ABNA24 - Israel is portraying Ali al-Taher as a “victory.” But if the area had already been evacuated beforehand, the story is not one of Hezbollah’s defeat, but rather a clear example of the difference between two approaches to warfare.
In war, the side that stands a few meters farther ahead does not necessarily win. Sometimes, more important than who has captured a particular high ground is what remains there and what price the enemy has paid to reach it.
The story of Ali al-Taher is important precisely from this perspective.
Based on the account presented by Hezbollah, the area had been evacuated before Israeli forces entered it, and the Resistance’s strategic equipment had also been removed. If we take this account as the basis for analysis, what the Israeli army captured is not necessarily a vital operational center or a decisive Hezbollah infrastructure, but rather a geographical position that the Resistance had decided not to defend through conventional warfare.
This is precisely where many Israeli media narratives make a fundamental mistake: they assess Hezbollah as though it were a conventional army.
A conventional army usually has defined lines, borders and fixed positions, and losing a high ground or withdrawing from an axis can directly signify defeat on that part of the front. But an organization such as Hezbollah is fundamentally not built around this logic.
In asymmetric warfare, territory matters, but “holding territory at any cost” is not necessarily the primary principle.
For such a force, what matters more is where the enemy is halted, where it becomes vulnerable, how many forces it deploys into an area, and what price it will have to pay to maintain its newly established position.
Put simply, Hezbollah does not necessarily ask: “How can we hold this hill forever?”
The more important question may be: “How can we make the enemy’s presence on this very hill costly for them?”
This distinction changes the entire meaning of the battlefield.
A conventional army may view a withdrawal as a sign that it has lost the initiative. But in guerrilla and asymmetric warfare, a withdrawal can itself be part of the operation. The defending force can evacuate an area, preserve its main capabilities, draw the enemy forward, and then choose the time and location of the next engagement.
Therefore, even if the Israeli army is currently stationed in part of Ali al-Taher, the decisive question remains unanswered: What comes next?
Has the presence in this area eliminated Hezbollah’s operational capabilities?
Has the Resistance’s command network or strategic equipment been destroyed?
Or has Israel simply entered an area from which a significant portion of its operational capacity had already been evacuated?
If the answer to the last question is yes, the gap between the military reality and Israel’s propaganda narrative will be very significant.
This is where Israeli domestic politics also comes into play.
Israel’s elections will be held on October 27, and Netanyahu has once again entered a critical contest for his political survival. Recent reports also indicate that security and his government’s wartime record are among the key issues in the election campaign.
In such an environment, Netanyahu needs an “image of achievement” more than ever.
He needs a map on which an area is marked in a new color; images of Israeli soldiers standing atop a high ground; and headlines that can tell the domestic audience that the army has advanced and Hezbollah has retreated.
Even a limited tactical achievement can be turned into a “strategic victory” by the election propaganda machine. But Netanyahu’s problem is that a real war does not end with election images.
If Hezbollah has withdrawn the bulk of its capabilities from the area, if its combat structure remains intact, and if Israeli forces are still forced to pay the price of maintaining their presence after entering new areas, then capturing a high ground is less the end of the story than the beginning of its next chapter.
And this may be the most important reality about Ali al-Taher:
Israel can color a hill on the map, but Hezbollah is fundamentally not fighting to defend colors on a map.
The logic of the Resistance is to preserve its capabilities, choose the timing of its strikes, and wear down an enemy that needs quick results to demonstrate victory.
From this perspective, what Netanyahu is presenting today as an achievement may become a more difficult problem tomorrow—not how the Israeli army entered Ali al-Taher, but what price it will have to pay to remain there.
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