On the one hand, the collapse of Bashar al-Assad government in a few days was so unthinkable that even caught the observers by surprise. It actually was a development that even the most optimistic opponents of al-Assad could not predict.
On the other hand, the homogeneous and heterogeneous composition of the groups involved in recent Syrian developments in addition to the exiled political opposition, the tribal-sectarian structure of Syrian society, the Kurdish cause, the role of foreign actors, and the threats of re-emergence of terrorism all make the transition period shrouded in ambiguity and meanwhile the most likely scenario Syria is drifting to is chaos.
In fact, the post-Assad Syria will face a substantial set of unsettled, vague, potentially critical issues in its dealing with the political transformation given the share-seeking of the factions even before the expected dispute over the nature and type of the future political system arrives.
Meanwhile, one issue more than any other has put Syrians, and even neighbors and the international community, in a state of suspense and concern about the future and it is the extent to which armed groups adhere to their beautiful promises of respecting human rights and maintaining the security of all ethnicities, religions and political orientations during the transition period, and essentially to commit to the fact that the the armed groups' rule over all government institutions is passing. Given various pieces of evidence, this is an issue that we cannot be very optimistic about. In other words, it is highly likely we will see a long and marked-by-crisis transition period and Syrians will very likely find it a pipe dream to form a stable government.
Abdulaziz Sager, the chairman of Jeddah-based Gulf Research Center (GRC), says that each of these rebel groups strives for supremacy and wants to be in charge... Each of them is loyal to a foreign actor and financier and will clash with each other unless the UN and some influential regional countries try to unite them."
A senior Western diplomat in the region, who talked on the condition of anonymity, told Reuters that there was no plan for how to govern Syria, given the dispersion of opposition forces, while Syria is a complex country divided into different sects and ethnic groups, each with its own local power.
Tactic of ideologic shift: Distance between words and action
The salafi and takfiri origin of ideas and throughts of many of the groups present in the ranks of Syrian rebels is the most important factor that draws concerns about entrenchment and domination of radical views in the transition period and subsequent growth of violence and insecurity.
In early 2017, Heyat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) announced its split from Al-Qaeda terror organization and its abandonment of jihadi-salafi ideology, and since then it has actively sought to control the religious sphere in Idlib and change ideological orientations within its ranks. In March 2019, the group established the Supreme Fatwa Council, run by its leader Abu Mohammad al-Jolani’s advisors, to monopolize the fatwa-issuing process and, by limiting the role of salafi scholars in the process, it wanted to prevent the possibility of informal and extremist interpretations of Islamic law.
Also, there are reports that the HTS supressed the ISIS nuclei and Al-Qaeda loyalists like Sami al-Uraidi, Abu Faroq al-Shami, Abu Jalibab al-Ardouni, and others affiliated with an organization dubbed Guardians of Religion and highlighted and promoted less radical figures like Abu Shoayb al-Masri, Abu Yaghdan al-Masri, Abu Alfath al-Farghali, Abu Hareth al-Masri in religious posts, especially in fatwa issuing.
As part of this agenda, in September 2020, Abdulrahim Atwan, as the grand religious authority of HTS, in an interview with French magazine Le Temps called for normalization of the Western countries' relations with the HTS, adding: “ We are currently trying to clean our image and the aim is not to embellish the reality, rather, the aim is to present it as it is." He further maintained that his group wants to be removed from the blacklist and it is in this way that the region will see improvement.
But despite these efforts to present a new face for the former salafi-jihadi rebels, and even working with other groups to form a government of salvation in Idlib in 2017, this reshuffle has not led to a change in the organization’s practices.
In fact, these political statements and messages are meaningless on paper if they are not translated into real actions on the ground.
For example, when former Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri was killed in a US drone strike in Afghanistan in 2022, Abdul Rahim Atwan condoled his death and called him a martyr, showing that his Al-Qaeda views have not changed.
On the other hand, the HTS's performance in determining the nature and type of interaction with the so-called technocratic government of salvation in Idlib is further evidence of the gap between words and actions of the group.
In September 2017, the “Syrian General Conference for Civilian Management in Liberated Areas” was arranged with the participation of prominent figures from Idlib, including academics and representatives of local authorities and councils, to determine the nature of the government running the rebel-controlled areas. At the end, a four-point statement was issued, the first of which stated: “Islamic law is the only source of legislation and the identity of the Muslim people of Syria must be preserved.” This principle will undoubtedly raised to consolidate HTS's position as the leader of the government.
This dominance of the military groups over the elements of the salvation government in Idlib was fully evident from the very beginning, where members of the HTS attended meetings of government institutions and Shura Council meetings, and the HTS Follow-up Office was located in every ministry.
Even the ministry of interior of the salvation government recruited its entire police forces from the HTS forces, and the “Fallah Center for Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Evil ” remained in the hands of this group. Control of this institution demonstrated the complete dominance of this group over Idlib and facilitated penalizing free activity of any ideology opposed to that of the group or its governance approach.
This approach triggered massive protests against the HTS in May this year, with the protestors rejecting the group's policies and calling for removal of al-Jolani, release of prisoners, and improvement of living conditions.
The purge of extremist elements was seen by many experts as part of an internal score-settling and power struggle over the group's leadership, rather than an ideological reshuffle.
On April 5, 2024, one of the HTS's most prominent leaders, Abu Maria al-Qahtani, was assassinated six months after his arrest on charges of collaborating with foreign parties. In December 2023, Abu Ahmed Zakour, another senior HTS figure who had previously led the Al-Nusra Front in Aleppo and was responsible for the organization's public relations, defected from the group and fled to areas under Turkish control.
After his escape, Zakour made several serious accusations against al-Jolani, claiming that the group's leader was involved in the August 2016 bombing in Atma on the Turkish-Syrian border that killed dozens of Free Syrian Army (FSA) members and a number of civilians. Al-Jolani’s announcement of his departure from the ideological foundations will certainly exacerbate the rift within the front and lead to disillusionment, disunity, and even rebellion among many of the organization’s salafi-jihadi militias, and this will not be an easy choice.
Even in these days, signs of caliphatism of HTS have begun to emerge gradually. Al-Jolani entered Damascus like a conqueror, leading his forces. Amid the allegiance chants of his loyalists and supporters, he delivered a speech in Ummayed Mosque reminiscent of ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's style.
Both of the leaders chose minbars of mosques as their first spot from which they delivered their first speeches to announce victory and win allegiance.
Al-Jolani in his speech that reminded of his jihadi
rhetoric announced that what they have gained is a victory not only for
Syria but the whole Islamic ummah and some of his fighters in recent
days called for foundation of an Islamic caliphate.
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