AhlulBayt News Agency (ABNA): National majority government In Iraq is a term that has been used over the past three months by powerful Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr to describe the future government.
With 73 seats, Sadrist Movement has declared itself the winner of the elections and seeks to destroy the traditional of the history of the Iraqi politics in the sense that in all the years since 2003, agreement has been the basis of the political factions' work in major government decisions, but now the movement is trying to completely transform this process and form a national majority government.
Perhaps now al-Sadr more than any other time in the past sees himself a religious leader of Iraq and actually he is closer to his several-year dream of being the top man of Iraq. Reviewing most of his largely surprising and confrontational manners after 2009, al-Sadr officially stepped in the elections and showed that he wholeheartedly eyes being recognized as a nationalist-religious leader.
In recent days, in his statements al-Sadr very meaningfully emphasized on formation of a national majority government and said he would not back down from his stances. Still, the current Iraqi political scene, revolving around al-Sadr centrality, has other special aspects that make it difficult to realize the national majority government.
Understanding al-Sadr behavior on national majority government
In the negotiations with the political groups present in the parliament in order to form a national majority government, al-Sadr follows three main policy levels, the outcome of which can be increasing the possibility of forming a national majority government. At the first level, al-Sadr has coalesced with Mohammed al-Halbousi coalition with 37 seats, the Kurdistan Democratic Party led by Massoud Barzani with 34 seats – including three minority seats – and the Al-Azm coalition led by Khamis Khanjar with 14 seats. They can easily form a government of majority if 30 independents join them.
At the second level, al-Sadr declared that Nouri al-Maliki and his State of the Law coalition are red line when it comes to a new cabinet and he more than once told all of parties in the Shiite Coordination Framework (SCF) he would never join a government in which the ex-PM participates. It seems that al-Sadr has delayed to now the reckoning with al-Maliki for his actions against the Sadr-led Mahdi Army in 2008, and is using that feud as a pretext to disagreement with the SCF.
At the third level, in his recent actions, al-Sadr has shown that he will not follow the principle of an agreement-produced government with the presence of all political groups. But in his eyed government he is ready to hand over some ministries to the groups within SCF. Meanwhile, it is likely that Hadi al-Amiri, the leader of Fatah Coalition, and other prominent figures like Qais al-Khazali, Ahmad al-Assadi,and Falah al-Fayadh strike a deal with al-Sadr and secure representatives in the new cabinet.
Difficulties ahead of al-Sadr
Although there are pieces of evidence that the process of dialogue between al-Sadr and the coordination framework made significant progress for the good of a coalition, other pieces of evidence show that the national majority government would form in coalition with the Progress, Al-Azm, and the KDP. Now if a tripartite coalition scenario is considered, several obstacles emerge with regards to the Iraqi political realities:
1. The principle of the majority-minority government is the dominant in democratic systems, in which the victorious parties form a government and the losing parties appear in the role of opposition. But Iraq today, with growing domestic problems and destructive foreign interference by the US, Israeli regime, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and even Turkey, is in special conditions that require all political parties from various religious roots to help settle the problems. So, the national majority government in which the SCF is excluded from power not only would be deprived of popular and loyal forces who are substantially involved in security of the country, which today is key to solving the problems, but also would have in front of it a powerful opposition bloc that practically creates a rough path to implementation of cabinet policies.
2. In case of exclusion of the SCF from a Sadrist-led government, a large part of administrative decisions would run into disruption in the path of implementation. After all, a large part of the state decisions require the opposition go-ahead for implementation.
3. Al-Sadr-Halbousi-Barzani coalition would not be enduring and stable. The experience of the country post-2003 proves that alliance of parties is not durable and there are always grounds for fracture.
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