15 April 2026 - 10:01
Source: Al-Waght News
Report / Election of Amidi As Iraq’s President: PUK Restores Power, Political Dynamics Shift

The period of political uncertainty that has been overshadowing Iraq for months has ended following a strategic and surprising turn. The election of Nizar Amidi, the candidate of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), as new Iraqi president on Sunday is not a simple change in the list of the officials of the country, it is a turning point in the Iraqi power dynamics, the competition among the two leading Kurdish parties, and redefinition of the international influence in the autonomous Kurdistan region. This shift signals a paradigm change in Kurdistan coalitions and even charts a new course for the ruling Shiite Coordination Framework’s policy to break the prime ministerial deadlock in Baghdad.

ABNA24 - The period of political uncertainty that has been overshadowing Iraq for months has ended following a strategic and surprising turn. The election of Nizar Amidi, the candidate of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), as new Iraqi president on Sunday is not a simple change in the list of the officials of the country, it is a turning point in the Iraqi power dynamics, the competition among the two leading Kurdish parties, and redefinition of the international influence in the autonomous Kurdistan region. This shift signals a paradigm change in Kurdistan coalitions and even charts a new course for the ruling Shiite Coordination Framework’s policy to break the prime ministerial deadlock in Baghdad.

Strategic success of the PUK against rival bloc

First and foremost, the selection of Amidi marked a strategic victory for the PUK. To grasp the depth of this triumph, one must return to the internal dynamics of the Iraqi Kurdistan.

In recent months, the rivalry between the PUK and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) had reached an impasse. The KDP, adopting a hardline stance and introducing a rival candidate, attempted to leverage political brinkmanship and its veto power in parliament to extract significant concessions on internal regional issues, such as resource management, budget, and the local Kurdistan cabinet. The KDP’s strategy was built on obstructionism, with them understanding that by preventing the PUK from achieving the two-thirds parliamentary majority required for presidential elections, they could keep the PUK in a deadlock.

However, what we have witnessed in recent days is a display of diplomatic prowess and politic that transcends the Kurdistan region’s borders. The PUK transformed the landscape by shifting the battlefield from Erbil to Baghdad. Accurately perceiving the fissures within rival coalitions, the party engaged in a complex game of intricate, behind-the-scenes negotiations to find new parliamentary partners, rendering the KDP’s cooperation unnecessary. This signifies that the PUK successfully turned the two-thirds law, which previously was a tool for paralyzing the process, into an instrument for beating the KDP. This victory not only solidifies the PUK’s standing within Iraq’s power structure but also significantly bolsters its political authority against its long-standing Kurdish rival.

Failure of pressure diplomacy; White House backs down 

At a broader level, the election of Amidi goes beyond a party victory, mounting to a strategic loss to the US and the White House policies. In recent months, the US openly pushed to sway the Iraqi government formation process to a departure from the resistance coalition and under the direct influence of the US and and its interests. Washington threatening to impose strict sanctions in case of not forming a government outside the circle of the resistance is indicative of the heavy diplomatic and economic pressures of Washington on the Iraqi actors. 

Washington was hopeful that, using sanctions and support to specific political currents, it could bring to power a government in Baghdad that will work like a buffer against the influence of the Resistance camp. However, a look at election of Amidi made it clear that political cohesion among the political parties demanding national sovereignty and resistance role in Iraq has beaten the foreign pressures. This election sent a clear message to the White House, telling it that the power structure in Iraq, just contrary to Washington’s calculations, is shaped by regional logic and home power balance, not foreign dictates.

Change of equation of prime minister post

The abrupt selection of Amidi , bypassing the customary agreement process in Erbil, has in turn reshaped the equation for selecting the prime minister. This choice has effectively made the path to premiership significantly more arduous for Nouri al-Maliki, the leading candidate for the Coordination Framework and leader of the State of Law coalition. Al-Maliki had previously allied with Masoud Barzani, leader of the KDP, during intra-parliamentary contests to form the future cabinet. Consequently, alongside KDP representatives, he boycotted the presidential election session.

All eyes are now once again on the Shiite Coordination Framework (SCF) to announce a new candidate or, less likely, reaffirm their commitment to al-Maliki’s candidacy. Other potential contenders include prominent figures such as caretaker Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, ex-PM Haider al-Abadi, Badr al-Douri, Mohsen al-Mandawi, Hamid al-Shatri, Qasim al-Araji, and Ali Shukri. However, despite this development, it appears unlikely that a significant rift will emerge within the Shiite Coordination Framework, as the parliamentary majority coalition.

Outcomes and future outlook

This political development has two key outcomes:

First, redefining the power in Kurdistan region: The PUK's victory in Baghdad significantly bolsters its political weight in future negotiations for the formation of local Kurdish cabinet. The KDP, defeated by a strategy of obstructionism, now finds itself in a difficult position to return to the negotiating table, as the primary power to determine the autonomous region’s future has returned from Baghdad. Consequently, the political deadlock in Erbil has not only remained unresolved but is likely to intensify, with heightened competition exacerbating the political division between Erbil and Sulaymaniyah as the two power holders in Kurdistan over core issues such as the presidency of the region, the premiership, the cabinet, and matters of budget and oil exports.

Second, consolidating the standing of the Resistance csmp: Forming a government against the will of the White House means defeat of the diplomacy of pressure. This can prepare the Iraqi political scene for even more powerful presence of the resistance allies in the future and prevent their political isolation.

Finally, though the cabinet formation process is in its early stages, with the election of a president the power blocs will be clarified. Actually, the course of the government formation is now one that more than ever is aligned with the Iraqi position in the Resistance camp, rather than with the American and Arab logic of assimilation of the country into their agenda. 

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