AhlulBayt News Agency: The struggle for independence from Britain was not merely a military confrontation, but a wide political battle in which London sought—through constitutional conferences, United Nations resolutions, and superficial initiatives—to repackage its presence in the South in a new form.
This included attempting to install client governments, reinstate exiled sultans, and push transitional formulas designed to preserve colonial influence under various federations and engineered coalitions.
Throughout 1966–1967, Britain intensified its maneuvers: it revived the widely rejected Constitutional Committee, arranged external meetings to unify pro-British forces, worked to manufacture an “alternative political representation,” and pursued international legitimacy for the Federal Government it had created.
It even tried to exploit the United Nations to advance transitional schemes that would prevent any path to genuine independence.
Meanwhile, the National Front was confronting a broader plan aimed at carving up the land and fragmenting the South—from efforts to internationalize Mayun Island, to granting Hadramout and Al-Mahrah the option of joining neighboring states, to attempts to embroil the army in political arrangements that guaranteed continued colonial dominance.
As the armed revolution escalated, territories were liberated, and sultanates collapsed one after another, Britain found itself caught in a desperate race between accelerating its political conspiracies on the one hand, and watching its project crumble on the ground on the other.
Ultimately, it became clear that the road to independence would first require thwarting these maneuvers and fabricated settlements, before securing victory on the battlefield.
Political Challenges
The revolution faced political challenges that extended from the earlier constitutional conferences and attempts to circumvent United Nations resolutions—challenges fundamentally aimed at handing power to a client government and shifting from old colonialism to a new form of colonial control.
In 1966, the British representative at the United Nations conveyed, on 25 February, a letter to the UN Secretary-General signed in the name of what was then called the “Foreign Minister of the Federal Government,” expressing support for the return of the British Constitutional Committee, which had been rejected by national forces earlier.
In the same month, the British High Commissioner appointed a group of his loyalists from the city of Aden as members of the Federal Council to fill the seats allocated to Aden.
In March 1966, Britain issued internal decrees lifting the ban on the return of politicians and sultans who considered themselves exiled abroad. Soon after, the High Commissioner announced the constitutional proposals drafted by Britain.
Around the same time—April 1966—the “Arab South League” organized a meeting in Asmara, Eritrea, bringing together elements of its leadership, several sultans, and some politicians, including Hussein Salem Bawazir, a Liberation Front leader. The meeting resulted in creating a bloc under the name “Leadership of National Forces in the Arab South.”
Another attempt followed in April 1966 to regroup pro-colonial political forces by arranging a meeting in Beirut, aimed at forming a political coalition capable of receiving the sultanates under the British-sponsored constitutional proposals. However, the growing escalation of armed and guerrilla operations in Aden led to the failure of this initiative.
As part of Britain’s ongoing political maneuvers, the British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Michael Stewart, delivered a statement before the House of Commons in May 1966, affirming his government's willingness to accept any solution to the so-called “Arab South constitutional issue.”
He also revealed efforts—undertaken with the assistance of the “Federal Government”—to hold a conference attended by representatives of the people in the South.
The UN Committee commented that the statement showed no clear acceptance of UN resolutions. Meanwhile, the British permanent representative continued pleading with the UN Secretary-General to appoint an observer to attend a conference the “Federal Government” intended to hold in August 1966 to discuss implementation of UN resolutions—but to no avail.
When the UN Special Committee arrived in Cairo in June 1966, the National Front delegation submitted a memorandum outlining its viewpoint on the situation and developments in the occupied South.
The memorandum defined the goals of the armed revolution: complete evacuation of colonial forces, dismantling all political structures associated with the colonial presence, and ensuring that UN resolutions reflect the full demands of the national forces engaged in both political and military struggle.
It rejected any settlement based on retaining “coalition-based” political entities involving sultans, ministers, or pro-colonial politicians.
The National Front maintained that the people viewed armed struggle as the foundation, while the UN’s role was merely supportive. If colonial authorities succeeded in misleading the UN, the people would continue fighting.
Accordingly, the Front refused to meet with the UN mission and rejected all its outcomes. It called for a general strike during the mission’s visit to Aden—and the strike succeeded.
In Cairo, in March 1967, a meeting was held between the UN mission and a delegation from the Arab South League, which proposed convening a conference that would include all political parties and relevant forces in the South to draft an interim constitution, form a transitional government, prepare for elections, and establish an elected constituent assembly.
The proposal stipulated that the transitional government become the sole authority during the interim period. This vision aligned with British plans, as it allowed traditional rulers to retain a place within the emerging state.
Yet, the military and political escalation adopted by the National Front—and similarly by the Liberation Front, to avoid being outmaneuvered—led to the National Front’s refusal to meet the UN Special Mission.
Suspicious Manoeuvres
British Minister Shackleton began his visit to Aden on 12 April 1967 as part of a new colonial scheme. Just two hours after his arrival, he declared that his mission was to explore possible arrangements for meeting with the Liberation Front anywhere agreed upon, in order to find a solution to the crisis in the occupied South Yemen based on United Nations resolutions.
Details contained in the press-conference document reveal that Shackleton’s visit took place four days before al-Makkawi (what was his official position?) arrived in Taiz.
Al-Makkawi had come from Cairo fully aware of Shackleton’s mission and the objectives behind his movements in the region. His visit to Taiz was therefore not a coincidence.
This is evidenced by his holding a press conference on 16 April 1967, during which he stated, in response to a question, that there were only two parties to the conflict: Britain as the ruling authority, and the Liberation Front as “the sole legitimate representative of the people of the region.”
Accordingly, Britain had no alternative but to recognize the Liberation Front and engage in direct negotiations with it alone to discuss ways of implementing UN resolutions.
On 21 April 1967, Britain attempted to extract from the UN Mission a recognition of the fabricated Federal Government. However, the Mission delivered a firm blow by cutting short its visit, thereby exposing Britain’s true intentions behind persuading the Mission to travel to Aden in the first place.
The Strategy of Liberating Regions
The revolution shifted to a new strategy that destabilized the colonial administration’s manoeuvres: the systematic liberation of regions. This began with Al-Dhalea, which was freed from occupation by the revolutionaries on 22 June 1967, followed by Al-Sha‘eeb on 25 June 1967.
Victories continued in rapid succession:
Al-Muflahi on 12 August, then Lahj and Dathina on 13 August, Al-Awadhel on 27 August, Zinjibar on 28 August, Lower Yafa‘ on 28 August, and Upper Yafa‘ on 2 September.
This was followed by the liberation of the Aqraabi Sheikhdom on 2 September 1967, and the regions of Ahwar, Al-Mahfid, and Lower Al-Awaliq on 9 September.
The momentum continued with the liberation of Coastal Hadramawt on 16 September, then Bayhan on 18 September, and finally Inner Hadramawt on 2 October 1967.
Intensifying Division Between the Two Fronts and Reliance on the Army
Previously, Britain had sought a political settlement that would preserve, within its framework, the political forces and parties aligned with its policies.
However, amid new developments, it resorted to inviting the Liberation Front to negotiate in order to form a coalition that would allow the National Front to participate alongside the Liberation Front and the League.
On June 19, 1967, the British Foreign Secretary announced the arrangements for the region, setting the date of independence for January 9, 1968. He promised to support the Federal Union Government’s army, along with its air and naval forces, and also assured the continued presence of a naval force near the southern coasts for protection.
Trials against political detainees were halted, and Britain agreed to lift the ban on the National Front, which had previously been treated as a “prohibited terrorist organization,” while the Liberation Front remained unrestricted.
Through these proposals, Britain relied on the growing division between the two fronts and counted on the Federal Union army to implement its political arrangements within the alternative system that would replace British control upon withdrawal.
The army was intended to serve as a striking force capable of countering popular movements and national fronts. Accordingly, in the last two years of occupation, the British government focused heavily on building and developing the federal army in terms of training and armament.
This British strategy was reinforced by the confidence of both the British authorities and their local allies in the loyalty of the federal army. However, they did not anticipate the nationalist sentiments among the army’s ranks.
Except for the sons of sultans and princes who occupied the top positions in the army, the British authorities were stunned by the uprisings within the army expressing nationalist positions, the largest of which was the uprising on June 20, 1967.
Confronting the Land Partition Project
The leadership of the National Front, from the heart of the battlefields, closely monitored the British-Saudi maneuvers, which increasingly sought to legitimize “popular representation” for forces other than the National Front in South Yemen.
Their activities extended to the corridors of the Arab League and the backrooms of the United Nations. Simultaneously, the National Front tracked geopolitical conspiracies aimed at partitioning the land.
The British High Commissioner, in one of his responses to the international mission, indicated that Britain had no authority to compel the eastern states (Qaiti, Al-Kathiri, and Mahra) to join South Arabia, as they were not part of the “Federation of South Arabia.”
Britain’s approach was to offer the eastern emirates (Hadhramaut and Mahra) the option to join either Saudi Arabia or the Gulf Emirates.
British Foreign Secretary Mr. Brown announced in the House of Commons on June 19, 1967, that January 19, 1968, was set as the date for independence.
He also mentioned plans to internationalize the island of Mayyun (Perim), located in the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, due to its strategic importance on this international maritime route.
This declaration conflicted with UN resolutions recognizing Mayyun Island as part of the occupied South Yemeni territories. The move came under pressure from the Zionist entity, which urged Britain not to withdraw from the island until international forces arrived.
However, the National Front thwarted these Western-Zionist plans through a popular uprising on the island.
Subsequent British statements revealed the colonial intentions to separate and internationalize certain islands. Diplomatic steps were taken with various UN member states to hand over administration of Mayyun Island to the United Nations.
Yet the people foiled the internationalization plot, as local populations mobilized, held demonstrations, and overthrew both the local governor and the British officer.
The Administrative Apparatus Conspiracy
As the revolution gained strength and continued exposing British maneuvers while thwarting their schemes—from the London Conferences frequented by sultans, ministers, and politicians opposed to armed struggle—Britain escalated its attempts to undermine the movement.
One such attempt was the final maneuver by High Commissioner Sir Turnbull, who tried to involve the UN Tripartite Mission for Aden with the “Federation” ministers, aiming to dilute and sabotage international resolutions that rejected any governmental body established by the colonial authorities.
In response to these developments, the new British High Commissioner, Trigellian, concluded that the only way to save the situation was for the widely unpopular ministers of the Federation Government to pretend to resign, allowing Britain to reactivate them in new frameworks.
Britain then pushed the idea of an “Administrative Apparatus,” headed by Hussein al-Bayoumi. This began with a meeting held in the Federation city on July 5, 1967, attended by all Federation ministers except the Minister of Interior.
During this meeting, the Federal Council agreed in principle to create the position of Prime Minister and tasked Hussein Ali al-Bayoumi with forming an interim administrative body representing political parties, the Aden Trade Union Congress, the Armed Forces of South Arabia, and the states of South Arabia.
The aim of this move was twofold: to reassure the terrified ministers and sultans on one hand, and on the other, to project signs of compromise toward the national movement and the UN mission—showing that Britain had abolished the Federation Government and established a new body that ostensibly included broad segments of the population, as required by UN resolutions.
Britain hoped to test how far the idea of involving political bodies and the Aden Trade Union Congress in its new administrative apparatus could succeed.
If it managed to attract some figures to join, it could proceed to the next step—bringing together these bodies, the labor congress, and several sultans.
The decision also explicitly emphasized the role of the army among these political bodies, reflecting Britain’s attempt to drag the army into the political arena to fracture it and pit it against the revolutionary wing of the national movement.
However, National Front members quickly moved to foil this colonial scheme.
Betting on the United Nations Mission
The British government continued to pin its hopes on the role of the United Nations to salvage its policy aimed at handing over power to its local clients. This became evident when the UN mission arrived in Aden on April 2, 1966, and attempted to meet with local residents and listen to their views. During the committee’s stay in Aden, however, it did not receive the cooperation it needed from the British authorities.
The British High Commissioner restricted the committee’s movements, limiting its contacts to the Federation Government and the sultans. The committee refused to meet with anyone representing this puppet government.
On July 21, 1967, the National Front announced its stance regarding the consultations taking place in New York between the UN Special Mission, the Liberation Front, and the British representative to the United Nations. The National Front indicated that it had sent a telegram to the Chairman of the Decolonization Committee stating:
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The National Front’s rejection of the colonial attempt represented by assigning Hussein Bayoumi to form a coalition government whose purpose was to bypass UN resolutions and preserve the interests of colonialism and its local clients.
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The National Front would continue its struggle to defeat any project introduced by the British government until Britain agreed to negotiate with the forces leading the armed struggle in the country.
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The National Front apologized for not sending a delegation to the United Nations due to the detention of several of its leaders in Cairo.
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The claim made by Mr. Abdul Qawi Makawi that the Liberation Front was a national movement and the sole representative of the people of South Yemen had no basis in reality.
Meeting with the Collaborating Forces
The UN mission fell into a serious trap when it agreed to meet in Geneva in the second half of August 1967 with several sultans and “ministers” who claimed to represent segments of the population.
These included the Federal National Party, delegations representing the sultanates in the Western Protectorates, the Tribal Council of Al-Mahra Governorate, and the two sultanates in the Emirates (Al-Qaiti and Al-Kathiri).
The National Front expressed its rejection of any engagement with the international mission, given the British government’s ongoing attempts to mislead the UN delegation and to dilute the clear provisions of UN resolutions and the mandate of the committee responsible for implementing them.
Resurgence of British Schemes
The second half of 1967 witnessed the rise of armed struggle, shattering the hopes of the High Commissioner and his government in relying on the sultanate regimes, which were collapsing under the blows of the armed national movement.
What they had depended on—the army they had created to protect these regimes—was already undermined by the national forces, which had begun establishing their organizational cells within it since the start of the armed revolution or even earlier.
Moreover, the army surprised the British government and its local collaborators with its patriotic stance supporting the revolution, as it refused to assume power to protect the interests of the collaborators and Britain. The army demonstrated this national position in a statement it issued on 28 August 1967.
Achieved Independence
After the National Front secured victory in Aden and the collapse of Britain’s last attempts to ignite internal conflict between the National Front and the Liberation Front, and with London’s attempts to push its projects under the guise of implementing United Nations resolutions exposed, Britain was compelled to announce its readiness to transfer authority to the representatives of the people.
The National Front responded with a clear message to British Foreign Secretary George Brown, affirming that it was the popular authority controlling the occupied South Yemen and the sole legitimate representative authorized to negotiate on sovereignty and independence.
The Front then addressed the United Nations, outlining the success of the armed revolution in eradicating the colonial presence in Aden and the protectorates, and declaring that the initiative had passed into the hands of the people’s will.
Subsequently, the National Front formed its negotiating delegation, headed by Qahtan Al-Shaabi and composed of its most prominent revolutionary leaders.
However, the delegation was surprised in Geneva to find that Britain had brought in a Saudi delegation led by Kamal Adham, attempting to tie the future of the nascent republic to the Kingdom, as had been done previously with North Yemen.
The National Front delegation rejected this diplomatic coercion and refused any dialogue before a clear recognition of the independent state, despite the presence of fugitive sultans in Saudi Arabia and mercenary forces along the borders.
The delegation conducted fierce negotiations, withdrawing when necessary and returning when tactically advantageous, steadfastly adhering to all foundations of independence without compromise.
The Independence Document emerged as one of the purest revolutionary legacies in the region’s history. The National Front refused to join the Commonwealth, rejected any military or defense agreements with Britain, and refused compensation conditioned upon the presence of a British military mission with extensive powers.
It also thwarted attempts to internationalize the islands of Mayun and Bab al-Mandeb—schemes backed by the Zionist side—and maintained sovereignty over all Yemeni islands, including the so-called “Kurya Muria” islands, which Britain had handed over to the Sultanate of Muscat despite UN objections, with these islands remaining in Yemeni records until after unification.
The National Front annulled all agreements previously signed by Britain with the sultanates and rejected any formula that would retain colonial influence or any form of tutelage.
Despite Britain’s obstinacy over the Kurya Muria file and its refusal to pay unconditional compensation, the October 14 Revolution successfully achieved full national independence on November 30, 1967, decisively closing the chapter of colonial rule and announcing the birth of a state with a clear unified Yemeni identity.
When the National Front delegation reached the United Nations to register the new state and stand before the world, representatives of countries around the globe saluted the southern fighters in a moment that embodied the essence of national struggle and marked the beginning of a new chapter in modern Yemeni history.
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