ABNA24 - Multiple weeks after the ceasefire in the Persian Gulf, the Arab monarchies are still grappling with the fallout of the crisis and see a return to stability in the shadow of tensions in the Strait of Hormuz beyond reach.
Among the Persian Gulf Arab states, no one more than the UAE finds itself the loser of the current regional dynamics. This is reflected in the economic crisis driven by capital flight, relocation of big companies, loss of tourism revenues, and halt of oil revenues. Add to these the crisis in the home and foreign policy.
On the domestic political front, the recent war has ripped open an old wound, threatening the federation’s cohesion as old rivalries among the emirates resurface.
According to unconfirmed reports circulating on Arab social media, Sheikh Sultan bin Muhammad Al Qasimi, the ruler of Sharjah, and Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, the ruler of Dubai, are both unhappy with Abu Dhabi’s foreign policy.
The reports claim that Sharjah’s ruling family, which is deeply conservative and closely aligned with Saudi Arabia’s monarchs, opposes Israeli influence in the Emirates, viewing it as a betrayal of the UAE’s founding fathers, who were staunchly anti-Israel and pro-Palestine.
As for bin Rashid, he reportedly voiced his dissatisfaction in a provocative social media post: “Life has taught me that responsibility is a trust. An official whose only concern is personal success is not trustworthy. An official who doesn’t care about the success of others is not reliable. Selfishness in achieving personal success is a betrayal of that trust, because the homeland cannot be divided or fragmented. Responsibility means bearing the worries of the nation—all of it—so that the people carry no burden.”
This comes after earlier reports of escalating tensions between Sheikh Rashid and Mohammed bin Zayed, the UAE’s president, over bin Zayed’s ambitious and troublesome regional policies, which have led to confrontations with neighbors like Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey.
These reports likely only scratch the surface of deep, long-standing divisions woven into the very fabric of the federation’s history.
In 1968, Britain decided to withdraw from the Persian Gulf, but before leaving, it sought to create a union or federation from its protectorate sheikhdoms. Until the 1950s, there were virtually no fixed borders between the Persian Gulf sheikhdoms and their territories were vaguely defined and often overlapped. Originally, both Qatar and Bahrain were meant to join the seven emirates in the union, but due to differences in size, population, wealth, and development, the decision was ultimately made to form the United Arab Emirates from just seven: Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Sharjah, Ras Al Khaimah, Ajman, Umm Al Quwain, and Fujairah.
The country is governed by the Federal Supreme Council, made up of the rulers of all seven emirates. The ruler of Abu Dhabi serves as president of the UAE, while the ruler of Dubai serves as vice president and prime minister.
This distribution of posts rests on hierarchy of power and wealth as the governing system relies on tribal system. So, the wealth and poverty of various emirates impacts the scale of the influence of each of them in the policies of the union. For example, Abu Dhabi and Dubai are top in the union as they are oil-rich and also hold trade centrality. This gives them a veto right and more representatives in the Federal Council.
Every four years, one of the rulers of the seven emirates should preside over the union, but this condition has not been met over the past 5 decades.
And while the constitution calls for cooperation on federal matters like foreign policy and defense, in practice Abu Dhabi, followed by Dubai, calls all the shots on the UAE's external relations.
This power imbalance stems first and foremost from an uneven contribution to the federation's budget. In practice, Abu Dhabi, thanks to its massive oil revenues, pays the largest share, and has consequently asserted uncontested dominance over all the other emirates. That has allowed Abu Dhabi to impose its own ideas and policies on the rest, while sidestepping established rules that require consulting the Federal Supreme Council on major national decisions and policies.
On top of that, there’s no shared, clear development plan among the seven emirates. Each one is going its own way, pursuing separate programs for growth. The fiercest competition is between Sharjah and Dubai, and between Sharjah and Ras Al Khaimah. Sharjah, for instance, is building one of the largest and most advanced ports in the Persian Gulf, just half an hour from Dubai’s Port, in a bid to reclaim its former status as a commercial hub.
Despite all of these problems, the biggest challenge of the UAE is the lack of true unity among its seven members. The lack of interest of other six emirates in the federal union which is largely under control of Abu Dhabi has resurfaced these days amid a crisis that the adventure of Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed has brought to the UAE through alignment with the Israeli regime and the US in their war of aggression against Iran.
According to the UAE’s constitution, the president cannot unilaterally decide on the federation’s overall policy, defense, or foreign affairs without consulting the members of the Supreme Council. Yet decisions made without consensus, like those during the recent war, end up affecting the security and economy of all seven emirates. These internal rifts previously came to light over the management of the Yemen crisis. At the time, Dubai’s ruler publicly criticized the country’s crisis management after the UAE suffered a string of battlefield defeats and mounting war costs.
Yet the costs and challenges of confronting Iran, both short- and long-term, dwarf anything the UAE faced in Yemen. That means this newly public rift would not just stay confined to a few snipes on social media. As events unfold, the UAE could be heading toward a severe internal fracture, one that might eventually lead to a future where the UAE, as we know it on the map today, no longer exists.
/129
Your Comment