Erdogan recently reiterated his will to meet with al-Assad and said: “There is no permanent difference. My meeting with Assad is possible because there is no permanent competition in politics and we are taking our steps in this regard.”
In the meantime, the Russians have also announced that they have prepared all the conditions for hosting the meeting between the two leaders , and according to Abdul Qadir Salvi, a Turkish columnist of the Hurriyet newspaper, now it is only a “matter of time.”But is it really so?
The answer is no as the developments on the surface show. The conditions they set for each other are hard to meet at present. Syria stipulated end of Turkish occupation of its territory and withdrawal of support to the terrorists. On the opposite side, Turkey demanded Damascus commitment to political process, a demand making no sense as the government has an upper hand now. Meanwhile, some people believe that these conditions are meant to make trump cards for possible sitting on the negotiating table.
Why does possible meeting matter more to Erdogan?
The current conditions tell us that Erdogan’s enthusiasm for meeting al-Assad is more, to an extent that it can be called a need for Ankara.
The remarks by Turkish officials for possible meeting are ironical while Ankara is preparing for a new round of incursion into Syria. Accusing the Syrian Kurdish militias of arranging the deadly blast in Istanbul last month, Ankara is preparing for another ground offensive in Syria’s north.
Erdogan seeks to realize his years-long dream of establishing a “safe zone” 30 kilometers deep into the Syrian territory as the West and Russia are at each other’s throats in Ukraine, a plan that is ostensibly meant to return 3.7 million Syrian refugees home, but in reality reveals Erdogan’s expansionist policy.
However, Erdogan’s main problem now is that he sees the government’s current policy on Syrian refugees can cost him his votes in next year elections. Since violent clashes broke out between Turks and the Syrian refugee community last summer, Erdogan has tried to show a shift in his policy towards them.
Recently, Erdogan unveiled a plan to repatriate one million Syrian refugees in stark contrast to his criticism of the opposition in March this year for what he called “the inhumanity of their insistence on sending refugees back home.” Erdogan said in a video message at the opening ceremony of a housing project for Syrians living in Idlib in northern Syria that about 500,000 Syrians have returned to safe areas in their country.
Actually, Erdogan is facing growing opposition against presence of the Syrian refugees on the Turkish soil. In May, a short film targeting the refugees caused controversy in Turkey. The film, titled Silent Invasion and set in 2043, shows a Syrian party wining the Turkish election and its leader declaring Arabic the official language of the country. A scene shows a young man lamenting his job as a cleaner in a hospital run by a Syrian man who does not allow him to speak Turkish. Then he asks his parents, “how could you let this happen? Even though you were warned many times that the Syrians are invading silently?”
In less than two hours, the film was viewed nearly 2 million times and hundreds of thousands liked it. Its director was detained shortly later.
Some politicians also fuel these concerns. For example, they promote the analysis that with 78 percent of Syrians in Turkey not willing to go back home and the fertility rate of Syrian women is 5.3, soon Turkey will have 15 million people of Syrian origin.
This is pushing Erdogan to find a way to send refugees back home. But the obstacles of another operation inside Syria are inevitable and he knows that making an unplanned move can make things worse rather than patch them up. A new operation and making infrastructure for return of refugees cost billions of dollars and economic crisis-stricken Turkey cannot afford it.
In terms of security and military alone, Turkey trains and pays salary to more than 50,000 Syrian rebel fighters. Murat Yesiltaş, an analyst at SETA Foundation, a Turkish think tank with close ties to Erdogan and his government, estimates that the intervention in Syria costs Ankara about $2 billion a year.
On the other hand, the Syrian Kurdish militant groups, excluding PKK forces, are estimated to have an army of 100,000 men and run a civil administration of similar size. These forces have warned that they will coordinate with Damascus to counter any Turkish operation. Th Syrian army and its allies are currently amassed around Manbij and Tal Rifat and are ready for orders by al-Assad to engage with the Turks and the terrorists under their command. Therefore, the play ground is by no means safe for Erdogan and it can accelerate his downfall in case of defeat and heavy casualties. In this situation, the cheapest option is to attract cooperation of Damascus.
What does al-Assad have in mind?
Certainly, Assad feels a smaller need for this meeting. Actually, he does need to accept a meeting that helps his enemy advance his agenda, especially when it comes to Erdogan who is highly untrustworthy.
A majority of the Turkish parties share with Erdogan the concerns about the threats posed by the Syrian Kurdish militias and economic challenges of the Syrian refugees but at the same time are critical of continuation of his support to the terrorists.
All major parties say they would resume ties with Damascus if they win power, a move they say would be a prelude to sending Syrians home. Therefore, al-Assad’s wait until next year’s Turkish presidential election is not unreasonable.
Also, the Turkish threats can bring the Syrian Kurds to their senses and tell them that reliance on the US does not buy them security and their problems would be solved faster through dialogue with central government.
Wresting a big privilege from Turkey is the least factor that can persuade al-Assad to agree to a meeting with Erdogan. This privilege can be Turkey’s help to evacuate terrorists from Idlib— a privilege that is big enough but not impossible for Erdogan who is feeling the danger of collapse.
Meanwhile, an inferior side cannot set conditions. The
symbolic and unrealizable conditions set by the Turkish government are
just to save face and avoid being mocked by the opposition who label
Erdogan a “loser” who is so desperate now that, to save his power, is
resorting to a person about whose departure from power he once proudly
talked and wasted billions of dollars on this failed subversive agenda.
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