AhlulBayt News Agency: It was neither logical nor functional for the Islamic resistance movement of Lebanon to continue remaining silent in the face of the comprehensive violations and arrogance of the Israeli occupation entity. Not taking action while enduring daily losses, killings, the burning of villages, and violations on land, sea, and air becomes humiliating.
This had been declared repeatedly by Secretary General Sheikh Naim Qassem in his speeches: “things cannot remain like this indefinitely.”
The issue concerns the usefulness of resistance actions in the balance of profit and loss, and their impact on the enemy’s calculations, as well as the costs and prices the enemy would have to bear.
During the phase of silence over the past 14 months, the equation was as follows: the benefit of remaining silent, allowing space for reconstruction, was greater than the benefit of responding, which could lead to war. The latter would also impose costs on the enemy, but the costs on the resistance and its environment would be greater. Therefore, avoiding war was a goal for both the resistance and the Israeli occupation entity at the same time.
The Israeli occupation entity was conducting a full intelligence operation, monitoring every movement of the resistance it could detect and destroying anything it believed existed or was being rebuilt. However, waiting for too long strips the resistance of its meaning. It solidifies the enemy’s gains achieved through the ceasefire, entrenches its expansion on the ground, and increases its boldness in striking and expanding further. Therefore, there was a wait for the appropriate moment locally and regionally.
The right moment came when the American–Israeli attack on Iran began. In addition, the prolonged silence in response to the enemy's aggression had become a heavy burden on the resistance. Therefore, a response became necessary for two reasons.
The first reason is that the consequences of the American–Israeli war against Iran will affect the entire region, including all parties to the Axis of Resistance. If Iran emerges victorious, or simply emerges intact from this war without the Islamic Republic falling, which was the primary objective set by the United States and the entity, then that alone would count as a victory for Iran.
This would extend to all other resistance forces as well. Such a failure would be resounding for the Americans and the Israeli occupation entity, even if they tried to present it as victory or claimed they had changed their objectives. It would still be a major failure with significant repercussions worldwide, especially in the region and particularly for the resistance forces in the region.
The “Karbala choice” adopted by the Islamic Republic of Iran and the resistance forces makes it extremely difficult for the United States to succeed in its aggression or to overthrow the Islamic Republic, or to eliminate the resistance forces that would fiercely defend their existence in large numbers. As a result, the resistance in Lebanon would be resilient against all forms of attack from all fronts that might threaten it, whether from the internal front through a civil war aimed at stripping the resistance of its weapons, from external forces that might enter from Syria, or in direct confrontation with the entity. Even if all these parties combined, the resistance could survive if it fought a Karbala-like battle. And the battle is indeed Karbala-like. Therefore, the regional reason exists, the circumstances are suitable for entering this confrontation.
The second reason is that the period of patience had reached its end. If it had continued much longer, the resistance would have lost its core identity, the identity of resistance. Another point concerns the scale of the response required.
Through this small and limited number of rockets and drones, the message reached the enemy and shocked it: the resistance still exists, is in good condition, and is capable of carrying out certain operations, even at the level of rockets and drones, from an area that was supposed to have been disarmed.
This shows that the resistance is both resilient and hidden at the same time.
If the enemy had intelligence about the presence of the resistance south of the Litani River, it would have eliminated it. Likewise, if the Lebanese authorities, the UNIFIL forces, the mechanism, and all intelligence services knew of its presence there, they would have gone and seized its assets. Therefore, this represents an intelligence failure and an operational failure for the enemy.
This move alone serves as a reminder of the resistance reclaiming the initiative and reaffirming its identity as a resistance force. It also reminds that it can respond when necessary. Here a certain deterrence equation emerges: If the enemy enters by land, there will be direct confrontation.
If it continues its aggressions, there will be costs and prices it must pay, starting with settlers leaving the northern part of the entity again, which would lead to economic disruption that the entity cannot sustain for long.
At the same time, a ground operation carries massive costs for the Israeli occupation entity, which it prefers to avoid. Therefore, the decision regarding the size and number of rocket barrages, or other operations such as drones or even commando attacks, remains possible against this enemy. The message has been delivered, and it will serve as a basis for further developments in the confrontation. It shifts the level of deterrence from no response to a calculated response.
If we also consider that the entity is already deeply engaged in a war that is exhausting its defensive and offensive capabilities, through intensive air operations against Iran and the missiles it receives from Iran, this places an enormous burden on it compared with the combined pressures from all of Iran’s allies.
Confrontation with Iran carries far greater costs. This could lead to new balances if Iran emerges from the war intact and standing on its feet. The message that would reach the world is that this axis is highly resilient and cannot be eliminated.
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