ABNA24 - The United Arab Emirates' decision to leave OPEC was presented by Abu Dhabi as a strategic move toward greater energy autonomy. The reality tells a different story. This departure represents the tacit acknowledgment of a deeper geopolitical defeat: the end of a decades-long project in which the Persian Gulf monarchies attempted to construct a regional order that excluded Iran. What we are witnessing is the collapse of the security architecture that has defined the Persian Gulf since 1981.
The Persian Gulf Cooperation Council was conceived as a cordon sanitaire against the Islamic Revolution. Four decades later, that project has failed. The recent war with Iran revealed the fundamental truth the monarchies had tried to conceal: without American protection, the regional balance of power favors Tehran.
Abu Dhabi bet heavily on an order in which Iran would be contained or defeated. That bet has failed. It now faces a future in which Iran holds veto power over access to Persian Gulf oil. The irony is considerable: an organization that Saudi Arabia dominated for decades now operates in a market where Tehran has the final word.
The Persian Gulf Cooperation Council was always more appearance than reality. Built on the fiction of shared monarchical solidarity, the (P)GCC concealed profound rivalries and contradictory visions of the regional future. What held it together was not a positive common project, but a common enemy: Iran.
The blockade against Qatar between 2017 and 2021 exposed the depth of divisions. Riyadh and Abu Dhabi attempted to discipline Doha for its relations with Iran and Turkey. Qatar resisted, demonstrating that the (P)GCC could not impose discipline even on its smallest member.
The war in Yemen constituted another collective humiliation. Despite massive spending on Western armaments and American support, the coalition proved unable to defeat Ansarallah. The conflict aggravated internal divisions: the Emirates and Saudi Arabia pursued divergent objectives; Oman maintained neutrality; Qatar was excluded.
The recent war with Iran consummated this disintegration. During forty days of confrontation, the Persian Gulf monarchies remained paralyzed. Despite repeated Iranian attacks, none undertook significant offensive action. Bases were struck; oil infrastructure was exposed; the Strait of Hormuz passed under Iranian control. Decades of defense spending had not prepared these monarchies to confront an adversary with effective power projection capability. The monarchies depended entirely on American protection that no longer operated as a reliable security horizon. Without that support, the (P)GCC was stripped of its raison d'être.
Iran and the new oil order
The days of a Saudi-dominated OPEC era is over. The global oil market now operates under a new reality: Iran possesses effective veto power over access to Persian Gulf crude. This transformation derives from a material reconfiguration of power in the Strait of Hormuz.
Tehran can interrupt oil traffic when necessary. It can strike energy infrastructure on the Arabian Peninsula and raise maritime insurance costs to prohibitive levels. Saudi Arabia may have greater reserves and production capacity, but Iran controls the critical chokepoint. If Tehran constricts the Strait, that oil does not reach global markets. Market power has migrated from those who control production to those who control access.
This explains why Saudi Arabia has sought a modus vivendi with Iran. The China-mediated normalization agreement in 2023 reflected Riyadh's recognition that perpetual confrontation no longer served its interests. The Saudis can maintain security ties with the United States, but can no longer afford open hostility toward Iran.
Oman and Qatar reached this conclusion years ago. Kuwait and Bahrain shelter under the American umbrella while avoiding provocation of Iran. But the Emirates bet differently. Abu Dhabi doubled down on confrontation with Iran, deepening ties with Israel, expanding military presence in the Horn of Africa, intervening in conflicts from Libya to Sudan. Mohammed bin Zayed constructed an image of the Emirates as a regional power projecting influence far beyond its size. This strategy depended on the premise that Iran would be contained, that American and Israeli support would guarantee Emirati security.
Abu Dhabi's dead end
The war with Iran dismantled that premise. The Emirates discovered that neither the United States nor Israel would guarantee protection of its interests. Its military capacity proved insufficient against a determined adversary. Above all, it had decisively overestimated its strategic importance.
Mohammed bin Zayed, who had cultivated the image of an indispensable actor in regional diplomacy, was placed at the margins of the political process. In the new regional order, Abu Dhabi does not have a seat at the main table.
The Emirates now faces a fundamentally hostile strategic environment. Iran possesses both capacity and motivation to act against Abu Dhabi. Saudi Arabia perceives the Emirates as a competitor whose autonomy must be contained. The United States will not guarantee Emirati security unconditionally.
The role of wild card in the regional deck that Abu Dhabi performed for years has ended. The future could take various forms: domesticated and forced to retreat; gradually absorbed by Saudi Arabia; or even fragmented. What seems improbable is restoration of its previous position.
Mohammed bin Zayed built his power on bold bets and exploitation of adversaries' weaknesses. Those bets have failed. The adversaries have proven stronger than anticipated. The allies proved unreliable. The OPEC exit acknowledges this reality: Abu Dhabi can no longer compete in the structures that defined the previous order.
The emerging regional order is being defined by powers that do not include the Emirates as a principal actor: Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, with Chinese and Russian mediation. Abu Dhabi can adapt to this order or resist it, but can hardly shape it.
The collapse of the (P)GCC, the consolidation of Iranian market power, and the marginalization of the Emirates are manifestations of a deeper transformation: the end of the Persian Gulf order constructed under American hegemony.
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