Last Thursday, Afghan sources reported a blast hitting funeral service of Nisar Ahmad Ahmadi, the acting governor of Badakhshan.
Some sources said that Safiullah Samim, one of the senior commanders of the Taliban and former police chief of Baghlan, was also killed in this explosion. Al Jazeera news network quoted an official of the Taliban Ministry of Health as saying that 18 people were killed and 33 others were injured in the car bombing, but the Ministry of Interior put the death toll at 11.
Meanwhile, ISIS has published an infographic on its official electronic publication in Afghanistan (Al-Adheem) of the identity and location of three high-ranking Taliban officials who have been killed in the past 6 months. These people include the Taliban police chief, the governor of Badakhshan and the governor of Balkh. In addition to Maulvi Safiullah Samim as a high-ranking official, Rahimullah Haqqani and Omar Khalid Khorasani, one of the leaders of the Pakistani Taliban, were killed on the eve of the first anniversary of the Taliban government.
More than a year from the takeover of power by the Islamic Emirate in Afghanistan, observers and international organizations believe that activity of terrorist groups has increased in Afghanistan, and in addition to Al-Qaeda and ISIS-Khurasan, other groups like Eastern Turkistsn Islamic Movement (ETIM), Tahreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Khutbeh Imam Bukhari, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Jaysh Muhammad, and Lashkar-e-Taiba have intensified their activities in the Central Asian country and carry out terrorist attacks inside and outside Afghanistan. Meanwhile, ISIS-Khurasan has been posing the biggest threat to Afghan citizens, especially religious and ethnic minorities, and neighboring countries. Taliban’s failure and procrastination in dealing with gbr group, in the meantime, is setting off the alarm bells to the future of Afghanistan.
ISIS running rampant under the shadow of Islamic Emirate: Taliban Incapability or tolerance?
It is hard to estimate the number of ISIS militants in Afghanistan, but according to expert estimations, in 2016, a year after ISIS foundation, ISIS-Khurasan had about 3,000 to 4,000 fighters. Even now, the estimations put the number of ISIS terrorists in this country at 4,000. The main areas of concentration of the group are eastern provinces of Kunar and Nangarhar near the border of Pakistan.
ISIS systemically aims at weakening of the military power and legitimacy of the Islamic Emirate of the Taliban, and calls the Taliban, who combine the Pashtun ethnic demands with Sharia religious practices, "dirty nationalists".
This group uses “hit and run” tactics, like roadside bombing and systemic killings, that have been used until recently by the Taliban against the previous government.
In addition to terrorist operations with high fatalities, in recent months, the ISIS-Khurasan has put on its agenda assassination of senior Taliban officials. On March 9, the terrorist group claimed responsibility for a suicide attack in which Mohammad Dawood Muzammil, the prominent governor of Balkh province in northern Afghanistan, was killed. A day before, the terrorists of the group had carried out an attack on the head of the Taliban water supply department in Herat province in West of the country. On March 15, this group took responsibility for an unsuccessful attack on a Taliban district governor in the eastern province of Nangarhar, and recently, the killing of Nisar Ahmad Ahmadi and Maulvi Safiullah Samim are among the actions of this group.
In the meantime, several ISIS leaders were killed by the Taliban forces, but while ISIS have been practically challenging the power of the Taliban at home and abroad, the Taliban’s blows to the group have failed to stop its activity in the country.
Firstly, ISIS takes advantage of the Taliban infighting and has so far managed to recruit a number of militants from other terrorist groups that even have close ties to the Taliban. Also, there are substantial divisions between Afghanistan and Pakistan Taliban leaders that allow the ISIS to recruit their members.
Secondly, the group’s success in launching noisy attacks in Afghanistan against civilians, and particularly the Shiite minority, has been attracting funds from the central ISIS abroad. These funds considerably help ISIS-Khurasan recruit Afghans while the country is in dire straits economically.
There are also reports that a relatively small but growing number of former members of Afghanistan's intelligence services and elite military units have joined ISIS-Khurasan to resist the Taliban. Also, there are concerns about recruitment of foreign fighters based in Afghanistan from Central Asia and Pakistan.
To paint its ideology against the Taliban rightful, the ISIS justifies assassination of the Taliban leaders as serving to curtail the influence of the foreigners and enemies in Afghanistan. This was clear about an article the terrorist group’s bi-weekly, Al-Naba, published about assassination of Dawood Muzammil. The article accused Muzammil of “acting on the behalf of Iran” in his anti-ISIS campaign.
Certainly, Taliban’s negligence of ISIS or show of reservations in dealing with it make the terrorist group’s actions go beyond assassination of the Taliban leaders and planning to carry out attacks on the Shiites and other civilians, and it also targets regional collaborative infrastructure projects. In recent months, Al-Adheem e-newspaper of ISIS has launched a blacking campaign against China's Belt and Road Initiative. Given the systemic attacks on projects under Chinese development in Pakistan's Baluchestan, ISIS may also threaten connection initiatives like Trans-Afghan railway that is planned to link Uzbekistan to Pakistan through Afghanistan. Undoubtedly, the activities of ISIS in Afghanistan reduce the possibility of developing future infrastructure projects that connect South and Central Asia.
Russian and Iranian officials believe that the US is responsible for creation of the ISIS. Moscow and Tehran stress that the main aim of ISIS was to destabilize borders of Iran and Russia, two US rivals in Asia, and immerse them in a security crisis. It seems that Russia has figured out that the Taliban either does not want to fight seriously or lacks the power to contain the group.
Danger to regional stability
Despite its focus on Afghanistan, ISIS does not limit its attacks on Afghanistan borders, and regional countries are taking effects from its actions. From 2020 to 2022, Uzbek, Uyghur, Tajik, and Indian fighters, as well as fighters from other ethnic groups, launched various attacks on their countries on the borders.
One of the main regions under ISIS threat is Central Asia. In April, the group fired several rockets at Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Due to the border clashes and the economic recession that followed the Soviet collapse, Fergana Valley has been a breeding ground of violent extremism in Central Asia. This valley, which covers parts of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, has been the main target of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and the radical Islamic Liberation Movement.
In addition to violent attacks, ISIS has also published materials in local languages and set up local media outlets to persuade people to join its ranks across South and Central Asia.
Pakistani officials increasingly warn that this group is turning into the top security threat to Islamabad.
ISIS-Khurasan is abusing the sectarian tensions inflamed by anti-Islamist policies of right-wing Indian government to recruit militants. The group publishes and distributes an anti-Hundu book in local language in India to recruit the Muslim minority. It asks the Indian Muslims to join the Islamic State in Hind Province (ISHP).
Pakstan is not immune to these propaganda tactics either. By targeting the Shiite minority, ISIS-Khurasan primarily promotes sectarianism in Pakistan and recruits forces especially from Baluchestan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces. Shiites of Pakistan have been susceptible to sectarian violence since the rule of General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq.
Generally speaking, it can be suggested that Afghanistan
instability has prevailed since 1970s and the country is still the cause
of regional concern and a scene to competition of world powers and
ideological clashes. Though a majority of foreign countries consider
ISIS a bigger threat than others, this may not be enough for the Taliban
to, for ending its regional and international isolation, put the group
on top of its security agenda.
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