ABNA24 - The continued closure of the Strait of Hormuz to the invading US and its allies, along with Trump’s inability to rein in skyrocketing global energy and commodity prices caused by a severe shortage of oil supply, has pushed White House leaders to a breaking point. The US president, seen by critics as delusional and dishonest, has backed away from his earlier stance on using military force to open the strait and destroy infrastructure. Seeking to justify this retreat and frame it as something other than a setback, he now claims that American energy security is not dependent on the Strait of Hormuz and has flatly denied ever making such wartime commitments.
Although the complications of a conflict with Iran have become almost as great for Trump as the strategic objectives he hoped to achieve by starting it, recent assessments by American intelligence agencies indicate that neither Iran’s missile and drone capabilities have been eliminated, as claimed by the defense secretary, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and the CENTCOM commander, nor is there any real sign of Tehran agreeing to unconditional concessions on enrichment or missile program . Still, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz as claimed by the White House has become the most serious and unyielding challenge of the conflict for the image‑driven US president. The inability of oil tankers to pass through the strait, and the heavy traffic piling up in the Sea of Oman and the Persian Gulf before the eyes of the world and an oil‑hungry market, has left no room for spin or inflated figures.
The global community now sees directly a long‑standing and undeniable reality: the Strait of Hormuz lies within Iran’s national and territorial jurisdiction, and the Islamic Republic and its armed forces are capable of fully and decisively asserting this sovereign right whenever they choose, and defending the country’s national interests in this strategic waterway.
Indeed, Ramadan War, as called by Iran, is a major changing factor to many of the rules of engagement and the security and political orders in local, regional, and even international terms, to an extent that return of the power dynamics to the pre-war is hardly imaginable.
One of the most significant of these shifting conditions, something the world has already begun preparing for, concerns the legal and security framework of the Persian Gulf, especially the Strait of Hormuz. This war, Iranian officials argue, has rendered the previous legal and customary regime obsolete, as it failed to safeguard Iran’s clear sovereign interests as the state with jurisdiction over the strait and as the historic guarantor of security in the Persian Gulf.
In this connection, members of Iran’s parliament have overwhelmingly backed a new proposal aimed at revising how the country exercises its sovereign rights over the Strait of Hormuz. They say the measure is necessary to protect national interests and the legitimate rights of the Iranian people in the aftermath of this imposed war, and in response to what they describe as the betrayal of hostile states and their allies who have, in Iran’s view, abused its goodwill in allowing the free and safe passage of their commercial and military vessels through this strategic waterway. If reviewed and approved, the proposal would become binding law. Reports indicate that the foreign ministry is also preparing the groundwork for an agreement with Oman, the other key stakeholder in the strait.
The core and most consequential element of the bill is its assertion that Iran has the right to deem international conventions on the law of the sea and free navigation inapplicable within its own territorial waters and coastline, covering the strategic Strait of Hormuz as well. Lawmakers compare the move to Egypt’s nationalization of the Suez Canal decades ago.
This legislation, in addition to punishing aggressors and the regional Arab states that, according to Iranian officials, violated historic neighborly relations and the principle of good‑faith coexistence, first by hosting US bases and troops, second by providing their territory for attacks against Iran, and third by supporting and encouraging strikes on Iran, could also generate substantial revenue through transit fees. Some economic experts, citing the annual volume of commercial and oil‑tanker traffic, estimate that Iran could earn up to 100 billion dollars a year.
We should attribute this potential to Iran’s significant comparative advantage in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, due to its numerous islands. The geography forces massive oil tankers and container ships to pass through the deeper section of the strait, which lies inside Iran’s territorial waters.
Beyond the economic and security benefits, control over the Strait of Hormuz would, in this view, considerably enhance Iran’s regional and international standing compared to the pre‑war period. Iran would be positioned as an influential actor and a new pole in the emerging global order. A state with this level of military credibility and geostrategic leverage in the Persian Gulf would no longer be susceptible to sanctions or threats; instead, a new environment would emerge in which countries seek expanded cooperation and engagement with Tehran. This marks a major victory for the Iranian people and a decisive failure for adversaries who aimed to weaken or fracture Iran during the war.
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