Bahrain in the Freedom House Report: Countries at the Crossroads 2012

(Ahlul Bayt News Agency) - Nearly two years after it began, the wave of popular uprisings that has shaken the Middle East and North Africa continues to hold the world’s attention. In the most consequential bout of political change in almost two decades, new leaders are emerging through generally free and fair elections, and citizens are demanding rights and accountability from their governments. These are promising signs of democratic progress in a region long dominated by brutal authoritarian regimes. But does this dramatic breakthrough reflect a wider trend toward democracy and good governance around the world?The findings of Countries at the Crossroads 2012, Freedom House’s comprehensive assessment of democratic governance in a select group of 35 states, suggest that it does not. Crossroads analyzes each country’s performance in four spheres: government accountability and public voice, civil liberties, rule of law, and anticorruption and transparency. Declines far exceeded improvements in the states covered in this year’s edition, in both number and scale. Large drops in government accountability have corresponded in some cases with declines in the primacy of the rule of law in civil and criminal matters, indicating that legal protections for individual citizens are eroding in tandem with the political leadership’s consolidation of power. Meanwhile, only the scores for free and fair electoral laws and elections—a subsection of accountability and public voice, and arguably one of the simpler areas of governance to improve—showed significant increases. The overall deterioration reflected in this year’s scores is cause for alarm among advocates of democracy, particularly given the prevailing impression that prodemocracy movements are gaining ground.Indeed, even within the Middle East and North Africa, the 2011 uprisings have had a wide variety of outcomes to date. It is clear from this diversity that the region’s transformation will not happen overnight, and that its success must not be left to chance.BahrainAuthor’s Note: The timeframe for events covered in Countries at the Crossroads 2012 is April 1, 2009, through November 30, 2011. For the sake of temporal consistency across all Countries at the Crossroads 2012 reports, therefore, developments in Bahrain occurring after this date are here reserved for a subsequent report. Most notably, the findings of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI), released on November 23, 2011, are included in the analysis, whereas follow-up actions taken after November 30 are not.The popular uprising that began in Bahrain in February 2011 marked the culmination of a decade-long political struggle that has seen the gradual retrenchment of political and to a lesser extent economic liberalizations initiated by King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa in the years following his March 1999 succession. The state’s violent suppression of the February revolt, followed by an extended campaign to punish and marginalize those who participated in it, unleashed new social forces and carved deep political rifts that severely hinder the prospects for a revival of King Hamad’s reform project. While the country’s Shiite majority leads calls for substantive political change, the ruling family has cast the ongoing crisis as a process of dangerous Shiite empowerment and Iranian-backed irredentism to justify increased restrictions on political freedoms, violent security crackdowns on protests, and an unwillingness to undertake substantial democratic reform.Having witnessed his father’s unsuccessful attempt to suppress a large-scale Shiite-led uprising from 1994 to 1999, Sheikh Hamad came to power promising a political rapprochement to include, inter alia, the welcoming home of exiled dissidents, the repeal of a draconian State Security Act, and a new constitution. Codified in a National Action Charter, the reform initiative was approved by 98 percent of voters in a referendum held on February 14 and 15, 2001. The government promptly backtracked on its democratic pledges, however, in a new constitution promulgated unilaterally in a series of royal decrees one year later. The elected lower house of the National Assembly (al-Majlis al-Watani) was subordinated to an appointed upper house and was denied the power to introduce legislation. Members of parliament (MPs) were barred from deliberating on any matter or decision taken by the government prior to the inauguration of the National Assembly in December 2002, and full amnesty was extended to officials suspected of human rights violations prior to that date. Bahrain’s electoral districts were redrawn along sectarian lines to preclude a Shiite-dominated lower house. Lastly, Bahrain was declared a monarchy and Sheikh Hamad its king. The liberal and Shiite opposition responded by boycotting the 2002 elections under the slogan, “This isn’t the parliament we asked for!”Numerous informal coalitions soon emerged to protest the terms of the new constitution. Some, such as the National Committee for Martyrs and Victims of Torture in Bahrain, demanded accountability for past abuses by the state. Others, like the Committee of the Unemployed, focused on socio-economic matters, including unequal distribution of housing and employment and, relatedly, discrimination against the country’s Shiite majority. By 2005, small-scale activism gave way to sustained unrest joined by organized Shiite and Arab nationalist opposition societies, a transformation punctuated in March by the largest mass demonstration Bahrain had witnessed since the 1990s.Although these same opposition groups eventually were persuaded to participate in the parliament in time for the 2006 election, the decision was far from unanimous. Bahraini Shiites in particular were split almost evenly between those who agreed with the idea of political engagement and those who considered it tantamount to government co-optation. The former, represented in parliament by the Islamic National Accord Society (al-Wefaq), would become the formal opposition; the latter faction abandoned al-Wefaq to form the offshoot Movement for Liberties and Democracy (al-Haqq), a group the government would soon brand a “terrorist” organization.Yet al-Wefaq’s parliamentary experiment occasioned more frustration than progress, as its initiatives were systematically obstructed by pro-government Sunni political societies—the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Islamic Platform (al-Minbar al-Islami); the Salafi society, Purity (al-Asalah); and a bloc of “independents” comprised mostly of tribal allies of the ruling family. At the same time, violent confrontations between security forces and street protesters increased, as did reliable reports of mistreatment and torture of political activists arrested for their association with al-Haqq and other underground movements. Inside and outside the parliament, there was a growing disconnect between the promise of King Hamad’s reform initiative and political reality.That the Arab Spring arrived in Bahrain on February 14, 2011, then, was no coincidence. Exactly ten years after the approval of the National Action Charter, first tens and then hundreds of thousands of Bahrainis took to the streets to demand that the document’s original vision be implemented. Led initially by a heterogeneous coalition of activists, the demonstrations were soon buoyed by the organizational capacity of al-Wefaq, which backed the protest movement after resigning from parliament over the deaths of several protesters. Other prominent groups, including the secular National Democratic Action Society (Wa‘ad) led by a charismatic Sunni leftist Ebrahim Sharif, also joined the revolt. Mimicking their behavior in parliament, pro-government Sunnis orchestrated a massive counter-mobilization that sparked open sectarian clashes and helped check the momentum of the uprising.On March 12, Crown Prince Salman, King Hamad’s son and heir apparent, was deputized to launch a government-opposition dialogue that sought a negotiated end to the crisis. His comprehensive seven-point proposal for talks included discussions of even the most thorny political issues. But al-Wefaq, the largest and most influencial constituent of the opposition, conditioned its participation on the government’s agreement to an elected assembly to revise the 2002 constitution. Meanwhile, several more radical factions rejected the idea of talks altogether, forming a new Coalition for a Republic that demanded an end to the Al Khalifa monarchy. Faced with such uncompromising negotiating positions, combined with rapidly-disintegrating law and order and pressure from more security-minded members of the ruling family, King Hamad abandoned the dialogue initiative after just two days (it was intended to last six weeks[1]). Instead, on March 14, several thousand ground troops from neighboring Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states arrived via Saudi Arabia. While this Saudi-dominated Peninsula Shield force was not deployed against protesters, its appearance amounted to a fait accompli that foreclosed all but a military solution to the standoff. A three-month period of martial law (State of National Safety) was declared the next day, foretelling what would be a violent crackdown on the February 14 uprising.ACCOUNTABILITY AND PUBLIC VOICE:The Al Khalifa tribe has ruled Bahrain since 1783 with the continued support of allied families that aided in the original conquest of the island. Following decades of fratricidal conflict, a principle of primogeniture was established to avoid intra-familial disputes over succession. This rule was reaffirmed in a revised constitution of 2002, by which Bahrain was transformed from an emirate into a hereditary monarchy headed by King Hamad. The latter assumed power immediately upon the death of his father in March 1999, and in turn named his son heir apparent. By right, King Hamad enjoys full power to appoint all officeholders of the state, including all judges and military commanders, with the exception of the 40 elected members of the lower house of parliament, the Council of Representatives (Majlis al-Nuwwab). He further enjoys the power to dissolve the National Assembly; to amend the constitution; to propose laws; to agree treaties; to promulgate legally-binding royal decrees; and to abate or commute sentences by decree.In practice, however, King Hamad’s powers are not so absolute. Rather than ruled by a single individual, Bahrain is better described as a collection of ministerial fiefdoms headed by senior members of the ruling family, these often in competition with one another. The most longstanding of these internal challengers is the king’s uncle, Prince Khalifa bin Salman, who has occupied the position of prime minster since independence in 1971. Over the course of 41 years in power, Prince Khalifa has cultivated both extensive patronage networks within Bahrain as well as strong ties with senior members of the Saudi ruling family, relationships that afford him an independent power base rooted in the private sector and in Bahrain’s structural economic and political dependence upon Saudi Arabia. Prince Khalifa’s business interests therefore place him in direct conflict with the political and especially economic liberalizations initiated by King Hamad and superintended by Crown Prince Salman, which include labor market reforms, anticorruption efforts, and economic diversification aimed at breaking Bahrain’s reliance upon Saudi largesse.In the post-February 2011 period, finally, an additional faction has emerged within the ruling family led by the brothers Khalid and Khalifa bin Ahmad, Ministers of the Royal Court and defense, respectively. (Sheikh Khalifa, or “the Field Marshal” as he is known, is also Commander-in-Chief of the Bahrain Defense Force.) Unlike the business-driven prime minister, the two represent—and promote via patronage of Sunni groups in society[2]—an ideological orientation that sees Bahrain as the target of Iranian- and Western-backed conspiracies to empower Bahraini Shiites at the expense of the ruling family and other Gulf Sunnis. Whereas Prince Khalifa retains the close backing of many prominent merchant families from both denominations, Khalid and Khalifa bin Ahmad espouse a decidedly anti-Shiite agenda, conceiving of the community as a veritable fifth column to be dealt with in the framework of security, rather than through political bargaining. The two brothers, otherwise known as the “khawalid,” are also thought to enjoy the sympathy of other security-oriented members of the ruling family, including most notably the powerful Minister of the Royal Court for Follow-Up Affairs, Ahmad bin Attiyatallah, as well as the longtime (but recently relocated) head of the National Security Agency, Khalifa bin Abdallah.Senior members of the Al Khalifa also dominate other agencies charged with the exercise of state power, including the Ministries of Interior, Justice and Islamic Affairs, and Foreign Affairs. The heads of these ministries, along with that of the National Security Agency and top military commanders, comprise the Supreme Defense Council, Bahrain’s highest decision-making body on matters of defense and national security. Given its composition, almost all of its members are from the ruling family. This monopoly on strategic positions in the cabinet (Council of Ministers) is offset by the deliberate reservation of less sensitive portfolios for non-royal Sunnis and Shiites. As part of an early attempt to appease protesters in late February 2011, for example, King Hamad announced a cabinet reshuffle that saw the replacement of four lesser ministers, two of them from the ruling family. One position was dropped entirely (electricity and water), one Shiite minister switched portfolios (housing), and two new ministers were appointed: one Sunni (cabinet affairs), one Shiite (labor).[3] Yet such cosmetic changes, aimed at pleasing domestic and international audiences, have done nothing to diminish the ruling family’s dominance of the government.Although Bahrain proscribes formal political parties, in practice most of the institutional functions of a party—mobilizing electoral support, devising legislative agendas, organizing parliamentary contestation—are replicated in the country’s many political “societies.” Governed by an August 2005 decree (No. 26) known as the Political Societies Law, societies are barred from forming on the basis of class, profession, or religion; may not receive foreign funding or support; may not utilize public institutions, educational facilities, or places of worship for their activities; and must agree to operate within the framework of Bahrain’s revised constitution of 2002. Societies must also, as per the decree, formally register with the Ministry of Justice and Islamic Affairs, which retains jurisdiction over their establishment, monitoring, and temporary or permanent dissolution.With its requirements for official registration and recognition of the 2002 constitution, the Political Societies Law served purposely to divide Bahrain’s political landscape into “legal” (registered) and “illegal” (unregistered) societies. As most liberal and pro-government Sunni groups had already registered for the 2002 vote boycotted by al-Wefaq, Wa‘ad, and the less influential Islamic Action Society (Amal), the question of compliance fell squarely on the latter holdouts. Eventually, all of Bahrain’s domestic-based opposition groups relented, overcoming fierce internal disagreement to reverse a three-year policy of political disengagement.[4] In the case of al-Wefaq, however, the decision came at the price of splitting the movement—and in effect the Shiite opposition—in two. Led by the group’s former deputy Hasan al-Mushaima, the offshoot al-Haqq was founded explicitly upon the cont