period. This is not temporary exercise, but a permanent, ongoing blockade strategy. When the Soviet Union invaded Hungary in 1956, the West was unable to respond effectively.
The model China is currently implementing around Taiwan may lead to a similar outcome. However, this time the difference is greater. China is not only a military power, but also a structural player in production, trade, and finance.
By 2025, China had become the world’s largest navy by number of vessels, and its economic weight is accelerating global transformation. In 1956, U.S. hegemonic power was rising, Britain was in decline, and the Soviet Union was a regional hard power. By 2026, China is rising as a hegemonic power, the United States remains the current hegemon, and Taiwan plays the role of modern-day Hungary. Yet this time, the transition of hegemony will not occur within a family of allies. The Suez Crisis marked the end of Britain’s global dominance.
The Hormuz crisis could have a similar consequence for the United States—this time, however, a power exists that is ready to assume a systemic role not only militarily, but also economically and financially. In 1956, the U.S. was ready to lead; today, China is ready. Thus, the Suez Crisis marked a conclusion, but the Hormuz crisis may mark the beginning of a new era.
Israel and the Repetition of Crisis Creation for the World
The world is passing through a new threshold. Energy, security, transportation routes, and economic balances are simultaneously breaking down. Israel and the United States stand out as the driving forces behind this process. Long-term dialogue about the American dream, India, and Israel, about the IMEC economic corridor, the Abraham Accords, the Gaza peace committee, no longer holds relevance. Financial capital is fleeing from unmanaged wars. The region is rapidly moving away from investment and prosperity.
Stopping the war is not solely dependent on Iran’s resistance. What truly matters is the pressure that regional states and rational actors will exert on the United States and Israel. Indeed, the cautious stance of Europe, Japan, and South Korea, along with their rejection of Trump’s request to deploy warships, indicates that this crisis is confronting a global legitimacy deficit. If this process remains unchecked, this period will be recorded in history not as a prolonged regional war, but as a chain of global economic and social upheavals.
For the stability of the world, halting the escalation of tensions is no longer a choice, it has become a necessity. Israel, with a population of approximately 9 million, using American power, has initiated a process that will affect 8 billion people. Unfortunately, only a small number of rational individuals in the United States fully grasp this reality.
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