Scenarios for Transition of Power in Saudi Arabia

AhlulBayt News Agency - Dementia and aging of Salman bin Abdulaziz, the king of Saudi Arabia, have raised speculations about the transition of power to the third generation of princes, as the foreign media have put forward the hypothesis that king Salman in a move similar to that of King of Jordan and Emir of Qatar, would resign for the benefit of his son Mohamad, a hypothesis that if realized could convey important messages within Saudi Arabia and among the Saudi princes.

According to the Charter Abdul Aziz, the transition of power in Saudi Arabia is a horizontal one and occurs from one brother to another one. In this respect, Saudi Arabia has been the only kingdom in the world so far, that seven decades after the death of King Abdul Aziz, the founder of the Saudi kingdom, has maintained this power transition formula. Thus, if king Salman intends to virtually marginalize this tradition for ever, as he largely ignored it by appointing Mohammed bin Nayef and Mohammed bin Salman as crown prince and deputy crown prince, he needs to make it operational through reasonable arguments and mechanisms that would please a broad range of Saudi princes:

First, given the fact that the sons of former Saudi kings (blood and half-brothers of King Salman including Saud, Faisal, Khalid, Fahd, Abdullah) were actually marginalized and have no such an important role in government and ministerial positions, king Salman wishes to appoint his own young and power-seeking sons as the crown prince rather than his cousin Mohammed bin Nayef, so that he can address this concern in his children's future, and resolve the issue of power transition that in recent years has become a major source of problem for Saudi Arabia, and solve it for a long time through transition of power to young princes. This is a point which can control the death rate of aging princes, but given the cyclical nature of power transition in Saudi Arabia and other fundamental issues, it cannot be a logical, efficient and legitimate mechanism without negative consequences.

Second, as the current crown prince would succeed the Saudi king, King Salman has the power to remove the crown prince from power. Thus, he seeks to dismiss Mohammed bin Nayef from the position of crown prince and pave the way for his son to become the King of Saudi Arabia.

Third, arguing that the Mohammed bin Nayef has only two daughters, and no sons, King Salman can make way for dismissing Mohamad bin Nayef, and given the importance of this issue among the Saudis, he can provide a strong justification to convince the Saudi princes.

Fourth, to consolidate the political power of bin Salman, political pairing between brothers and cousins, to undermine the duties of bin Nayef, and to show them as desperate and poor, have been among the policies put in the agenda of king Salman’s family and other princes close to this wing that can play a significant role together with other factors over the last few months.

These four factors actually make up a major part of king Salman’s concerns, worries, and initiatives that can make way for the transition of power more than ever. But one may wonder whether this action which is a kind of power monopoly in Salman’s family, can intensify competition among the Saudi princes and lead to a crisis.

The answer to this question may be negative; however, given that it is a quite new experience in Saudi Arabia, it could have effects and consequences in the form of discontent in the royal family. But for some reasons it cannot launch a competition for conflicting processes, the reasons include:

First, any transfer of power in recent decades and years in Saud Arabia were limited to the House of Saud, and the Saudi princes have remained loyal to traditions found within the House of Saud as opposed to other branches and believe it is a must to adhere to rules of Saudi royal family. Accordingly, any dissatisfaction among the brothers and princes could be settled in this framework.

Second, after the rise of Salman to power, there were clear division of duties between two Mohamads in political and economic affairs, which could be sustained following agreements reached after the transfer of power. This means that if Mohammed bin Salman becomes the next king of Saudi Arabia, he can appease his cousin by appointing him as a crown prince or minister, and this actually depends on how Bin Nayef gives up the ambition of becoming the next Saudi king, which is also what the Americans seek, and persuade him to collaborate with the family of king Salman.

Third, there is no considerable opposition from Salman’s brothers, since many brothers of Salman are tangling with diseases and aging, and cannot potentially cause any crisis, as they also do not wish to. Many of their children are appointed in government positions that can mitigate the effects of any possible competition. Only some younger and more energetic brothers, including Ahmed, Abdul Elah and Muqrin bin Abdulaziz have the ability to attract and recruit as opposed to king Salman.

Therefore, taking into account different variables, we may conclude that King Salman, with regard to local and regional considerations and concerns, would incline towards the transfer of power to his own son or resignation in favor his son, the same way did the king of Jordan or Emir of Qatar. He is also likely to dismiss bin Nayef and appoint his son Mohamad bin Salman as the crown prince, and for a while put an end to one of the issues that have periodically been giving rise to crises in Saudi Arabia. However, in the meantime, king Salman should note the green light of the Americans about ignoring bin Nayef and persuasion of a range of princes about allegiance to bin Salman which also reveal the inefficient and costly cycle of succession system in Saudi Arabia.



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