When talking about the success of this model throughout its history one
must acknowledge the fact that it is not free of problems, weaknesses,
and failures, and this is the case for every political actor from the
greatest empires to the smallest political groups.
Hezbollah is a small organization fighting “Israel”, which is a regional
entity and project with unlimited international support. Therefore, it
needed material and financial assets, cadres, an incubating environment,
a logistical structure, a dynamic and charismatic leadership, and a
strategic geopolitical depth (national and supranational). How did
Hezbollah achieve this?
The dimensions of this success and its historical circumstances are
intertwined, but it is necessary to sort and disassemble them to get a
clearer picture.
Also, focusing on the elements of success and uniqueness does not
translate into ignoring the obstacles, challenges, and changes. Shedding
light on these elements contributes to enhancing our understanding of
their importance and their role in the party’s march, in a way that
encourages interaction with them in terms of reform, correction, and
care. Hence, their inclusion is not the result of complacency or vanity.
1- The founding generation gains experience: The first
generation of Hezbollah gained experience and expertise within Lebanese
and Palestinian political and military movements, during difficult times
of civil war and confronting the “Israeli” enemy.
They experienced challenges, problems, and failures that reinforced
their desire and need for changes and acquiring the necessary resources,
skills, and networks of influential interpersonal relationships.
A number of cadres belonging to the first generation had plenty of
experience in large parties such as the Amal movement, local Islamic
movements, mosque groups, and a few of them were part of non-Islamic
resistance forces (Fatah movement).
This generation experienced communist and nationalist ideas, argued with them, responded to them, and often competed with them.
This generation suffered the disappointments of the defeat of the
Nasserist project, the kidnapping of Imam Musa al-Sadr, the
assassination of Sayyed Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr in Iraq, the repeated
“Israeli” aggressive operations, and the expulsion of the Palestine
Liberation Organization from Jordan and then Lebanon.
All of these prompted the founders to try and think in a different way.
For example, from a military point of view, their collective experience
contributed to the planning and implementation of the most dangerous
military and security operations during the 1980s, which established a
solid foundation for the party's saga.
2- Taking inspiration from the Islamic Revolution and integrating with it.
The victory of the revolution in Iran transformed the broader Islamic
world. For the Shiites this was a historic opportunity to break out of
the state of oppression.
The Lebanese Shiites were the first to network with the victorious
revolution, especially since some of the cadres had built strong
personal relations with Iranian cadres opposed to the Shah’s regime and
provided them with assistance in Beirut, in addition to religious
relations with Iranian figures due to contacts through the Hawzas in
Najaf and Qom.
Thus, the benefits of the Islamic revolution reached Lebanon quickly.
The most prominent of these was the arrival of the training groups sent
by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps by order of Imam Khomeini to
the Bekaa Valley through Syria following the “Israeli” invasion in 1982.
To carry on and grow, this resistance required organizational frameworks
that gradually took shape until the structure of Hezbollah emerged.
The existence of this regional support for the resistance is
indispensable in light of the imbalance of power. The Iranian regional
political support and Iranian material resources (arms, training, and
money) enabled Hezbollah throughout the decades to focus on the conflict
with the “Israeli” enemy without needing to be constantly preoccupied
with securing support or searching for compromises with regional powers
in pursuit of protection.
The religious/ideological link between the party and the Wali al-Faqih
[guardian Islamic jurist] organized the party’s relationship with Iran
and facilitated an understanding between them. It allowed the latter to
look at the party from several perspectives, namely the Islamic
revolution, which is hostile to the American system of hegemony in the
Islamic field (specifically the resistance in Lebanon and Palestine) and
Iranian national security as well as preserving Shiism.
3- Solidifying the historical resistance framework of the Lebanese Shiites
Hezbollah engraved and reproduced the history of the Lebanese Shiites
from the angle of their role in resisting the Ottomans, the French, and
the Zionists.
Imam Khomeini’s fatwa for the delegation of the nine (they formed the
nucleus of establishing Hezbollah) on the duty to resist the “Israeli”
occupation with the available capabilities, no matter how modest, played
a pivotal role in activating the resistance project as a religious duty
first and foremost.
Thus, Hezbollah became a natural extension, compliment, and boost to the
experiences of the Shiite revolutionaries at the beginning of the
twentieth century and the positions of their great scholars such as
Sayyed Abdul Hussein Sharaf al-Din and Imam Musa al-Sadr. All these are
figures deeply enshrined in the conscience of the Shiite community,
especially Imam al-Sadr (the founder of the Lebanese resistance
regiments "Amal") due to the temporal rapprochement between its
experience and the birth of Hezbollah.
Therefore, loyalty to the resistance project is no longer loyalty to the
party, but to the sect's heroic role in defending the natural unity of
Syria and in the face of the “Israeli” occupation since the beginning of
its aggression against occupied Palestine.
4- Spreading power and confidence within an oppressed sect
The historical grievances and the structural marginalization of the
Lebanese Shiites, especially after the defeat of their revolution in
1920 (and they had been defeated before that in the second half of the
18th century in Mount Lebanon), contributed to their thirst for changing
their reality and the presence of a high revolutionary readiness that
was being nourished by the restoration of the revolutionary practices of
the Imams of Prophet Muhammad’s household (PBUH).
Hezbollah presented the resistance project under the title of
confronting occupation and hegemony to which the sectarian system is
affiliated. This would free the society from marginalization and
oppression - the world in the party’s ideology is divided between the
oppressed and the arrogant.
What helps the party perpetuate this narrative is its already strong presence among ordinary people born after the mid-1940s.
Hezbollah recalls this marginalization, which the society is actually
experiencing firsthand – once directly as Shiites and once as part of
the center’s marginalization of the parties in the north, the Bekaa, and
the south. These areas are inhabited by an Islamic majority, and this
made it easier for the party to communicate with various national groups
under the rubric of confronting deprivation and marginalization.
Accordingly, Hezbollah's success with resistance had multiple
dimensions, serving as a remedy for dissipated pride dating back nearly
two hundred years.
5- Filling the void in the shadow of a failed state
The civil war and the resulting settlement, which the party was not a
part of, led to the emergence of a weak state incapable of carrying out
many of its sovereign duties.
This allowed the party to carry the responsibility of the resistance and conduct social work for relief and development.
This state was not, in several stages, in agreement with the resistance
project. It was even hostile towards it at times, including the era of
Amin Gemayel and later Fouad Siniora’s destitute government.
However, it [Siniora’s government] was too weak to confront the resistance even with the help of external supporters.
This chronic state deficit that resulted in a lack of sovereignty
reinforced the popular legitimacy of the resistance and forced the party
to assume responsibilities that were not at the heart of its project,
especially with the deterioration of the economic situation in the past
two years.
6- Benefiting from the advantages of Lebanese Shiism, which
tested nationalist, leftist, patriotic, and Islamic currents and
produced a large number of intellectual and scholarly figures (Sheikh
Muhammad Jawad Mughniyeh, Sayyed Mohsen al-Amin, Sayyed Muhammad Hussein
Fadlallah, and Sheikh Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din, etc.).
It was historically characterized by a moderate tendency resulting from
the peculiarities of the highly diverse and complex Lebanese reality,
and later due to the many waves of migration towards Africa and the
West.
In recent decades, the Shiite community has also witnessed the
phenomenon of displacement to urban centers (Beirut, the southern Matn
coast, and Tyre) and integration into the contracting and trade sectors,
which had repercussions on their social class and political awareness.
Hezbollah had to work and grow within this type of complex Shiism, and
therefore, its relationship with the general Shiite environment is based
on a mixture of loyalty to it and negotiation at the same time.
This requires the party to be distinguished by social flexibility and
targeted communication for each circle of its incubating environments,
each of which has its own cultural, class, and regional characteristics
for the Shiites themselves.
The party gradually attracted elements and cadres from these circles,
which was reflected in an internal organizational vitality capable of
understanding the complexities of the Shiite scene, dealing with it, and
understanding its various internal sensitivities.
7- Maneuvering within the complexities of the Lebanese system
resulting from deep-rooted sectarianism, its exposure to external
interference, and its highly centralized financial-business economic
model, required Hezbollah to maintain a safe distance. The movement
positioned itself on the system’s external edge and approached it only
to the extent that was needed to protect the resistance from local
players with foreign ties to the United States and its allies.
Therefore, this complexity imposed on Hezbollah to weave broad
horizontal relations in the general political sphere (it had to develop
its political thought and initiatives to build a network of
cross-sectarian national alliances) and restricted vertical relations
within the political system.
However, the deterioration of the political system and its poles,
leading to the danger of the state’s disintegration, put the party in a
historical dilemma; it must work through the system itself to ward off
the danger of the state’s collapse (a concern that has grown in the
party’s awareness after the devastation that befell Syria and Iraq and
the accompanying disintegration of state structures) with apprehension
that engaging in regime change or reform would lead to an externally
backed civil war.
From the beginning, Hezbollah, in particular, had to be aware of the
external interference in Lebanon, its channels, borders, and goals, as
they represented an imminent threat to it.
Just like that, the party's local political choices could have
reinforced tension or appeasement with local and international forces.
It was not possible for the party to estimate the direction of the
policies of foreign powers (such as America, Saudi Arabia, and France)
in internal affairs and how to deal with them regardless of the
international and regional situations.
Therefore, the party has developed complex decision-making mechanisms
from its developing experience in Lebanese politics, which are
mechanisms that it can employ in other areas related to the resistance
and its regional role.
8- The rapid positioning within the Lebanese political arena of
conflict is crowded with competitors. Hezbollah came into existence amid
a heavy presence of political forces, armed and unarmed, most of which
have external relations. It had to expand its influence within all this
fierce competition.
In its
infancy, the party underwent several field tests and intense political
competition with major Lebanese forces rooted locally and forces with a
regional reach.
Then the party became vulnerable to severe political attacks from the
anti-resistance forces, especially after 2004. The burden of this
competition increased after Hezbollah confronted the leadership of a
national alliance with the so-called March 8 forces and the Free
Patriotic Movement.
Hezbollah's opponents receive extensive external support and are
distinguished by their presence in various cultural, media, and
political spheres in the form of parties, elites, platforms, the private
sector, and non-governmental organizations, which are entities closely
integrated with regional and international financial and political
networks hostile to the resistance.
Some of these adversaries play security roles that double their threat.
This reality produces constant pressures on the party, forcing it to
dedicate part of its resources and capabilities to the local political
sphere. It also makes it accumulate skills, frameworks, and criteria for
managing political competition in a way that guarantees it the local
and national stability necessary to avoid open internal conflicts that
distract it from its main mission.
9- Intellectual rivalry in a complex and open public sphere
resulting from the richness of the Lebanese political and intellectual
life, contrary to what is the case in most Arab countries.
The party had to present its Islamic thesis in a highly competitive
intellectual market where leftist, liberal, and nationalist currents
have deep roots and prominent thinkers in the region.
This is what the party quickly realized in its infancy and prompted it
to self-review the Islamic state and the Islamic revolution.
The party is
constantly confronting political and cultural arguments that are highly
critical of its political and cultural project (apart from a fierce
information war) that prompted a number of its elites and institutions
to engage in this “market” and root the party’s proposals on issues such
as Wilayat al-Faqih, the homeland, the Lebanese system, multiple
identities, the legitimacy of the resistance weapon, American hegemony,
and social justice.
As a result, despite the party’s intense preoccupation with the issue of
resistance and its requirements from the tactical cultural discourse,
it finds itself obliged to engage in many discussions and develop its
intellectual, research, and scientific institutions and cadres – a
challenge still facing the party.
10- The ability to transform geography into its environment.
The geographical contact of the Shiite communities in Lebanon with
occupied Palestine in southern Lebanon and the western Bekaa made this
environment targeted by “Israeli” aggression and under constant and
imminent threat.
Thus, the party gained enormous influence and wide embrace within these
communities through the success of its experiment in resistance,
liberation, and deterrence.
This contact and the success of the party produced what is called the
incubating environment, which is the most important element in the
success of the resistance’s experiences.
The party has succeeded in completely assimilating into this
environment, including its fighters, cadres, leadership, voters, and
supporters.
This contact gave rise to a historical Shiite awareness of the
Palestinian issue resulting from the historical personal and commercial
ties between the Shiite and Palestinian communities and then Shiite
engagement with Palestinian organizations and the residents of
Palestinian camps after the 1948 Nakba.
On the other hand, this contact with “Israeli” aggression had a
significant impact on Shiite urbanization and migration, as the occupied
areas witnessed extensive Shiite migration to Africa and North America,
and internally to coastal cities, specifically Tyre and Beirut.
This migration was a decisive element in the social and political rise
of the Shiites, as well as giving Hezbollah popular incubators in vital
areas and providing it with necessary human and material resources.
11- The participatory nature of the relationship with Iran:
The two sides dealt from the beginning on the basis that Iran’s role is
to support the party’s decisions that it takes in accordance with the
data of the Lebanese reality, especially since the Iranian state was
preoccupied with major internal and external challenges.
Therefore, the Wali al-Faqih used to grant legitimacy to the act,
provided that the party takes the necessary decisions. Later, Hezbollah
was able, due to its successes and the role of its Secretary General
Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, to become a partner in the Iranian regional
decision-making process, especially in the files related to the
resistance project.
This partnership is reinforced by the influence of the Revolutionary
Guards within the Iranian national security establishment, and the broad
respect for the party's experience among the Iranian people is a lever
for this partnership.
The Iranians were keen from the beginning to play the role of an
assistant to Hezbollah, which is why the decision was to send trainers
instead of fighters to Lebanon after the “Israeli” invasion.
This independence is reinforced by the theory of Wilayat al-Faqih itself, which recognizes local and national specificities.
With the Wali al-Faqih having the authority to command in all
administrative affairs, but according to wisdom, justice, and the
ability to understand interests and conditions of time, which are among
the obligatory attributes of the Wali al-Faqih, he realizes that every
local and national society has deep peculiarities that its people tell
about.
Therefore, the Wali often leaves the party to determine the interests after he adjusts their terms.
This partnership had a direct reflection on Hezbollah's regional
influence, as the Iranians realize that the party's Arab identity, along
with what it has accumulated in the Arab conscience, makes it, among
other arenas and files, a major player in managing the resistance
project.
12- Mastering the administration in connection with the experience of Iranian institutionalization.
Hezbollah has benefited from its deep ties with Iranian institutions,
whether the Revolutionary Guards, the civil services, or even the hawza
in Qom, to draw inspiration from the experience of building institutions
and organizing administration, which is one of the historical
characteristics of the Iranian experience.
A number of the institutions of the Islamic Revolution either initially
opened branches in Lebanon and then were run by the party, or
transferred their experience to the party, which copied it with a local
flavor and peculiarities.
Iranian experts in management and human resources have transferred
knowledge, skills, and administrative systems to party cadres that
worked to build and develop active and efficient civil institutions in
the fields of education, development, party organization, health,
services, and local administration.
The party's institutions usually benefit from Arab and Lebanese experts
and academics from outside its environment to gain access to qualitative
experiences and new knowledge.
The above-mentioned party institutions in the capital and the outskirts
attracted thousands of young men and women graduates of universities who
chose these majors or who were encouraged by the party to study in them
to benefit from modern sciences in management and human resources.
This institutional momentum contributes to the efficiency of the party's
activities and its ability to meet its needs, to preserve and transfer
experience, to development, to attract energies, and to adapt to
transformations, especially since the “Israeli” enemy has repeatedly
targeted these institutions.
13- Building strategic interests with Syria after years of mutual anxiety.
The relationship between the party and Syria was characterized by
mistrust and suspicion at the beginning, with several field frictions
between the two parties taking place, which reinforced the mutual
distrust.
Damascus aspired to gain the regulating position of the Lebanese reality
with international and regional recognition and to employ this in
Syria's internal stability, regional influence, and balance with the
“Israeli” enemy.
Some Syrian government officials were apprehensive that the party's
agenda, identity, and relationship with Iran could disrupt their
Lebanese project.
But with the war on Iraq, after Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait, the
failure of the Arab-“Israeli” settlement project, the end of the
Iraqi-Iranian war, and Hezbollah’s steadfastness in the face of the
“Israeli” enemy in the 1993 aggression, a new path was launched, the
beginning of which was to prevent President Hafez al-Assad, at the
initiative of the then commander of the Lebanese army, Emile Lahoud,
using the army to clash with the resistance in 1993.
Since then, it can be said that a door for direct communication opened
on the issue of resistance between the party and President al-Assad,
regardless of the complexities of the so-called Syrian-Lebanese security
system.
This relationship was strengthened during the “Israeli” aggression in
1996 when Syria played a key role in the birth of the April
Understanding.
The relations between the two parties were strengthened after the
American invasion of Iraq and Resolution 1559, as Syria realized its
need for the party and its necessity regionally and in Lebanon.
Syria also became a vital strategic depth for the party with the
expansion of the confrontation arena after 2011, which was proven by the
party’s entry into the war in Syria in 2013.
The party succeeded in understanding Syria’s concerns in Lebanon and
kept pace with its vital interests by not clashing with the post-Taif
regime and revealed to it its weight in the conflict with the “Israeli”
enemy. The strategic partnership that developed over time between Syria
and Iran helped in this.
14- The awakening of the marginalized Arab Shiites.
With its rise, the party became the center of the Shiites' eyes, hearts,
and minds in the Arab world. They have experienced decades of exclusion
and abuse, similar to the Zaydis in Yemen.
Thus, they
found in the successes of the Shiite Hezbollah a possible entry point
for Islamic and national recognition. This oppression of the Arab
Shiites served as an amplifier for Hezbollah's achievements and a
motivator for being identified with it and drawing inspiration from it.
Thus, Hezbollah's regional influence is primarily a product of its soft
power, a power characterized by long-term results and acceptable costs.
It is a fully legitimate influence.
The party supports the choice of these Shiites in peaceful struggle,
encourages climates of dialogue with their partners and the governments
of their countries, emphasizes Islamic unity, respects their national
privacy, helps them in the media to raise their voice to demand rights,
and urges them to political, media, and popular participation in support
of the resistance project within the region.
15- Healing the Arab psychological defeat through victory over
the “Israeli” enemy and support for the rising resistance project in
Palestine.
A large part of Arab societies took pride in Hezbollah's resistance,
interacting with it and getting closer to it, as they found it a
response to decades of disappointment and defeats.
Hezbollah has been keen to highlight its Arab identity in its political,
cultural, and media discourse and in its artistic products (anasheed)
and has strengthened its institutions concerned with communicating and
engaging in dialogue with Arab elites, parties, and groups.
This Arab fascination with the party's experience in fighting the
“Israeli” enemy and in its leadership constituted a provocative factor
for the Arab official regimes that emerged from the conflict with the
enemy, as the party's successes practically undermined the discourses of
complacency and the legitimacy of its advocates.
This explains the insistence of a number of regional regimes on creating
sectarian tensions that have had negative repercussions on the party's
relationship with part of its Arab incubators.
But the decline of the sectarian wave as the party continues to lead
Arab resistance efforts against the “Israeli” entity can create
conciliatory atmospheres with Arab incubators on the basis of
understanding and dialogue, organizing differences, and neutralizing
them from the resistance project.
16- Inspiration, representation, and transfer of experience
Hezbollah has limited material, human, and financial resources.
Therefore, its building of partnerships and alliances at the regional
level within the resistance project had to be based on its most
prominent assets, namely its ability to inspire and transfer its
experience and lessons learned to its peers within movements and forces
that practice the act of resistance.
What made this possible was that the party’s victories revived the
spirit of resistance in the Arab and Islamic spheres (for example, the
comparison between Sayyed Nasrallah and President Abdel Nasser abounded)
and thus stimulated the desire of many groups and elites to understand
and benefit from the party’s experience.
The most prominent results of this appeared in occupied Palestine, especially in the second intifada.
Therefore, Hezbollah was interested in transferring its experience in
resistance, administration, media, and organization to a large network
of Arab and Islamic non-governmental political actors involved,
militarily or politically, in confronting the American hegemony system.
The transfer of experience naturally includes the transfer of values,
ideas, patterns of behavior and practical culture, as well as
establishing networks of links and relations with the cadres of these
movements and parties.
Thus, over time, additional groups joined the equations of force and
deterrence for the resistance project. The Zionists started talking
about multiple circles of the resistance axis that extend to Iraq and
Yemen.
By Housam Matar | Al-Akhbar Newspaper
Translated by Al-Ahed News
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