ABNa24 - Donald Trump entered the White House for the first time in 2016. Regardless of all of Trump's and MAGA's (Make America Great Again) characteristic aspects, in foreign policy aspect, he should be seen as a norm breaker. He openly lashed out at the foreign policy of his precedents, saying that the US and interests should be central to any foreign policy designed by the White House, or fruitless wars should be ended, and the focus should be on China.
Many people, even inside Trump’s own campaign for a second term, mocked him for constantly bringing up China, relevant or not, and blaming Beijing for almost everything. Others, however, saw that rhetoric as the clever voice of US’s deep state, which was trying to break free from a foreign policy framework tied to non‑American stakeholders and pivot toward what it viewed as the real threats emerging in the East.
Before the start of the war on Iran, called Ramadan War in Iran, Trump signaled this shift from East to West. As his recent national security strategy made clear, he intended to devote only limited attention to West Asia.
Today, things look very different. The same Trump who once dismissed the US’s long wars in the West Asia as pointless now finds himself trapped in the deadly quagmire of Iran. And many analysts argue that regardless of how the Ramadan War ends, who claims victory and who loses, in the broader strategic picture, China stands to gain the most.
How did Trump fall into trap?
But it should be said that before aggression against Iran, Trump was on his way to preparation for confrontation with China; from putting his hands on Panama Canal and expelling Chinese companies from there to waging a trade war against Beijing. In some cases, he was successful, in others he was not.
Trump’s foreign‑policy approach، which is deeply intertwined with his self‑aggrandizing, showman‑like personality, created a sharp contrast with the style of figures like Biden or Obama, who also sought to refocus on China.
Unlike them, who aimed to manage multiple files or, in some cases, pull back and walk away, as Biden did in Afghanistan, Trump preferred to close files outright rather than leave them suspended. And he wanted to close them loudly, in Hollywood movies' style , and fast, as happened in Venezuela. He could then claim he had solved the Venezuela problem once and for all, in an operation that, unusually for Trump’s style and politics, looked almost heroic.
For that reason, one could say he turned to Iran with the intention of closing that file permanently. But his gamble failed, and he found himself drawn into a grinding conflict, a war that was supposed to help the Washington focus more sharply on China but has instead imposed financial, military, and media costs on Washington.
The next issue was the reality of American politics, which ultimately boxed Trump in. His administration could be seen as a government of celebrity outsiders with little political experience, loud figures without practical know‑how. McMahon, Kennedy, and Hegseth stood at the forefront of this group, and Trump himself is one of them.
We remember how Elon Musk entered the administration with sweeping promises to overhaul the country’s bureaucracy. But when he chose to step off Trump’s sinking ship, he made a striking comment, saying he underestimated the US political machinery, and it was stronger than he was.
Trump experienced the same dynamic in foreign policy. He believed that as president, he could wave his magic wand and declare “America First,” and that would make it so. But he soon discovered that even inside the Oval Office, few truly bought into that line.
It was here where, even if Trump was really interested to exit West Asia, the Zionist lobby gripped him, reminding him that his precedents all were in West Asia for a reason and this reason is, indeed, not democracy. Trump is told you have an Israel you have to put first. If you want to go after China, do so, but first you should secure the region for the Zionism and the Israeli regime.
So, on the one hand Trump had been interested to close West Asia case in his own style and on the other hand the Zionist lobby went far to sell this gamble to Trump the way he liked it. The lobby told him we go eliminate the Iranian leader and the military commanders, then Iran will sink in a home chaos and rebellion, and we are done. This was a proposal Trump could not turn down.
And Trump is now trapped in a harsh nightmare ; one that will almost certainly force him to forget any long‑term plan to counter China. He may even have to forget about the US itself; he walked straight into a game whose media outcome has become unmistakable: Israel First.
China, meanwhile, has acted with notable strategic finesse. During the economic war, Beijing demonstrated early on that it held the upper hand against the West. Its brief export ban on rare‑earth minerals showed how deeply and effectively it had embedded itself across the global supply chain, a slow, methodical penetration that Trump could never intimidate with a quick tactical move. As a result, he needed more focus on China and East Asia, not less.
China showed the same shrewdness on the geopolitical front. After political upheavals in Panama and Venezuela, Beijing sent a clear message that it had no intention of repeating the Soviet Union’s disastrous path in its rivalry with the US
While many expected China to lash out over Venezuela, it stayed silent. Beijing saw itself on a carefully charted course that allowed no risky detours, especially not into a potential Soviet‑Afghanistan repeat, this time in Venezuela.
But if China understood the danger and avoided a new Afghanistan, did the US understand it too? We now know the answer is no. Many analysts argue that Iran has become a new Vietnam for Trump and for the US, while China sits back and observes. And this is not a passive posture. As the old saying goes: when your enemy is making a mistake, don’t interrupt him. China has no need to intervene; it is simply watching the US decline unfold.
The weight of the war now rests heavily on Washington. American companies and infrastructure are continuously being targeted by Iranian armed groups. Beyond the direct cost of the conflict, the collateral costs are far more devastating for the US.
We’re all familiar with the intense technological rivalry between Chinese and American firms, in data processing, AI, and beyond. It used to be a fierce and neck‑and‑neck race. But it is no longer so close. Competing becomes much harder when American tech companies, accustomed to quiet, focused work in Silicon Valley, must now assume that at any moment a missile or drone could strike their offices or infrastructure in West Asia.
This cost is astronomical for the US if we remember that all of companies whose CEOs stood with Trump as a backer of the Silicon Valley during his inauguration ceremony are now put on Iran's hit list.
On the other hand, with his war, Trump is practically providing new markets to China. War will soon or late end.
In the aftermath of the war, Arab countries in the Persian Gulf will be compelled to open their doors to Chinese companies from two directions. The first is the issue of distrust in the US; as a result of Washington not being a capable partner for them, they believe that the US abandoned them against missiles and drones, focusing instead on Israel. Consequently, they cannot rely on the Americans that much.
The next point is that American companies prefer to limit their activities in various forms. They are not very interested in remaining as a potential target in the region. As a result, the region will be open for China business and investment.
Beijing’s win in the technology race can practically make the US lose the battle with China sooner than what the world and the Americans thought.
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