Ahlul Bayt News Agency - The international community is still coming to terms with one of recent history's most shocking series of events. In June 2014, the world had hardly heard of the "Islamic State of Iraq and Syria", and what began as a rather limited offensive on the Iraqi city of Mosul led quickly to an avalanche of territorial gains. One year on, what is now known as "Islamic State" (Daesh in its Arabic acronym) controls large chunks of Iraq and Syria, increasingly consolidates its grip on its territories, provides goods and services to the local population, runs a legal system based on a harsh interpretation of Sharia law, and eyes continuous expansion. It also extorts, sells stolen artefacts, runs an illicit oil trade and enslaves women. It's a novel and strange form of statehood indeed.
Though much has been said about what exactly to call IS/ISIS/ISIL/Daesh, all versions include an important yet hardly discussed term, namely "state". It is thus relevant to ask another question: Is the Islamic State really a state? And, if not, is it close to becoming one? The answer to these questions must begin with the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States. Generally regarded as a treaty codifying customary international law, the convention outlines four general requirements for statehood: (1) a permanent population; (2) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with other states.
If we now turn to the facts, we see that IS fails to satisfy three of the four conditions just outlined. Though it may be tempting to think that it controls a permanent population by now, this is by no means the case. Shifting battle lines in both Syria and Iraq go hand in hand with changing population dynamics, as could be seen by both the takeover of Palmyra and Ramadi as well as the loss of Tikrit and Tel Abyad. The same applies for the second condition—the possession of a defined territory—with the added fact that IS does not even enjoy homogeneous control over its internal dominion. And to date, no evidence exists that it has entered into any relations with other states, as opposed to entities, organisations or individuals within those states; not because it is unwilling, but because it is currently incapable of doing so. That leaves one criterion, government: in large part, the ability to provide services and run a judicial system. IS does seem to do just that, and so it only meets the third criterion. By any stretch of the imagination, then, "Islamic State" is not yet a state in the legal sense. All of this without even mentioning the significant yet somewhat controversial notion of recognition by other states, which some consider an additional necessary ingredient of statehood.
Islamic State, then, is what might be called a proto-state, an entity in a process of transformation toward statehood. In effect, it turned into a proto-state in June 2015, after a series of territorial gains and the inception of an administrative and judicial system within its territories. At present, IS/ISIS/ISIL/Daesh is still caught up in this transformational stage. And so, after more than a year of extraordinary developments, it is time to evaluate its chances of completing this transformation toward de-facto statehood. Is it close to achieving this goal or are the odds against it? And are there crucial changes IS must make, albeit reluctantly, to satisfy the conditions of statehood just outlined?
In the absence of highly unlikely turns of events, IS will fail to carve out a defined territory with a permanent population. Only one of the two following conditions will allow it to demarcate its border permanently: (1) a possible settlement between regional and international players on the one hand and IS on the other; and (2) a de-facto stalemate resulting from paralysing fatigue settling among its opponents. It goes without saying that a large-scale international agreement, or a series of agreements, granting IS legitimacy will not come to pass. The international community, especially the United States, will remain bent upon containing its expansion and entrenchment, and, if the conditions are ripe, to dismantle the organisation. And though years of fighting and depletion of human resources have begun to take their toll on the Syrian army, the other main factions battling IS have yet to be affected by fatigue. Jaish Al-Fath, inspired by recent victories, will undoubtedly confront IS in different Syrian provinces. The YPG has already proven quite successful against IS, as shown by its takeover of chunks of previously IS territory in northern Syria, including Tel Abyad. And while the Peshmerga are entrenched resiliently against IS in northern Iraq, the Shia militias will not cease in chasing the organisation from town to town. All of these different forces, not to mention the possibility of a reinvigorated Syrian army assisted by Hezbollah, are bent on Islamic State's destruction, and as long as they have the resources, they will keep up the fight.
From a more general perspective, one can safely assume that state and non-state actors in both Syria and Iraq are highly unlikely to accept any territorial partition of their respective countries by IS. In Syria, whoever gains the upper hand – Assad or the Islamist coalition – will move on to restore the country's territorial integrity. In fact, if a broad Islamist coalition, comprised of Jaish Al-Fath and Jaish Al-Islam, emerges in Syria, IS will have to deal with an enemy as motivated and challenging as ever, while having to withstand constant pressure from Peshmerga and Shia forces in Iraq.
The IS leadership is well-aware of all these negative odds. It knows that it is outnumbered and surrounded, and that the future holds no hope for a cessation of hostilities that would allow for its successful transition from proto- to de-facto state. Its leadership, consisting partly of ex-Baathists, knows that it must take the initiative to end hostilities when its strategy of lightning offensives no longer works. Indeed, such a shift in strategy, along with other important concessions, is the only means by which IS can hope to perhaps become a de-facto state. What are these other concessions? First, to end spreading its brand internationally and recruiting jihadist militant groups to join its ranks, thus shifting from an international network strategy to a more cohesive localist state policy. Second, to make changes to its system of punishment and tone down the brutality displayed toward its citizens. In fact, it has started to take steps towards this second concession.
Moreover, the IS leadership is aware that an economy based partially on an illicit oil and stolen artefact trade is not sustainable in the long-term. A durable economy would have to include a minimal degree of trade with other states, a fact that reinforces the need for concessions. In effect, then, these concessions are the preconditions for satisfying the third condition of statehood, namely the capacity to enter into relations—whether trade-related or other—with other states. The road ahead for Islamic State is thus indeed fraught with seemingly insurmountable obstacles.
Transitioning to a de-facto state is perhaps the hardest challenge IS will ever face. Perhaps its leaders are mulling over various future strategies of de-escalating the conflict and becoming a more acceptable insurgent power, but the chances of other parties in the Middle East accepting major and permanent territorial shifts are highly unlikely. Short of an unexpected turn of events, IS will remain a proto-state for the foreseeable future. Whether it will survive in the long-term, even with such status, remains to be seen. For now, the odds are against it.
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source : MEMO
Saturday
25 July 2015
5:27:09 AM
702199
Though much has been said about what exactly to call IS/ISIS/ISIL/Daesh, all versions include an important yet hardly discussed term, namely "state". It is thus relevant to ask another question: Is the Islamic State really a state? And, if not, is it close to becoming one?