ABNA24 - Iran’s foreign minister has said that “over the past three years, the United States has spent $11 billion in American taxpayers’ money on missile defense for Israel.”
Iranian Foreign Minister Seyyed Abbas Araghchi stated that “the United States has fired more interceptor missiles to defend Israel than Israel itself has,” describing the relationship as “not based on mutual interests, but rather a parasitic, one-sided relationship.”
According to estimates by Steven Semler, a US foreign policy analyst, American forces fired around 609 interceptor missiles worth approximately $11 billion to defend Israel between October 2023 and September 2026. This calculation does not include missiles used to protect US forces in the region. The reported figure therefore represents only part of Washington’s direct military spending in support of Tel Aviv.
The scale of these costs becomes clearer when viewed in the context of US military aid to the Israeli regime. Under a 2016 memorandum of understanding, Washington committed to providing $3.3 billion in annual military aid and $500 million for missile defense programs. These commitments are separate from the costs of direct military operations and replenishing expended munitions.
Consequently, US support for the Israeli regime is not limited to annual aid. In times of crisis, Washington also deploys its military forces and weapons stockpiles to protect the regime.
The main issue, however, is not just money and missiles; it is the relationship between the costs borne by the United States and the objectives pursued by the Israeli regime. This contradiction became clear in two wars against Iran. In June 2025, the Israeli regime launched a military attack in the midst of indirect negotiations between Iran and the United States, and Washington eventually entered the war directly by attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities. On February 28, 2026, the United States and the Israeli regime launched another military attack against Iran. The consequences of this war extended beyond the battlefield, imposing heavy costs on Washington’s weapons stockpiles and regional standing, as well as on energy markets in the United States and around the world.
At both junctures, Netanyahu’s role in pushing Trump toward military action was the subject of media reports and analysis. Netanyahu portrayed an attack on Iran as a way to achieve Israel’s strategic objectives and sought to secure direct US support to advance them. Now, renewed efforts to resort to military action are increasing the risk of repeating the same miscalculation. The assumption that US firepower could force Iran to retreat while containing the subsequent costs has been challenged by the experience of both wars, which has shown that entering such a confrontation carries consequences far beyond its architects’ initial calculations.
This situation has created a strategic contradiction for Washington. On the one hand, the US administration promises, under the slogan “America First,” to put the country’s resources at the service of the American people’s direct interests. On the other hand, it spends billions of dollars defending Israel and puts pressure on its missile stockpiles by entering the war. An October 2026 report by the US Congressional Research Service has also highlighted concerns about declining munitions stockpiles and the lengthy time required to replace some interceptor missiles. According to analyses by American think tanks and media outlets, these costs are not merely a budget line; they also affect US military readiness in other regions, including the Indo-Pacific.
Within the United States, unconditional support for Israel has also become more contentious than ever. Growing criticism of Tel Aviv’s policies has increased the political cost of this relationship for the US administration. Under these circumstances, questioning Washington’s actual interests in this alliance is no longer a demand voiced solely by foreign critics; it is an issue tied to defense spending, military priorities and political divisions within American society. Against this backdrop, the need to reassess the limits and consequences of this alliance has become increasingly pressing.
From this perspective, Araghchi’s remarks offer a clear picture of part of the military price of the US-Israel relationship—a relationship in which decisions made by Tel Aviv can impose direct and indirect costs on Washington. The ultimate question is whether continuing down this path is consistent with the claim that US national interests come first, or whether Washington is once again paying the price for a strategic failure stemming from Netanyahu’s pursuit of the Israeli regime’s objectives.
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